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Abstract
Complexity Issues in Justification Logic
by
Roman Kuznets
Adviser: Professor Sergei Artemov
Justification Logic is an emerging field that studies provability, knowl-
edge, and belief via explicit proofs or justifications that are part of the lan-
guage. There exist many justification logics closely related to modal epis-
temic logics of knowledge and belief. Instead of modality  in pure justi-
fication logics, or in addition to modality  in hybrid logics, which has an
existential epistemic reading ‘there exists a proof of F ,’ all justification logics
use constructs t :F , where a justification term t represents a blueprint of a
Hilbert-style proof of F . The first justification logic, LP, introduced by Sergei
Artemov, was shown to be a justification counterpart of modal logic S4 and
serves as a missing link between S4 and Peano arithmetic, thereby solving a
long-standing problem of provability semantics for S4 and Int.
The machinery of explicit justifications can be used to analyze well-known
vepistemic paradoxes, e.g. Gettier’s examples of justified true belief that can
hardly be considered knowledge, and to find new approaches to the concept
of common knowledge. Yet another possible application is the Logical Om-
niscience Problem, which reflects an undesirable property of knowledge as
described by modality when an agent knows all the logical consequences of
his/her knowledge. The language of justification logic opens new ways to
tackle this problem.
This thesis focuses on quantitative analysis of justification logics. We
explore their decidability and complexity of Validity Problem for them. A
closer analysis of the realization phenomenon in general and of one proce-
dure in particular enables us to deduce interesting corollaries about self-
referentiality for several modal logics. A framework for proving decidability
of various justification logics is developed by generalizing the Finite Model
Property. Limitations of the method are demonstrated through an exam-
ple of an undecidable justification logic. We study reflected fragments of
justification logics and provide them with an axiomatization and a decision
procedure whose complexity (the upper bound) turns out to be uniform for
all justification logics, both pure and hybrid. For many justification logics,
we also present lower and upper complexity bounds.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Justification Logic is a relatively new field that studies provability, knowledge,
and belief via explicit proofs or justifications that are part of the language.
There exist many justification logics that closely resemble modal epistemic
logics of knowledge and belief, with one important difference: instead of ϕ
with existential epistemic reading ‘there exists a proof of ϕ’, justification
logics operate with constructs t :F , where a justification term t represents a
blueprint of a Hilbert-style proof of F .
The first justification logic, LP, was introduced in [Art95] (see also [Art98,
Art01, Art04b]). It was shown to be a justification counterpart of modal
logic S4 and serves as a missing link between S4 and Peano arithmetic,
thereby solving a long-standing problem of provability semantics for S4, and
hence for Int. Other justification logics were developed in [AKS99, Bre99,
Bre00, Pac05, Rub06b, Art07]. The 2007 paper by Artemov demonstrates
1
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how the machinery of explicit justifications can be used to analyze a well-
known epistemic paradox such as Gettier’s examples of justified true belief
that can hardly be considered knowledge (see [Get63]).
Explicit justification terms can be combined with the traditional epis-
temic modality providing for a more nuanced structure of knowledge. Such
systems were studied in [AN04, Art04a, AN05a, AN05c, AN05b, Rub06c,
Art06, Rub06d]. The use of explicit justifications also suggests a new ap-
proach to the concept of common knowledge, which was explored in [Ant06a,
Art06, Ant06b, Ant07a, Ant07b].
The language of explicit justification allows to study self-referential prop-
erties of modal logics through their justification counterparts. These results
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 (see also [BK05, Kuz06c, BK06,
Kuz08]).
Yet another possible application of the justification logic language is the
Logical Omniscience Problem. Logical omniscience is an undesirable prop-
erty of knowledge as described by modality (see [Hin62, Hin75, Par87, Par95,
Par05]). The language of justification logic opens new ways to tackle this
problem. Some approaches are described in [Kuz06b, AK06a, AK06b].
Chapter 2 will serve as a collection of definitions and facts about modal
logics and complexity that will be used in the following chapters. It also
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introduces a notation for modal languages used throughout the thesis.
We will focus on quantitative analysis of justification logics, both pure and
combined with various modal logics of knowledge and belief. We will explore
their decidability and complexity of their Validity Problems. A closer analysis
of the realization phenomenon in general and the specific procedure in par-
ticular will enable us to deduce interesting corollaries about self-referentiality
in various modal logics.
In Chapter 3, we will describe the pure and hybrid justification logics
that will be studied in this thesis.
In Chapter 4, we will develop a framework for proving decidability of
various justification logics by generalizing the Finite Model Property. We
will also show limitations of the method by presenting an example of a simple
justification logic that is undecidable.
In Chapter 5, we will present several results on complexity of justification
logics.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we will present results on self-referentiality of sev-
eral modal logics proven via their justification counterparts.
Chapter 2
Short Reference Guide
This chapter is intended mostly as a reference for facts and definitions outside
of justification logic that will be used in our research.
2.1 Modal Logic: Language and Hilbert Sys-
tems
We will consider several modal logics, both mono- and multimodal ones.
Hence, we need to introduce notation for the multiple languages we will use.
Definition 2.1.1. Modal formulas are defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= pi | ⊥ | (ϕ→ ϕ) | (△ϕ) (2.1.1)
where pi, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . are sentence letters, △ ∈ X is one of the modalities
used in a particular modal language.
Most common examples of modal languages include
4
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• monomodal language ML with X = {};
• multimodal language MLn with X = {K1, . . . , Kn}. ◭
Note 2.1.2. We will denote the set of all sentence letters pi by SLet .
Note 2.1.3. We will consider ♦ and ♦i to be abbreviations of ¬¬ and ¬i¬
respectively.
Note 2.1.4. In the epistemic context, modalities K and Ki are typically used
instead of  and i respectively.
Note 2.1.5. Language ML1 can be identified with ML if all occurrences of
K1 are replaced by .
Some common modal axioms and rules used in monomodal logics follow:
Prop. Finitely many schemes of classical propositional logic in the monomodal
language ML along with
Modus Ponens Rule
ϕ→ ψ ϕ
ψ
K. Normality Axiom (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
T. Reflexivity Axiom ϕ→ ϕ
4. Modal Positive Introspection ϕ→ ϕ
5. Modal Negative Introspection ¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ
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D. Seriality Axiom ⊥ → ⊥
Nec. Modal Necessitation Rule
⊢ ϕ
⊢ ϕ
where ϕ and ψ are arbitrary monomodal formulas in language ML.
Some of these axioms and rules are generalized for the n-modal logics in
the following ways:
Prop. Finitely many schemes of classical propositional logic in the multimodal
language MLn along with
Modus Ponens Rule
ϕ→ ψ ϕ
ψ
Ki. Normality Axiom Ki(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kiϕ→ Kiψ)
Ti. Reflexivity Axiom Kiϕ→ ϕ
4i. Modal Positive Introspection Kiϕ→ KiKiϕ
5i. Modal Negative Introspection ¬Kiϕ→ Ki¬Kiϕ
Neci. Modal Necessitation Rule
⊢ ϕ
⊢ Kiϕ
where i = 1, . . . , n, ϕ and ψ are arbitrary multimodal formulas in lan-
guage MLn.
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Table 2.1.1: Axiom systems for several monomodal logics
Logic Prop K T 4 5 D Nec
K
√ √ √
D
√ √ √ √
T
√ √ √ √
K4
√ √ √ √
D4
√ √ √ √ √
S4
√ √ √ √ √
K5
√ √ √ √
K45
√ √ √ √ √
KD45
√ √ √ √ √ √
S5
√ √ √ √ √ √
Table 2.1.2: Axiom systems for several multimodal logics
Logic Prop Ki Ti 4i 5i Neci
Kn
√ √ √
Tn
√ √ √ √
S4n
√ √ √ √ √
S5n
√ √ √ √ √ √
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Tables 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 define several mono- and multimodal logics respec-
tively. Further information about these modal logics can be found in [Fey65,
FHMV95, CZ97, FM98, BdRV01].
2.2 Tableau Systems for Several Modal Log-
ics
This section includes tableau rules for several modal logics. This particular
version of tableaux, sometimes called Single Step Tableaux, uses prefixes to
denote worlds. Each prefix σ = i1i2 . . . ik is a finite non-empty sequence of
integers ij. By σ.n we understand sequence i1i2 . . . ikn.
It is assumed that all propositional tableau rules are present in each modal
tableau system. Propositional rules do not change prefixes. Below are the
modal rules of various monomodal logics:

σ ϕ
σ.n ϕ
σ ¬♦ϕ
σ.n ¬ϕ (2.2.1)
where σ.n has already occurred on the branch;
♦
σ ¬ϕ
σ.n ¬ϕ
σ ♦ϕ
σ.n ϕ
(2.2.2)
where σ.n is a new prefix on the branch.
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Table 2.2.1: Tableau systems for K, D4, T, S4
Logic  ♦ T 4 D
K
√ √
T
√ √ √
D4
√ √ √ √
S4
√ √ √ √
T
σ ϕ
σ ϕ
σ ¬♦ϕ
σ ¬ϕ (2.2.3)
D
σ ϕ
σ ♦ϕ
σ ¬♦ϕ
σ ¬ϕ (2.2.4)
4
σ ϕ
σ.n ϕ
σ ¬♦ϕ
σ.n ¬♦ϕ (2.2.5)
where σ.n has already occurred on the branch.
All these rules are α-rules; ϕ is an arbitrary formula in language ML; σ is
an arbitrary prefix.
We will only use tableaux for D4, T, and S4. The modal rules that should
be used for each of them are listed in Table 2.2.1.
More details and tableaux for other modal logics can be found, for in-
stance, in [Fit72, Mas94, FM98, Mas00, Fit07a].
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2.3 Gentzen Systems for Several Modal Log-
ics
Here are two modal Gentzen rules:
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⇒ ψ
ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn ⇒ ψ (2.3.1)
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ξ ⇒
ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,ξ ⇒ (2.3.2)
where ϕi’s, ψ, and ξ are arbitrary monomodal formulas in language ML.
The Gentzen system for K is obtained by adding (2.3.1) to the propo-
sitional Gentzen system. The Gentzen system for D is obtained by adding
both (2.3.1) and (2.3.2). Both resulting systems are cut-free. Moreover, it is
possible to restrict the use of axioms to ⊥ ⇒ and p⇒ p for sentence letters
p.
For more information about cut-free Gentzen systems for modal logics
see [Wan94, Fit07a].
2.4 Modal Logic: Kripke Frames and Models
Definition 2.4.1. A binary relation R ⊆ W ×W is called
• reflexive if uRu for each u ∈ W ;
• transitive if uRv and vRw yield uRw for any u, v, w ∈ W ;
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• serial if for each u ∈W there is v ∈ W such that uRv;
• symmetric if uRv yields vRu for any u, v ∈ W ;
• Euclidean if uRv and uRw yield vRw for any u, v, w ∈ W . ◭
Lemma 2.4.2. A binary relation R on set W that is both Euclidean and
reflexive must be also symmetric and transitive. Hence, such an R is an
equivalence relation.
Definition 2.4.3. An n-modal Kripke frame forMLn is a (n+1)-tuple
F = (W,R1, . . . , Rn) ,
where W 6= ∅ is a set of possible worlds and accessibility relations Ri are
binary relations on W . ◭
Definition 2.4.4. An n-modal Kripke model forMLn is a (n+2)-tuple
M = (W,R1, . . . , Rn, V ) ,
where (W,R1, . . . , Rn) is a Kripke frame and propositional valuation
V : W × SLet→ {True,False}
is a map that assigns a truth value to every sentence letter at every world of
the model.
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Truth relation M, u  ξ for u ∈W and ξ ∈MLn is defined by induction
on the size of ξ:
M, u  p ⇌ u ∈ V (p) (2.4.1)
M, u 2 ⊥ (2.4.2)
M, u  ϕ→ ψ ⇌ M, u 2 ϕ or M, u  ψ (2.4.3)
M, u  Kiϕ ⇌ M, w  ϕ (∀w)uRiw (2.4.4)
where p is a sentence letter, u,w ∈W , ϕ, ψ ∈MLn, i = 1, . . . , n. ◭
Definition 2.4.5. A monomodal Kripke frame (model) is a 1-modal
Kripke frame (model). We will usually omit the subscript ofR1 in monomodal
frames and models, denoting it simply by R. ◭
Definition 2.4.6. We say that a Kripke model (W,R1, . . . , Rn, V ) is based
on the Kripke frame (W,R1, . . . , Rn). ◭
Definition 2.4.7. A Kripke frame F = (W,R1, . . . , Rn) and all Kripke mod-
els based on it are called finite if W is a finite set. ◭
Definition 2.4.8. Formula ϕ ∈ MLn is called valid in a Kripke model
M = (W,R1, . . . , Rn, V ) if M, w  ϕ for all w ∈W . ◭
Definition 2.4.9. Formula ϕ ∈ MLn is called satisfiable in a Kripke
model M = (W,R1, . . . , Rn, V ) if M, w  ϕ for at least one w ∈W . ◭
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Definition 2.4.10. Formula ϕ ∈ MLn is called valid in an n-modal
Kripke frame F if ϕ is valid in all Kripke models based on frame F. ◭
Definition 2.4.11. Formula ϕ ∈MLn is called satisfiable in an n-modal
Kripke frame F if ϕ is satisfiable in at least one Kripke model based on
frame F. ◭
Definition 2.4.12. Formula ϕ ∈ MLn is called valid with respect to a
class CF of n-modal Kripke frames (with respect to a class CM of
n-modal Kripke models) if ϕ is valid in all frames F ∈ CF (in all models
M ∈ CM). ◭
Definition 2.4.13. Formula ϕ ∈ MLn is called satisfiable with respect
to a class CF of n-modal Kripke frames (with respect to a class CM
of n-modal Kripke models) if ϕ is satisfiable in at least one frame F ∈ CF
(in at least one model M ∈ CM). ◭
Definition 2.4.14. Formula ϕ ∈MLn is called refutable with respect to
a class CF of n-modal Kripke frames (with respect to a class CM of
n-modal Kripke models) if ¬ϕ is satisfiable in at least one frame F ∈ CF
(in at least one model M ∈ CM). ◭
Completeness results for several monomodal logics are listed below:
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Theorem 2.4.15 (Completeness Theorem for monomodal logics).
• K is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of all monomodal Kripke
frames (models).
• D is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of all monomodal Kripke
frames (models) with serial R.
• T is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of all monomodal Kripke
frames (models) with reflexive R.
• K4 is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of all monomodal Kripke
frames (models) with transitive R.
• D4 is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of all monomodal Kripke
frames (models) with transitive and serial R.
• S4 is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of all monomodal Kripke
frames (models) with transitive and reflexive R.
• K5 is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of all monomodal Kripke
frames (models) with Euclidean R.
• K45 is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of all monomodal Kripke
frames (models) with transitive and Euclidean R.
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• KD45 is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of all monomodal Kripke
frames (models) with serial, transitive, and Euclidean R.
• S5 is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of all monomodal Kripke
frames (models) with R that is an equivalence relation.
• Kn is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of all n-modal Kripke frames
(models).
• Tn is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of all n-modal Kripke frames
(models) with reflexive Ri, i = 1, . . . , n.
• S4n is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of all n-modal Kripke frames
(models) with transitive and reflexive Ri, i = 1, . . . , n.
• S5n is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of all n-modal Kripke frames
(models) with Ri that are equivalence relations for i = 1, . . . , n.
Further information on Kripke models and frames for various modal logics
can be found in [Fey65, FHMV95, CZ97, FM98, BdRV01].
2.5 Complexity of Various Logics
Definition 2.5.1. By complexity of a logic L we will mean complex-
ity of the validity problem for L, i.e., complexity of determining, given a
CHAPTER 2. SHORT REFERENCE GUIDE 16
formula F in the language of L, whether L ⊢ F . ◭
Definition 2.5.2. The satisfiability problem for a logic L is the problem
of determining, given a formula F in the language of L, whether L 0 ¬F .
◭
Theorem 2.5.3 ([Coo71]). The satisfiability problem for classical propo-
sitional logic Cl, also known as SAT, is NP-complete. Accordingly, Cl is
co-NP-complete.
Theorem 2.5.4 ([Sta79]). The intuitionistic propositional logic Int is
PSPACE-complete.
Theorem 2.5.5 ([Lad77]).
• T is PSPACE-complete.
• S4 is PSPACE-complete.
• S5 is co-NP-complete.
Theorem 2.5.6 ([HM85, HM92]).
• Tn is PSPACE-complete for n ≥ 1.
• S4n is PSPACE-complete for n ≥ 1.
• S5n is PSPACE-complete for n ≥ 2.
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2.6 Maximal Consistent Set Construction
This section includes definitions and statements used for constructing maxi-
mal consistent sets. Throughout the section, L is assumed to be a consistent
logic, understood as a set of formulas in a (countable) language L, with
classical Boolean logic in the background. In particular, we assume that all
Boolean connectives and constants are expressible in L. All formulas are
assumed to be in language L.
Definition 2.6.1. A set Γ of L-formulas is called L-consistent if
¬(F1 ∧ . . . ∧ Fn) /∈ L
for any finite subset {F1, . . . , Fn} ⊆ Γ.
A set Γ is called maximal L-consistent if it is L-consistent whereas no
superset ∆ ) Γ is. ◭
The following lemma lists several useful properties of maximal consistent
sets:
Lemma 2.6.2. Let Γ be an arbitrary maximal L-consistent set.
1. No L-consistent set contains ⊥.
2. If a set ∆ is L-consistent, so are all subsets of ∆.
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3. For each formula F , set Γ contains exactly one of formulas F and ¬F .
4. Set Γ is closed under modus ponens, i.e., for any formulas F and G,
if F → G ∈ Γ and F ∈ Γ, then G ∈ Γ.
5. Set Γ is closed under conjunctions, i.e., for any formulas F and G, if
F ∈ Γ and G ∈ Γ, then F ∧G ∈ Γ.
6. L ⊆ Γ.
7. If F /∈ L, then the set {¬F} is L-consistent.
8. For each L-consistent set ∆, there exists a maximal L-consistent set ∆′
such that ∆′ ⊇ ∆.
9. If L is supplied with a proof system that allows derivations from hy-
potheses and L enjoys the Deduction Theorem, a set ∆ is L-consistent
iff
F1, . . . , Fn 0L ⊥
for any finite subset {F1, . . . , Fn} ⊆ ∆.
Let us restrict the notion of maximal consistency to formulas from a given
set X. We will need this relativized version for decidability proofs.
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Definition 2.6.3. A set Γ of L-formulas is called maximal L-consistent
relative to a set X if
• Γ ⊆ X,
• Γ is L-consistent,
• Γ ∪ {G} is not L-consistent for any G ∈ X \ Γ. ◭
The following is a relativized version of Lemma 2.6.2:
Lemma 2.6.4. Let X be a set of formulas. Let set Γ be maximal L-consistent
relative to X.
1. For each formula F , set Γ contains at most one of formulas F and ¬F .
Moreover, if {F,¬F} ⊆ X, set Γ contains exactly one of them.
2. If L is supplied with a proof system that allows derivations from hy-
potheses and Γ ⊢L F for some F ∈ X, then F ∈ Γ.
3. Set Γ is closed under modus ponens, i.e., for any formulas F and G,
if F → G ∈ Γ, F ∈ Γ, then ¬G /∈ Γ. Moreover, if G ∈ X, then G ∈ Γ.
4. Set Γ is closed under conjunctions, i.e., for any formulas F and G, if
F ∈ Γ and G ∈ Γ, then ¬(F ∧G) /∈ Γ. Moreover, if F ∧G ∈ X, then
F ∧G ∈ Γ.
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5. L ∩X ⊆ Γ.
6. For each L-consistent set ∆ ⊆ X, there exists a set ∆′ that is maximal
L-consistent relative to X such that X ⊇ ∆′ ⊇ ∆.
Chapter 3
Justification Logics Defined
In this chapter, we will define major justification logics, both pure and hybrid,
describe their semantics, and outline the relationships between pure justifi-
cation and modal logics. At the end of the chapter, we will also provide a
short historical survey of the development of justification logics.
3.1 Justification Logic and Forgetful Projec-
tion
First, we will describe the language of pure justification logic and give a
precise meaning of the term “justification counterpart of a modal logic.”
3.1.1 Language of Pure Justification Logic
We will start by defining the language of Justification Logic. It has two types
of objects: formulas that we will mostly denote by F , G, . . . and justification
21
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terms, denoted t, s, . . ., which are sometimes called evidence terms , proof
terms , or proof polynomials .
Definition 3.1.1. Justification terms are built from justification con-
stants ci, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . and justification variables xi, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . by means
of several operations according to the following grammar:
t ::= ci | xi | (t · t) | (t+ t) | (! t) | (? t) (3.1.1)
The binary operations application · and sum +, the latter also called union or
choice, and the unary operation proof checker ! are present in all justification
logics, whereas the unary operation negative introspection ? may or may not
be allowed depending on the desired modal counterpart.
We will, therefore, distinguish between
• basic language JL of justification logic with +, ·, and ! only and
• language JL(?), obtained by adding the unary operation ? to JL.
We will denote the set of all justification terms in either language by Tm.
◭
Note 3.1.2. As usual, whenever possible, we will omit parentheses according
to the following order of operations: unary operations bind more strongly
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than binary ones, · binds more strongly than +. Thus,
! t · s+ ? r
should be read as
((! t) · s) + (? r) .
Definition 3.1.3. Justification formulas in language JL or JL(?) are
defined by the following grammar
F ::= pi | ⊥ | (F → F ) | (t :F ) (3.1.2)
where pi, i = 0, 1, 2, . . ., are sentence letters and t is a justification term in
language JL or JL(?) respectively.
The new construct t :F is read ‘term t serves as a justification (evidence,
proof) of formula F .’
We will denote the set of all justification formulas in either language
by Fm. ◭
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Definition 3.1.4. The size of justification formulas and terms is defined by
|ci| = 1
|xi| = 1
| ! t| = |t|+ 1
| ? t| = |t|+ 1
|t · s| = |t|+ |s|+ 1
|t+ s| = |t|+ |s|+ 1
|pi| = 1
|⊥| = 1
|F → G| = |F |+ |G|+ 1
|t :F | = |t|+ |F |+ 1
where ci is a justification constant, xi is a justification variable, t and s are
justification terms, pi is a sentence letter, F and G are justification formulas.
◭
Note 3.1.5. The remaining Boolean connectives ∨, ∧, ¬, ↔ and the Boolean
constant ⊤ are defined through → and ⊥ in the standard way.
Note 3.1.6. Again we will omit parentheses using the standard operation
order on Boolean connectives. The new construct ‘:’ binds more strongly
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than any Boolean connective. Thus,
! t : t :F → G
should be read as
(! t : (t :F ))→ G .
Note 3.1.7. We will denote justification formulas by Latin letters F , G, . . .
whereas modal formulas will be denoted by Greek letters ϕ, ψ, . . . . This will
allow to distinguish between the two easily. Of course, such a distinction will
not be possible while considering hybrid languages with both justification
terms and traditional modalities. We will continue to denote such hybrid
formulas by Latin letters.
3.1.2 Justification and Modal Counterparts
Definition 3.1.8. The forgetful projection is a function ◦ : JL(?)→ML
that converts justification formulas into monomodal formulas. It is defined
by induction on the size of the justification formula:
• p◦ = p ,
• ⊥◦ = ⊥ ,
• (F → G)◦ = F ◦ → G◦ ,
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• (t :F )◦ = (F ◦) ,
where p is a sentence letter, F and G are justification formulas, t is a justi-
fication term.
The forgetful projection of a set X of justification formulas is the
set of modal formulas X◦ = {F ◦ | F ∈ X}. ◭
A logic can be identified with the set of its theorems. In this sense,
Definition 3.1.9. A monomodal logic ML is said to be the forgetful pro-
jection of a justification logic JL if JL◦ = ML. In this case, we also say
that JL is a justification counterpart of ML. ◭
Note 3.1.10. One monomodal logic may have several justification counter-
parts. A few examples will follow later.
To prove that a modal logic ML is the forgetful projection of a justification
logic JL, two inclusions must be demonstrated:
1. JL◦ ⊆ ML, i.e., the forgetful projection of every JL-theorem is derivable
in ML.
2. ML ⊆ JL◦, i.e., it is possible to realize each occurrence of  in every
ML-theorem in such a way that the resulting justification formula is a
theorem of JL.
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The first statement is typically more or less trivial and is proven by in-
duction on the JL-derivation. The main difficulty is presented by the second
statement. That is why the two statements combined are usually called
a Realization Theorem (just like soundness and completeness combined are
usually branded Completeness Theorem). Realization Theorems have been
proven for many pairs of modal-justification counterparts using a variety of
methods.
3.2 Axiom Systems for Pure Justification Lo-
gics
3.2.1 Axioms and Rules for Pure Justification Logics
Various justification logics are obtained by combining the following axioms
and rules:
A1. Finitely many schemes of classical propositional logic in language JL
(or JL(?))
Modus Ponens Rule
F → G F
G
A2. Application Axiom s : (F → G)→ (t :F → s · t :G)
A3. Monotonicity Axiom s :F → s+ t :F
t :F → s+ t :F
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A4. Factivity Axiom t :F → F
A5. Positive Introspection t :F → ! t : t :F
A6. Negative Introspection ¬t :F → ? t :¬t :F
A7. Consistency Axiom t :⊥ → ⊥
R4. Axiom Internalization Rule
c :A
R4!. Axiom Internalization Rule
with positive introspection
! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A
where F and G are justification formulas in language JL (or JL(?) respec-
tively), t and s are justification terms in language JL (or JL(?) respectively),
A is an axiom of the logic, c is a justification constant, and n ≥ 0 is an integer.
Note 3.2.1. Depending on the justification logic, all formulas and terms in
these axioms and rules are taken either from language JL or from JL(?).
Naturally, axiom A6 can only be used for logics in language JL(?).
Note 3.2.2. For each justification logic, axiom A in rules R4 and R4! stands
for an arbitrary axiom of this logic, not for an arbitrary axiom from A1–A7.
Note 3.2.3. Rule R4! is admissible in presence of axiom A5 and rule R4.
Thus, rules R4 and R4! should be used interchangeably: R4 in conjunction
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with A5, and R4! in the absence of A5.
Note 3.2.4. Similarly, axiom A7 is an instance of axiom A4; hence only one
of them should be used for each particular logic.
3.2.2 Constant Specifications
Both rules R4 and R4! postulate that each constant justifies all axioms of the
logic. But there are situations when it is desirable to supervise or restrict the
use of constants, e.g., to reserve a particular constant for a particular scheme
of axioms or for a particular axiom instance. Such restrictions were used
in [Mil07] for establishing lower complexity bounds, in [Kuz05] for demon-
strating potential undecidability, and for such applications as Logical Om-
niscience Problem (see [Kuz06b, AK06a, AK06b]) and self-referentiality in
modal logic (see [BK05, Kuz06c, BK06, Kuz08]). For this purpose, rules R4
and R4! can be restricted to a particular constant specification.
Definition 3.2.5. A constant specification for a justification logic JL
is any set of formulas
CS ⊆ {c :A | c is a justification constant, A is an axiom of JL} .
◭
Note 3.2.6. A constant specification for a justification logic JL1 is not always
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a suitable constant specification for another justification logic JL2 because
some axioms of JL1 may not be axioms of JL2.
Proposition 3.2.7. Let CS be a constant specification for a justification
logic JL1. If all axioms of JL1 are also axioms of another justification logic JL2,
then CS can also be used as a constant specification for JL2.
Note 3.2.8. The ability to transfer a constant specification CS to a stronger
justification logic implicitly depends on the system of propositional axioms
chosen in A1. Although any complete propositional axiom system can be
used in A1, which is why it is almost never specified, this axiomatization
should better remain intact if we are to transfer CS from one justification
logic to another. It would not suffice that an axiom of the weaker logic be
derivable in the stronger one as Def. 3.2.5 requires that formula A in c :A be
an axiom of the logic, not just a theorem.
Definition 3.2.9. Let CS be a constant specification for a justification
logic JL. The justification logic JLCS is obtained by replacing rule R4
(or rule R4!) in JL by rule R4CS (or rule R4
!
CS respectively):
R4CS . Axiom Internalization Rule restricted to CS c :A ∈ CS
c :A
R4!CS . Axiom Internalization Rule with positive introspection
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restricted to CS c :A ∈ CS
! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A
where n ≥ 0 is an integer. ◭
Note 3.2.10. By Note 3.2.3, only one of R4 and R4! is present in any jus-
tification logic. Therefore, only one of R4CS and R4
!
CS is present in its CS-
restriction.
Definition 3.2.11. Let JL be any justification logic. The justification
logic JL0 is the logic JL∅ with the empty constant specification CS = ∅, or
equivalently, the logic JL with neither R4 nor R4!. ◭
Definition 3.2.12. Let JL be a justification logic. The total constant
specification for JL is the largest constant specification
T CSJL = {c :A | c is a justification constant, A is an axiom of JL} .
Thus, JLT CSJL = JL. We will omit the subscript JL in T CSJL whenever it is
clear from the context. ◭
Note 3.2.13. Many theorems are formulated for JLCS with an arbitrary CS.
According to Def. 3.2.12, such theorems also apply to JL itself.
It is sometimes convenient to view CS as a function from constants to
sets of axioms justified by them:
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Definition 3.2.14. Let CS be a constant specification for a justification
logic. For each justification constant c,
CS(c) = {A | c :A ∈ CS} . (3.2.1)
◭
For each logic JL, between its smallest constant specification ∅ and its
largest constant specification T CSJL there is a multitude of possibilities.
Some types of constant specifications present special interest and were stud-
ied in more detail. Among them are the following types:
Definition 3.2.15. A constant specification CS for a justification logic JL
is called
• axiomatically appropriate if
∞⋃
i=0
CS(ci)
contains all axioms of JL, i.e., if each axiom is justified by at least one
constant;
• injective if for each constant c the set CS(c) contains at most one
axiom, i.e., if every constant proves at most one axiom;
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• schematic if for each constant c the set CS(c) consists of one or several
(possibly zero) axiom schemes, i.e., every constant proves certain axiom
schemes;
• schematically injective if it is schematic and for each constant c the
set CS(c) consists of at most one axiom scheme, i.e., every constant
proves at most one scheme;
• finite if CS is a finite set;
• almost schematic if CS is a disjoint union of a schematic CS1 and a
finite CS2. ◭
Note 3.2.16. The name might deceptively suggest that a schematically in-
jective constant specification is simply the one that is both schematic and
injective. However, a schematically injective CS must indeed be schematic,
but it is only injective when it is empty.
Note 3.2.17. The total constant specification is schematic and axiomatically
appropriate, but is not schematically injective.
Note 3.2.18. Some notes on terminology:
1. The definitions of “constant specification” in [Art98, Art01, Art04b]
and of “axiom specification” in [Art95] corresponded to what we call
CHAPTER 3. JUSTIFICATION LOGICS DEFINED 34
here a “finite constant specification.” The definition used here was
perhaps first presented in [Mkr97].
2. “Total constant specifications” were called “maximal” in the earlier
papers. The term “total” was probably first used in [Art07] although
its idea goes back to [Mkr97, Kuz00].
3. The term “schematic” was first introduced in [Mil07] although its idea
again goes back to [Mkr97, Kuz00].
4. The term “schematically injective” is due to Robert Milnikel ([Mil07]).
5. The term “axiomatically appropriate” is due to Melvin Fitting ([Fit05]).
6. The term “almost schematic” is new.
3.2.3 Common Pure Justification Logics
We will now define several pure justification logics by listing which axioms
and rules from Section 3.2.1 should be used for each of them.
Definition 3.2.19. Justification logics J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, and LP in lan-
guage JL and justification logics J5, J45, JD45, and JT45 in language JL(?)
are defined by the axioms and rules specified in Table 3.2.1. ◭
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Table 3.2.1: Axiom systems for common justification logics
Logic A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 R4 R4!
J
√ √ √ √
JD
√ √ √ √ √
JT
√ √ √ √ √
J4
√ √ √ √ √
JD4
√ √ √ √ √ √
LP
√ √ √ √ √ √
J5
√ √ √ √ √
J45
√ √ √ √ √ √
JD45
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
JT45
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
It is apparent from Table 3.2.1 that J is the minimal justification logic.
Hence, all the names, except for LP, start with prefix J. The name LP,
chronologically the first justification logic, was kept to avoid confusion as
it has been used in virtually all the papers on the subject. The logic LP,
the original Logic of Proofs, could also be named JT4 in the new uniform
notation.
To understand the naming conventions for these justification logics, it
would help to compare Table 3.2.1 with Table 2.1.1. The similarity of the
names of modal logics in Table 2.1.1 and the names of justification logics in
Table 3.2.1 should be immediate. In the next section, we will explain that
this is not a mere coincidence. For now, it suffices to note that the name
of a justification logic with axiom A4, A5, A6, and/or A7 typically contains
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Table 3.2.2: Forgetful projections of justification axioms are modal theorems.
Forgetful projections of justification rules are admissible
Justification Axioms Their forgetful projections
A1 propositional axioms propositional axioms
MP F, F → G ⊢ G F ◦, F ◦ → G◦ ⊢ G◦ MP
A2 s : (F → G)→ (t :F → s · t :G) (F ◦ → G◦)→ (F ◦ → G◦) K
A3 s :F → s+ t :F F ◦ → F ◦ taut
A3 t :F → s+ t :F F ◦ → F ◦ taut
A4 t :F → F F ◦ → F ◦ T
A5 t :F → ! t : t :F F ◦ → F ◦ 4
A6 ¬t :F → ? t :¬t :F ¬F ◦ → ¬F ◦ 5
A7 t :⊥ → ⊥ ⊥ → ⊥ D
R4 c :A A◦
R4! ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n
c : . . . :c :A  . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1
A◦
the symbol denoting the modal axiom that is the forgetful projection of
this justification axiom (see Table 3.2.2), e.g., all logics with axiom A7 have
letter ‘D’ in their name.
3.2.4 Realization Theorems
Theorem 3.2.20 (Realization Theorem, [Art95, Bre99, Rub06b, Art07]).
The following correspondences hold:
1. J◦ = K
2. JD◦ = D
3. JT◦ = T
4. J4◦ = K4
5. JD4◦ = D4
6. LP◦ = S4
7. J45◦ = K45
8. JT45◦= S5
In addition, most probably, J5◦ = K5 and JD45◦ = KD45.
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Theorem 3.2.21. Justification logics JCS , JDCS , JTCS , J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS ,
J5CS , J45CS , JD45CS , and JT45CS are consistent for any CS.
Proof. Let JLCS be one of these justification logics. First of all, it is sufficient
to prove that JL is consistent since JLCS ⊆ JL for any constant specifica-
tion CS suitable for JL. If JL ⊢ ⊥, then by the Realization Theorem 3.2.20
for JL, we would have JL◦ ⊢ ⊥◦ = ⊥, which would contradict the well-
established consistency of the modal logics in the right side of the equations
in Theorem 3.2.20.
This argument can potentially leave the question open for logics J5CS
and JD45CS . However, it is sufficient to note that the forgetful projections
of all justification axioms are derivable and the forgetful projections of all
instances of justification rules are admissible in S5 (see Table 3.2.2), which
is well known to be consistent.
3.2.5 Internalization and Other Properties
A crucial role in the proof of the Realization Theorems is played by the
following fundamental property of justification logics:
Lemma 3.2.22 (Internalization Property, [Art01, Art07]). For any jus-
tification logic
JLCS ∈ {JCS , JDCS , JTCS , J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS , J5CS , J45CS , JD45CS , JT45CS} ,
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where CS is an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for JL, if
F1, . . . , Fn, ⊢JLCS B ,
then there exists a term t(x1, . . . , xn) for some fresh justification variables xi,
i = 1, . . . , n, such that
x1 :F1, . . . , xn :Fn ⊢JLCS t(x1, . . . , xn) :B .
Note 3.2.23. The requirement for CS to be axiomatically appropriate cannot
be dropped. Since axioms are derivable, Internalization demands that for
each axiom, there be a justification term, which can only be a justification
constant. The requirement that CS be axiomatically appropriate guarantees
the existence of at least one such constant for each axiom.
Proof of Lemma 3.2.22. For the logics listed in the Lifting Lemma 3.2.25
below, the Internalization Property is an instance of the Lifting Lemma; the
proof can be found there.
Thus, we only need to supply a proof for the remaining justification log-
ics: J, JD, JT, and J5. The procedure below shows, by induction on the
given derivation, how to prefix every formula in this derivation with an extra
justification term:
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A  c :A by R4!CS where A is an axiom.
Such c exists because CS is
axiomatically appropriate
Fi  xi :Fi hypotheses
D → G D
G
 
s1 : (D → G) s2 :D
(s1 · s2) :G by A2 and modus ponens twice
! . . . !︸︷︷︸
k
c : . . . :c :A  ! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
k+1
c : . . . :c :A where c :A ∈ CS by R4!CS
k ≥ 0 is an integer
If n = 0, the resulting statement is called constructive necessitation, which
essentially is a justification counterpart of the modal Necessitation Rule:
Corollary 3.2.24 (Constructive Necessitation). For any justification
logic
JLCS ∈ {JCS , JDCS , JTCS , J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS , J5CS , J45CS , JD45CS , JT45CS} ,
where CS is an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for JL, if
JLCS ⊢ B ,
then there exists a ground term t such that
JLCS ⊢ t :B .
For logics with positive introspection, an even stronger result can be
formulated:
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Lemma 3.2.25 (Lifting Lemma, [Art01, Art07]). For any justification
logic with positive introspection
JLCS ∈ {J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS , J45CS , JD45CS , JT45CS} ,
where CS is an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for JL, if
F1, . . . , Fn, q1 :G1, . . . , qk :Gk ⊢JLCS B
for some justification terms q1, . . . , qk, then there exists a term
t(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yk)
for some fresh variables xi, i = 1, . . . , n, and yj, j = 1, . . . , k such that
x1 :F1, . . . , xn :Fn, q1 :G1, . . . , qk :Gk ⊢JLCS t(x1, . . . , xn, q1, . . . , qk) :B .
Note 3.2.26. Lifting Lemma is often formulated with qj restricted to jus-
tification variables. A more general version formulated here comes at no
additional price. It will be used for proving seriality in finitary canonical
models in Lemma 4.4.21.
Proof of Lemma 3.2.25. The procedure below shows, by induction on the
given derivation, how to prefix every formula in this derivation by an extra
justification term.
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A  c :A by R4CS where A is an axiom.
Such c exists because CS is
axiomatically appropriate
Fi  xi :Fi hypotheses
qj :Gj  ! qj :qj :Gj by A5 and modus ponens
from hypotheses qj :Gj
D → G D
G
 
s1 : (D → G) s2 :D
(s1 · s2) :G by A2 and modus ponens twice
c :A  ! c :c :A where c :A ∈ CS
by A5, R4CS , and
modus ponens
Justification logics also enjoy the Deduction Theorem:
Lemma 3.2.27 (Deduction Theorem, [Art01, Art07]). For any justifica-
tion logic
JLCS ∈ {JCS , JDCS , JTCS , J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS , J5CS , J45CS , JD45CS , JT45CS} ,
where CS is a constant specification for JL, if
Γ, F ⊢JLCS G ,
then
Γ ⊢JLCS F → G .
The following Substitution Property requires certain flexibility from the
constant specification. In fact, there are two slightly different formulations.
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Lemma 3.2.28 (Substitution Property, [Art01, Art07]). For any justi-
fication logic
JLCS ∈ {JCS , JDCS , JTCS , J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS , J5CS , J45CS , JD45CS , JT45CS} ,
where CS is a schematic constant specification for JL, if
Γ ⊢JLCS F ,
then
Γ[s\x,G\p] ⊢JLCS F [s\x,G\p] ,
where [s\x,G\p] means substituting justification term s for justification vari-
able x and/or formula G for sentence letter p.
Note 3.2.29. The requirement for CS to be schematic cannot be dropped
completely. Consider c :A(p) ∈ CS. It is derivable in JLCS . The Substitution
Property states, in particular, that no matter what formula G we substitute
for p in c :A(p), the result c :A(G) should still be derivable in JLCS . Therefore,
constant c must justify all substitution instances of A, i.e., CS has to be
schematic.
Still the substitution that we will often use does not need the exact for-
mula F [s\x,G\p] derivable after the substitution. Instead, for F = t :H we
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will sometimes simply need a t′ to exist such that t′ :H[s\x,G\p] is deriv-
able; it will not matter whether this t′ is an exact substitution instance of t
or not. In this case, an axiomatically appropriate CS can be used instead of
a schematic one:
Lemma 3.2.30 (Substitution Property with renaming of constants,
[Fit05]). For any justification logic
JLCS ∈ {JCS , JDCS , JTCS , J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS , J5CS , J45CS , JD45CS , JT45CS} ,
where CS is an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for JL, if
Γ ⊢JLCS F ,
then
Γ[s\x,G\p] ⊢JLCS F [s\x,G\p] ,
where [s\x,G\p] means substituting justification term s for justification vari-
able x and/or formula G for sentence letter p, and formula F is obtained from
formula F by (possibly) replacing some justification constants with other con-
stants.
Note 3.2.31. Here, once again, the requirement for CS to be axiomatically
appropriate cannot be dropped. Consider c : A(p) ∈ CS. It is derivable
in JLCS . When p is replaced by a formula G, the resulting c :A(G) may not
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be in CS, so in this case we need another constant c′ such that c′ :A(G) ∈ CS.
Axiomatic appropriateness of CS guarantees this because A(G) is still an
axiom. So we simply replace c with c′ as needed.
3.2.6 Historical Survey
In the earlier papers, pure justification logics have also been called “opera-
tional modal logics,” “explicit modal logics,” “explicit counterparts of modal
logics,” “logics of knowledge with justifications.”
The first justification logic, Logic of Proofs LP, was introduced by Sergei
Artemov in [Art95] (see also [Art98, Art01, Art04b]), where its forgetful
projection was shown to be S4.
Artemov et al. in [AKS99] introduced justification logic LPS5 and showed
it to be a justification counterpart of S5. This logic was slightly different
from JT45 later adopted for this role in [Pac05, Rub06b, Art07]. Instead of
axiom A6, logic LPS5 had axiom scheme
t : (F → ¬s :G)→ (F → ? t :¬s :G) ,
which is, in some sense, a guarded variant of A6. This enabled us to develop
an arithmetic semantics for LPS5 by avoiding a situation when one term
proves infinitely many formulas.
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Justification counterparts J, JD, JT, J4, and JD41 for modal logics K, D,
T, K4, and D4 respectively were developed and the Realization Theorem for
them was proven by Vladimir Brezhnev in [Bre00].
Eric Pacuit in [Pac05] suggested axiom systems J5, JD45, and JT45,2 the
latter independently formulated by Natalia Rubtsova in [Rub06a]. Rubtsova
in [Rub06b] proved the Realization Theorem for JT45, i.e., that JT45 is a
justification counterpart of S5.
The logic J45 was first formulated by Artemov in [Art07]. The proof of
the Realization Theorem for it is very similar to the case of JT45 and was
omitted there. Most probably, the same method can be easily applied to
prove that J5◦ = K5 and JD45◦ = KD45.
Strictly speaking, formulations of justification logics without axiom A5
in [Pac05, Art07], e.g., Pacuit’s J5, are slightly different from those given
in Table 3.2.1. Terms ! . . . ! c in rule R4! are replaced there by justification
constants. This minor change seems to have a profound effect on decidability
and complexity results, which is the reason we went back to Brezhnev’s
original formulation.
It should be mentioned that apart from the realization techniques devel-
1Under the names LP(K), LP(D), LP(T), LP(K4), and LP(D4) respectively.
2Under the names LP(K5), LP(KD45), and LP(S5) respectively.
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oped by Artemov, there is a different technique for proving realization due
to Melvin Fitting (see [Fit03a, Fit05, Fit06b, Fit07c, Fit07b]), but we will
not use it in this thesis.
All the logics discussed in this thesis use the multi-conclusion framework
when one justification term is allowed to (and justification constants often
have to) justify many, sometimes infinitely many formulas. Single-conclusion
justification terms have been studied in [Kru97, Kru01, Kru06d, Kru06c],
but they remain outside the scope of our research.
Similarly, outside the scope of this research are various justification logics
with quantifiers (see [Yav01b, Fit04a, Fit06a]).
3.3 Semantics for Pure Justification Logics
3.3.1 Symbolic M-Models
Definition 3.3.1. An M-model for a justification logic
JLCS ∈ {JCS , JDCS , JTCS , J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS}
in language JL, where CS is a constant specification for JL, is a pair
M = (V,A) ,
where propositional valuation
V : SLet→ {True,False} (3.3.1)
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assigns a truth value to each sentence letter and
A : Tm× Fm→ {True,False} (3.3.2)
is an admissible evidence function. Informally, A(t, F ) specifies whether
term t is considered admissible evidence for formula F . We will use A(t, F )
as an abbreviation of A(t, F ) = True and also ¬A(t, F ) as an abbreviation
of A(t, F ) = False.
The admissible evidence functionAmust satisfy several closure conditions
that depend on the axioms and rules of JLCS :
• Application Closure: if A(s, F → G) and A(t, F ), then A(s · t, G);
• Sum Closure: if A(s, F ), then A(s+ t, F );
if A(t, F ), then A(s+ t, F );
• CS Closure: if c :A ∈ CS, then A(c, A) and
A(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
, ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : . . . : ! c :c :A) for n ≥ 1;
• Positive introspection Closure (only if A5 is an axiom of JL):
if A(t, F ), then A(! t, t :F );
• Consistent Evidence condition (only if A7 is an axiom of JL):
A(t,⊥) = False
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for any formulas F and G, any terms t and s, any c : A ∈ CS, and any
integer n ≥ 1.
The truth relation M  H is defined as follows:
M  p ⇌ V (p) = True (3.3.3)
M 2 ⊥ (3.3.4)
M  F → G ⇌ M 2 F or M  G (3.3.5)
M  t :F ⇌ M  F and A(t, F ) (if A4 is an axiom of JL) (3.3.6)
M  t :F ⇌ A(t, F ) (if A4 is not an axiom of JL) (3.3.7)
for any formulas F and G, any term t, and any sentence letter p. ◭
Note 3.3.2. So far no M-models have been developed for logics with Nega-
tive Introspection axiom A6, hence the absence of a negative introspection
Closure similar to the Positive Introspection Closure from the list of closure
conditions above.
The following trivial proposition simplifies verification of the CS Closure
condition for the justification logics with positive introspection (axiom A5):
Proposition 3.3.3. Let A : Tm×Fm→ {True,False} satisfy both the Pos-
itive Introspection Closure condition and the following
• Simplified CS Closure: if c :A ∈ CS, then A(c, A).
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Table 3.3.1: M-models
Logic Appl. Sum CS Simp. CS Pos. Intr. Cons. Ev. Def. Def.
Clos. Clos. Clos. Closure Closure Cond. (3.3.6) (3.3.7)
JCS
√ √ √ √
JDCS
√ √ √ √ √
JTCS
√ √ √ √
J4CS
√ √ √ √ √
JD4CS
√ √ √ √ √ √
LPCS
√ √ √ √ √
Then, A also satisfies the full CS Closure condition.
Table 3.3.1 (cf. Table 3.2.1) summarizes which closure conditions and
which definition of truth for formulas t :F should be used for various justi-
fication logics. In this table, using Prop. 3.3.3, the CS Closure condition is
replaced by its simplified version whenever possible.
Theorem 3.3.4 (Completeness Theorem for M-models, [Mkr97, Kuz00]).
Each justification logic
JLCS ∈ {JCS , JDCS , JTCS , J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS} ,
where CS is a constant specification for JL, is sound and complete w.r.t. its
M-models.
Proof. We will first prove soundness by induction on the derivation in JLCS .
Consider an arbitrary M-model M = (V,A) for JLCS :
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A1. All propositional axioms are valid and themodus ponens rule is admissi-
ble in M since the propositional cases (3.3.4)–(3.3.5) for  in Def. 3.3.1
are classical.
A2. Application Axiom s : (F → G)→ (t :F → s · t :G)
Let M  s : (F → G) and M  t :F . To show validity of A2, we need
to show that M  s · t :G.
Independent of whether (3.3.6) or (3.3.7) is used, both A(s, F → G)
andA(t, F ) hold. Hence, by the Application Closure condition, we have
A(s · t, G). In the case of (3.3.7), this alone is sufficient to conclude
that M  s · t :G.
In the case of (3.3.6), we also know that M  F → G and M  F .
Hence, by (3.3.5), M  G. Combined with A(s · t, G), this yields M 
s · t :G.
A3. Monotonicity Axiom s :F → s+ t :F
t :F → s+ t :F
W.l.o.g. we will show validity of the first formula. Let M  s :F . To
show validity of A3, we need to show that M  s+ t :F .
Firstly, A(s, F ) holds. Hence, by the Sum Closure condition, A(s+t, F )
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holds. In the case of (3.3.7), this is sufficient to conclude that M 
s+ t :F .
In the case of (3.3.6), we additionally know that M  F . Combined
with A(s+ t, F ), this yields M  s+ t :F .
A4. Factivity Axiom t :F → F
Let M  t :F . To show validity of A4, we need to show that M  F .
In both factive logics JTCS and LPCS , (3.3.6) is used. Therefore, M 
t :F implies M  F .
A5. Positive Introspection t :F → ! t : t :F
Let M  t :F . To show validity of A5, we will show that M  ! t : t :F .
Firstly, A(t, F ) holds. M-models for the logics J4CS , JD4CS , and LPCS
with positive introspection must satisfy the Positive Introspection Clo-
sure condition. Hence, A(! t, t :F ) holds. In the case of (3.3.7), this is
sufficient to conclude that M  ! t : t :F .
In the case of (3.3.6), we combine A(! t, t :F ) with the assumption that
M  t :F . Together, they yield M  ! t : t :F .
A7. Consistency Axiom t :⊥ → ⊥
To show validity of A7, we need to show that M 1 t :⊥ for any term t.
CHAPTER 3. JUSTIFICATION LOGICS DEFINED 52
M-models for both logics JDCS and JD4CS with Consistency Axiom
must satisfy the Consistent Evidence Condition (∀t)¬A(t,⊥). Accord-
ing to (3.3.7) used in either case, M 1 t :⊥.
R4CS . Axiom Internalization Rule restricted to CS c :A ∈ CS
c :A
To show the admissibility of R4CS , we need to show that M  c :A for
each c :A ∈ CS.
By the CS Closure condition, A(c, A) must hold, which is sufficient to
conclude M  c :A in the case of (3.3.7).
We have already shown that M  A for any axiom A of logic JL.
Combined with A(c, A), this yields M  c :A in the case of (3.3.6).
R4!CS . Axiom Internalization Rule with positive introspection
restricted to CS c :A ∈ CS
! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A
To show the admissibility of R4!CS , we need to show that
M  ! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A (3.3.8)
for each c :A ∈ CS and each integer n ≥ 0.
By the CS Closure condition, A(c, A) for n = 0 and
A(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A) (3.3.9)
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for n ≥ 1 hold.
In the case of (3.3.7), this alone is sufficient to conclude (3.3.8) for any
n ≥ 0.
In the case of (3.3.6), we will use induction on n.
Base. n = 0. This case coincides with rule R4CS and has already been
proven.
Step. Assume for n = k that
M  ! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A . (3.3.10)
Then
M  ! ! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
k+1
c : ! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A
follows from (3.3.9) for n = k + 1 and the IH (3.3.10).
This completes the proof of soundness.
The completeness is shown by the standard maximal consistency argu-
ment.
Lemma 3.3.5. Let a justification logic
JLCS ∈ {JCS , JDCS , JTCS , J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS} ,
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where CS is a constant specification for JL. For each maximal JLCS-consistent
set Γ, there exists an M-model MΓ such that
MΓ  F ⇐⇒ F ∈ Γ .
Proof. This model MΓ = (VΓ,AΓ), sometimes called the canonical M-model
for Γ, is defined as follows:
VΓ(p) = True ⇌ p ∈ Γ (3.3.11)
AΓ(t, F ) = True ⇌ t :F ∈ Γ (3.3.12)
for any sentence letter p, any term t, and any formula F .
To show that AΓ is indeed an admissible for JLCS evidence function we
need to verify the closure conditions for each logic:
• Application Closure: if AΓ(s, F → G) and AΓ(t, F ), then AΓ(s · t, G).
By (3.3.12), AΓ(s, F → G) and AΓ(t, F ) mean that
{s : (F → G), t :F} ⊂ Γ .
Axiom A2 states that JLCS ⊢ s : (F → G) → (t :F → s · t :G), so by
Lemma 2.6.2.6,
s : (F → G)→ (t :F → s · t :G) ∈ Γ .
Closing by modus ponens twice by Lemma 2.6.2.4, we get s · t :G ∈ Γ
and, by (3.3.12), AΓ(s · t, G).
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• Sum Closure: if AΓ(s, F ), then AΓ(s+ t, F );
if AΓ(t, F ), then AΓ(s+ t, F ).
Again w.l.o.g. we will only prove the first statement. By (3.3.12),
AΓ(s, F ) means that s : F ∈ Γ. According to axiom A3, we have
JLCS ⊢ s :F → s+ t :F ; thus, by Lemma 2.6.2.6,
s :F → s+ t :F ∈ Γ .
Closing by modus ponens by Lemma 2.6.2.4, we get s + t :F ∈ Γ and,
by (3.3.12), AΓ(s+ t, F ).
• CS Closure: if c :A ∈ CS, then AΓ(c, A) and for each integer n ≥ 1
AΓ(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : . . . : ! c :c :A) .
For each c :A ∈ CS and each n ≥ 0,
JLCS ⊢ ! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c : . . . : ! c :c :A
– by rule R4!CS , for logics JCS , JDCS , and JTCS or
– by rule R4CS , axiom A5, and modus ponens, for logics J4CS , JD4CS ,
and LPCS .
By Lemma 2.6.2.6,
! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c : . . . : ! c :c :A ∈ Γ ,
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so by (3.3.12), AΓ(c, A) and, for any n ≥ 1,
AΓ(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : . . . : ! c :c :A) .
• Positive Introspection Closure (for J4CS , JD4CS , and LPCS):
if AΓ(t, F ), then AΓ(! t, t :F ).
By (3.3.12), AΓ(t, F ) means that t :F ∈ Γ. All the three logics listed
above have axiom A5, so JLCS ⊢ t :F → ! t : t :F . By Lemma 2.6.2.6,
t :F → ! t : t :F ∈ Γ .
Closing by modus ponens by Lemma 2.6.2.4, we get ! t : t :F ∈ Γ and,
by (3.3.12), AΓ(! t, t :F ).
• Consistent Evidence condition (for JDCS and JD4CS):
AΓ(t,⊥) = False for all terms t.
Both logics listed above have axiom A7, so JLCS ⊢ ¬t :⊥ for each term t.
By Lemma 2.6.2.6, ¬t :⊥ ∈ Γ. By Lemma 2.6.2.3, t :⊥ /∈ Γ. Therefore,
by (3.3.12), AΓ(t,⊥) = False.
Thus, AΓ is indeed an admissible evidence function.
We will now show that
MΓ  F ⇐⇒ F ∈ Γ
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by induction on complexity of formula F :
F = p. For a sentence letter p, the statement follows directly from (3.3.11)
and (3.3.3):
MΓ  p ⇐⇒ VΓ(p) = True ⇐⇒ p ∈ Γ .
Boolean cases are trivial.
F = t :G. Let t :G ∈ Γ. Then, by (3.3.12), AΓ(t, G), which alone is sufficient to
conclude that MΓ  t :G in the case of (3.3.7).
In the case of (3.3.6), we need to show additionally that M  G.
Both logics JTCS and LPCS , where (3.3.6) is used, have axiom A4, so
for them JLCS ⊢ t : G → G. By Lemma 2.6.2.6, t : G → G ∈ Γ.
By Lemma 2.6.2.4, G ∈ Γ. Thus, by IH, MΓ  G.
Let t :G /∈ Γ. Then, by (3.3.12), AΓ(t, G) = False, so MΓ 1 t :G.
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.3.5.
Showing completeness is now easy. We need to provide a countermodel
for each F such that JLCS 6⊢ F . By Theorem 3.2.21, JLCS is consistent. By
Lemma 2.6.2.7, the set {¬F} is JLCS-consistent. By Lemma 2.6.2.8, it can be
extended to a maximal JLCS-consistent set Γ. By Lemma 3.3.5, there exists
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an M-model MΓ canonical for Γ. Since ¬F ∈ Γ, by Lemma 3.3.5, MΓ  ¬F .
Therefore, MΓ 1 F .
This completes the proof of Completeness Theorem 3.3.4.
3.3.2 Epistemic F-models
F-models are a hybrid of M-models with Kripke models. They are closer to
modal epistemic semantics and thus can be adapted to hybrid logics with
both modal and justification knowledge assertions.
Definition 3.3.6. An F-model for a justification logic
JLCS ∈ {JCS , JDCS , JTCS , J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS}
in language JL, or for
JLCS ∈ {J5CS , J45CS , JD45CS , JT45CS}
in language JL(?), where CS is a constant specification for JL, is a quadruple
M = (W,R, V,A) ,
where W 6= ∅ is a set of worlds, R ⊆ W ×W is a binary accessibility relation
on W , the propositional valuation
V : SLet→ 2W (3.3.13)
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assigns to each sentence letter p a set of worlds V (p) where p is true, and
A : Tm× Fm→ 2W (3.3.14)
is an admissible evidence function. Informally, A(t, F ) ⊆ W is a set of worlds
where term t is considered admissible evidence for formula F .
The accessibility relation R must be
• reflexive if A4 is an axiom of JL;
• transitive if A5 is an axiom of JL;
• serial if A7 is an axiom of JL.
The admissible evidence function A must satisfy the following closure
conditions:
• Application Closure: A(s, F → G) ∩ A(t, F ) ⊆ A(s · t, G);
• Sum Closure: A(s, F ) ∪ A(t, F ) ⊆ A(s+ t, F );
• CS Closure: if c :A ∈ CS, then A(c, A) =W and for each n ≥ 1
A(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : . . . : ! c :c :A) = W ;
• Positive Introspection Closure (if A5 is an axiom of JL):
A(t, F ) ⊆ A(! t, t :F );
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• Monotonicity (if A5 is an axiom of JL):
u ∈ A(t, F ) and uRv yield v ∈ A(t, F );
• Negative Introspection Closure (if A6 is an axiom of JL):3
[A(t, F )]c ⊆ A(? t,¬t :F )
for any formulas F and G, any terms t and s, any worlds u, v ∈ W , any
c :A ∈ CS, and any integer n ≥ 1.
The truth relation M, u  H is defined as follows:
M, u  p ⇌ u ∈ V (p) (3.3.15)
M, u 1 ⊥ (3.3.16)
M, u  F → G ⇌ M, u 1 F or M, u  G (3.3.17)
M, u  t :F ⇌ u ∈ A(t, F ) and
M, w  F for all w ∈ W such that uRw (3.3.18)
for any sentence letter p, any formulas F and G, any world u ∈ W , and any
term t.
In addition, logics with axiom A6 must satisfy
• Strong Evidence Property : if u ∈ A(t, F ), then M, u  t :F
for any formula F , any term t, and any world u ∈ W . ◭
3Here [X]c denotes the complement of set X.
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Definition 3.3.7. A formula F is valid in an F-model M = (W,R, V,A),
written M  F , if F is true in all worlds w ∈W . ◭
Definition 3.3.8. A formula F is satisfiable in an F-model
M = (W,R, V,A) if F is true in at least one world w ∈ W . ◭
Definition 3.3.9. A formula F is called JLCS-valid if F is valid in all F-
models for JLCS . ◭
Definition 3.3.10. A formula F is called JLCS-satisfiable if F is satisfiable
in at least one F-model for JLCS . ◭
Definition 3.3.11. A formula F is called JLCS-refutable if ¬F is satisfiable
in at least one F-model for JLCS . ◭
The following proposition, analogous to Prop. 3.3.3, can be used for F-
models with Positive Introspection Closure condition:
Proposition 3.3.12. Let A : Tm × Fm → 2W satisfy both the Positive In-
trospection Closure condition and the following
• Simplified CS Closure: if c :A ∈ CS, then A(c, A) = W .
Then, A also satisfies the full CS Closure condition.
Table 3.3.2 (cf. Tables 3.2.1 and 3.3.1) summarizes which closure con-
ditions should be used for various justification logics. In this table, using
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Table 3.3.2: F-models: Conditions on the admissible evidence function
Logic Appl. Sum CS Simp. CS Pos. Intr. Monot. Neg. Intr.
Clos. Clos. Clos. Closure Closure Closure
JCS
√ √ √
JDCS
√ √ √
JTCS
√ √ √
J4CS
√ √ √ √ √
JD4CS
√ √ √ √ √
LPCS
√ √ √ √ √
J5CS
√ √ √ √
J45CS
√ √ √ √ √ √
JD45CS
√ √ √ √ √ √
JT45CS
√ √ √ √ √ √
Prop. 3.3.12, the CS Closure is replaced by its simplified version whenever
possible. Table 3.3.3 details the requirements on the binary relation R and
the necessity of the Strong Evidence Property.
Definition 3.3.13. Let M = (W,R, V,A) be an F-model for a justification
logic JLCS . We will sometimes consider the admissible evidence function A
separately from any F-models. In such cases, we still need to know the
set W in order to verify the CS Closure condition. Therefore, we will call A
an admissible for JLCS evidence function on set W 6= ∅.
For justification logics with positive introspection, A must satisfy the
Monotonicity condition, which also depends on the binary relation R. For
this reason, we will also call A an admissible for JLCS evidence function
on a (monomodal) Kripke frame (W,R). ◭
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Table 3.3.3: F-models: Conditions on R and the Strong Evidence Property
Logic Reflexive Transitive Serial Strong
Bin. Rel. Bin. Rel. Bin. Rel. Ev. Prop.
JCS
JDCS
√
JTCS
√
J4CS
√
JD4CS
√ √
LPCS
√ √
J5CS
√
J45CS
√ √
JD45CS
√ √ √
JT45CS
√ √ √
Theorem 3.3.14 (Completeness Theorem for F-models, [Fit05, Pac05,
Rub06b, Art07, Kuz08]). Let CS be
1. a constant specification for JL ∈ {J, JT, J4, LP, J5, J45, JT45} or
2. an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for JL ∈ {JD, JD4, JD45}.
Then, for any formula F ,
JLCS ⊢ F ⇐⇒ F is JLCS-valid.
Note 3.3.15. Logics JDCS , JD4CS , JD45CS are sound w.r.t. F-models even
when CS is not axiomatically appropriate.
Proof. Let JLCS satisfy one of the cases described in the formulation. Through-
out the proof we will write “valid” instead of “JLCS-valid.”
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We will first prove soundness by induction on the derivation in JLCS .
Consider an arbitrary F-model M = (W,R, V,A) for JLCS :
A1. All propositional axioms are valid and the modus ponens rule is ad-
missible in M since the propositional cases (3.3.16)–(3.3.17) for  in
Def. 3.3.6 are classical and local, i.e., work entirely within each world.
A2. Application Axiom s : (F → G)→ (t :F → s · t :G)
Let M, u  s : (F → G) and M, u  t :F . To show validity of A2, we
need to show that M, u  s · t :G.
By (3.3.18), u ∈ A(s, F → G) ∩ A(t, F ). Hence, by the Application
Closure condition, u ∈ A(s · t, G).
Also, by (3.3.18), M, w  F → G and M, w  F for any uRw. Hence,
by (3.3.17), M, w  G for any uRw. Combined with u ∈ A(s · t, G),
this yields M, u  s · t :G.
A3. Monotonicity Axiom s :F → s+ t :F
t :F → s+ t :F
W.l.o.g. we will show validity of the first formula. Let M, u  s : F .
To show validity of A3, we need to show that M, u  s+ t :F .
By (3.3.18), u ∈ A(s, F ). By the Sum Closure, u ∈ A(s+ t, F ).
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Also, by (3.3.18), M, w  F for any uRw. Taking into account that
u ∈ A(s+ t, F ), this yields M, u  s+ t :F .
A4. Factivity Axiom t :F → F
Let M, u  t : F . To show validity of A4, we need to demonstrate
M, u  F .
By (3.3.18), M, w  F for any uRw. F-models for all logics with
axiom A4, i.e., JTCS , LPCS , and JT45CS , must have reflexive R; hence,
uRu and M, u  F .
A5. Positive Introspection t :F → ! t : t :F
Let M, u  t : F . To show validity of A5, we need to show that
M, u  ! t : t :F .
By (3.3.18), u ∈ A(t, F ). F-models for all logics with axiom A5, i.e.,
J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS , J45CS , JD45CS , and JT45CS , must satisfy the Posi-
tive Introspection Closure condition. Hence, u ∈ A(! t, t :F ).
It remains to show that M, w  t : F for any uRw. By (3.3.18),
M, w  F for any such w. F-models for all logics with axiom A5 must
also satisfy the Monotonicity condition and have a transitive R. By
Monotonicity, w ∈ A(t, F ). In addition, for any wRz, by transitivity,
CHAPTER 3. JUSTIFICATION LOGICS DEFINED 66
also uRz, so M, z  F for any wRz.
By (3.3.18), indeed M, w  t :F for any uRw. Since u ∈ A(! t, t :F ),
again by (3.3.18), we have M, u  ! t : t :F .
A6. Negative Introspection ¬t :F → ? t :¬t :F
Let M, u  ¬t : F . To show validity of A6, we need to show that
M, u  ? t :¬t :F .
F-models for all logics with axiom A6, i.e., J5CS , J45CS , JD45CS , and
JT45CS , must satisfy both the Negative Introspection Closure condition
and the Strong Evidence Property.
From M, u 1 t :F , by Strong Evidence, we conclude that u /∈ A(t, F ).
Then, u ∈ A(? t,¬t :F ) by the Negative Introspection Closure. Thus,
M, u  ? t :¬t :F by Strong Evidence.
A7. Consistency Axiom t :⊥ → ⊥
To show validity of A7, we need to show that M, u 1 t :⊥ for any term
t and any world u ∈ W .
F-models for all logics with axiom A7, i.e., JDCS , JD4CS , and JD45CS ,
must have serial R, i.e., there must exist a world w accessible from u.
By (3.3.16), M, w 1 ⊥. Hence, by (3.3.18), M, u 1 t :⊥.
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R4CS . Axiom Internalization Rule restricted to CS c :A ∈ CS
c :A
To show admissibility of R4CS , we need to show that M  c :A for any
c :A ∈ CS.
We have already shown JLCS-validity of all axioms of JL, so M  A.
By the CS Closure Condition, A(c, A) = W . Hence, M  c :A.
R4!CS . Axiom Internalization Rule with positive introspection
restricted to CS c :A ∈ CS
! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A
To show admissibility of R4!CS , we need to show that
M  ! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A
for any c :A ∈ CS and any integer n ≥ 0. We will use induction on n.
Base. n = 0. This case coincides with rule R4CS and has already been
proven.
Step. Assume for n = k that
M  ! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A .
By the CS Closure condition,
A(! ! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
k+1
c, ! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A) = W .
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Thus, by (3.3.18),
M  ! ! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
k+1
c : ! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A .
This completes the soundness proof. No particular properties of CS, such as
being axiomatically appropriate, have been used in it. Hence, JLCS is sound
w.r.t. F-models for an arbitrary CS.
The completeness is shown by the standard maximal consistency argu-
ment through construction of the canonical model for the logic.
Before we define the canonical model, we will need the following notation:
Definition 3.3.16. Let Γ be a set of justification formulas.
Γ♯ = {F | t :F ∈ Γ for some term t} . (3.3.19)
◭
Definition 3.3.17. The canonical F-model for logic JLCS is a quadruple
M = (W,R, V,A)
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defined as follows:
W ⇌ {Γ | Γ is a maximal JLCS-consistent set} (3.3.20)
ΓR∆⇌ Γ♯ ⊆ ∆ (3.3.21)
V (p)⇌ {Γ ∈ W | p ∈ Γ} (3.3.22)
A(t, F )⇌ {Γ ∈ W | t :F ∈ Γ} (3.3.23)
for any sentence letter p, any term t, and any formula F . ◭
We will first prove that the canonical model constructed in such a way is
actually an F-model.
Lemma 3.3.18. Let CS be
1. a constant specification for JL ∈ {J, JT, J4, LP, J5, J45, JT45} or
2. an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for JL ∈ {JD, JD4, JD45}.
Then, the canonical F-model M for JLCS from Def. 3.3.17 is an F-model
for JLCS .
Proof. There are many conditions to be verified. Let us start with the con-
dition on W . JLCS is consistent by Theorem 3.2.21, so there exist consistent
sets that can be extended to maximal consistent sets by Lemma 2.6.2.8.
Hence, W 6= ∅.
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Let us verify that R defined in (3.3.21) satisfies all the necessary condi-
tions:
• Reflexivity (required for JTCS , LPCS , and JT45CS):
We need to show that ΓRΓ for any maximal JLCS-consistent set Γ. In
other words, we need to show that Γ♯ ⊆ Γ, i.e., t :F ∈ Γ implies F ∈ Γ
for any term t and any formula F .
Let t :F ∈ Γ. All the three logics listed above have axiom A4; there-
fore, JLCS ⊢ t : F → F . By Lemma 2.6.2.6, t : F → F ∈ Γ. By
Lemma 2.6.2.4, F ∈ Γ.
• Transitivity (required for J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS , J45CS , JD45CS , JT45CS):
We need to show that ΓR∆ and ∆RΣ imply ΓRΣ for any maximal
JLCS-consistent sets Γ, ∆, and Σ.
Let ΓR∆, ∆RΣ, and t :F ∈ Γ. We need to show that F ∈ Σ.
All the six logics listed above have axiom A5, so JLCS ⊢ t :F → ! t : t :F .
By Lemma 2.6.2.6, t :F → ! t : t :F ∈ Γ. By Lemma 2.6.2.4, ! t : t :F ∈ Γ.
Therefore, t :F ∈ ∆ since Γ♯ ⊆ ∆. Finally, F ∈ Σ since ∆♯ ⊆ Σ.
• Seriality (required for JDCS , JD4CS , and JD45CS):
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For these three logics, we will use an extra assumption that CS is
axiomatically appropriate.
We need to show that (∀Γ ∈ W )(∃∆ ∈W )ΓR∆. It is sufficient to show
that Γ♯ is JLCS-consistent for any Γ ∈ W . Indeed, if Γ♯ is consistent,
by Lemma 2.6.2.8, it can be extended to some maximal JLCS-consistent
set ∆ ⊇ Γ♯ that would be accessible from Γ by definition (3.3.21) of R.
Suppose towards a contradiction that Γ♯ is not JLCS-consistent, which
would imply, by Lemma 2.6.2.9, that
F1, . . . , Fn ⊢JLCS ⊥
for some si : Fi ∈ Γ, i = 1, . . . , n. Internalizing this derivation by
Lemma 3.2.22, using the axiomatic appropriateness of CS, we would
get
x1 :F1, . . . , xn :Fn ⊢JLCS t(x1, . . . , xn) :⊥
for fresh variables xi, i = 1, . . . , n, and some term t(x1, . . . , xn). The
simultaneous substitution of si for xi, i = 1, . . . , n, in this deriva-
tion, given the axiomatic appropriateness of our CS, would yield, by
Lemma 3.2.30,
s1 :F1, . . . , sn :Fn ⊢JLCS t(s1, . . . , sn) :⊥
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for some term t(x1, . . . , xn) obtained from t(x1, . . . , xn) by (possibly)
replacing some justification constants with other constants. All the
three logics listed above have axiom A7, so
JLCS ⊢ t(s1, . . . , sn) :⊥ → ⊥ ;
hence,
s1 :F1, . . . , sn :Fn ⊢JLCS ⊥ .
The latter statement clearly contradicts the consistency of Γ. This
contradiction shows that Γ♯ is JLCS-consistent.
We will now turn to showing that A, defined in (3.3.23), is indeed an
admissible for JLCS evidence function. We need to verify the following con-
ditions:
• Application Closure: A(s, F → G) ∩ A(t, F ) ⊆ A(s · t, G).
Let Γ ∈ A(s, F → G) ∩ A(t, F ). By (3.3.23), it means that
{s : (F → G), t :F} ⊂ Γ .
Since JLCS ⊢ s : (F → G)→ (t :F → s · t :G), by Lemma 2.6.2.6,
s : (F → G)→ (t :F → s · t :G) ∈ Γ .
Closing by modus ponens twice by Lemma 2.6.2.4, we get s · t :G ∈ Γ,
and by (3.3.23), Γ ∈ A(s · t, G).
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• Sum Closure: A(s, F ) ∪ A(t, F ) ⊆ A(s+ t, F ).
Let, w.l.o.g. Γ ∈ A(s, F ). By (3.3.23), it means that s :F ∈ Γ. Since
JLCS ⊢ s :F → s+ t :F , by Lemma 2.6.2.6,
s :F → s+ t :F ∈ Γ .
Closing by modus ponens by Lemma 2.6.2.4, we get s + t :F ∈ Γ, and
by (3.3.23), Γ ∈ A(s+ t, F ).
• CS Closure: for any c :A ∈ CS, we need to show A(c, A) = W and, in
addition,
A(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A) = W
for any integer n ≥ 1.
For each c :A ∈ CS and each integer n ≥ 0,
JLCS ⊢ ! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A
– by rule R4!CS , for logics JCS , JDCS , JTCS , and J5CS or
– by rule R4CS , axiom A5, and modus ponens, for logics J4CS , JD4CS ,
LPCS , J45CS , JD45CS , and JT45CS .
By Lemma 2.6.2.6, for any maximal JLCS-consistent set Γ,
! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A ∈ Γ ,
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in particular, for n = 0, c :A ∈ Γ. Therefore, by (3.3.23), Γ ∈ A(c, A)
for any Γ and, in addition,
Γ ∈ A(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A)
for any integer n ≥ 1.
• Positive Introspection Closure (required for J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS , J45CS ,
JD45CS , and JT45CS): A(t, F ) ⊆ A(! t, t :F ).
Let Γ ∈ A(t, F ). By (3.3.23), it means that t : F ∈ Γ. All the six
logics listed above have axiom A5, so JLCS ⊢ t : F → ! t : t : F . By
Lemma 2.6.2.6,
t :F → ! t : t :F ∈ Γ .
Closing by modus ponens by Lemma 2.6.2.4, we get ! t : t :F ∈ Γ, and
by (3.3.23), Γ ∈ A(! t, t :F ).
• Monotonicity (required for J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS , J45CS , JD45CS , JT45CS):
if Γ ∈ A(t, F ) and ΓR∆, then ∆ ∈ A(t, F ).
Let Γ ∈ A(t, F ) and ΓR∆. For all the six logics listed above, the
Positive Introspection Closure has just been proven; therefore, Γ ∈
A(t, F ) implies Γ ∈ A(! t, t : F ). By (3.3.23), the latter means that
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! t : t :F ∈ Γ. Thus, by the definition (3.3.21) of R, we have t :F ∈ ∆.
Finally, by (3.3.23), ∆ ∈ A(t, F ).
• Negative Introspection Closure (required for J5CS , J45CS , JD45CS , JT45CS):
[A(t, F )]c ⊆ A(? t,¬t :F ).
Let Γ /∈ A(t, F ). By (3.3.23), it means that t : F /∈ Γ. Since Γ is
maximal JLCS-consistent, by Lemma 2.6.2.3, ¬t : F ∈ Γ. All the four
logics listed above have axiom A6, so JLCS ⊢ ¬t :F → ? t :¬t :F . By
Lemma 2.6.2.6,
¬t :F → ? t :¬t :F ∈ Γ .
Closing by modus ponens by Lemma 2.6.2.4, we get ? t :¬t :F ∈ Γ and,
by (3.3.23), Γ ∈ A(? t,¬t :F ).
It only remains to show that the Strong Evidence Property is satisfied for
logics J5CS , J45CS , JD45CS , JT45CS .
We will actually prove a stronger statement that the canonical F-models
for all the ten logics considered so far enjoy Strong Evidence. But first we
will need to show the fundamental property of canonical models, which, after
Melvin Fitting, we will call the Truth Lemma.
Lemma 3.3.19 (Truth Lemma). Let CS be a constant specification for
JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP, J5, J45, JD45, JT45} .
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The canonical F-model M for JLCS from Def. 3.3.17 enjoys the following
property:
M,Γ  F ⇐⇒ F ∈ Γ .
Note 3.3.20. Strictly speaking, for logics with negative introspection, we do
not yet know whether M is a proper F-model, but we can still operate with 
as prescribed in (3.3.15)-(3.3.18).
Proof of the Truth Lemma. Induction on |F |:
F = p. For any sentence letter p, the statement follows directly from (3.3.22)
and (3.3.15):
M,Γ  p ⇐⇒ Γ ∈ V (p) ⇐⇒ p ∈ Γ .
Boolean cases are trivial.
F = t :G. Let t :G ∈ Γ. First of all, by (3.3.23), Γ ∈ A(t, G). Further, G ∈ ∆
for any ∆ accessible from Γ, by (3.3.21). So by IH, M,∆  G for any
ΓR∆. Combined with Γ ∈ A(t, G), this yields M,Γ  t :G by (3.3.18).
Let t : G /∈ Γ. Then, by (3.3.23), Γ /∈ A(t, G), so M,Γ 1 t : G
by (3.3.18).
This completes the proof of the Truth Lemma 3.3.19.
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We are now ready to finish the proof of Lemma 3.3.18 by showing the
Strong Evidence Property of all canonical F-models:
• Strong Evidence Property : if Γ ∈ A(t, F ), then M,Γ  t :F .
By (3.3.23), Γ ∈ A(t, F ) means that t :F ∈ Γ. By the Truth Lemma 3.3.19,
M,Γ  t :F .
Thus, the canonical F-model for each JLCS is indeed an F-model for JLCS .
In addition, this F-model satisfies the Truth Lemma 3.3.19. This completes
the proof of Lemma 3.3.18.
We are finally ready to show completeness of JLCS w.r.t. its F-models.
The canonical model M = (W,R, V,A) for JLCS constructed in Def. 3.3.17
is sufficient to refute all formulas F such that JLCS 6⊢ F . By Lemma 3.3.18,
M is an F-model for JLCS .
Consider any such F . By Theorem 3.2.21, JLCS is consistent. Then,
by Lemma 2.6.2.7, the set {¬F} is JLCS-consistent. By Lemma 2.6.2.8, it
can be extended to a maximal JLCS-consistent set ∆ ∋ ¬F . By the Truth
Lemma 3.3.19, M,∆  ¬F , so M,∆ 1 F .
This completes the proof of Completeness Theorem 3.3.14.
As mentioned in the proof above, the canonical F-model for each of the
ten justification logics enjoys the Strong Evidence Property. Thus, although
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it is not necessary for the soundness of the logics without axiom A6, the
Strong Evidence Property can still be added to strengthen the completeness
claim for them. The following theorem lists several other properties of the
canonical F-models for several logics and formulates stronger completeness
results for them:
Theorem 3.3.21 (Strong Completeness Theorem for F-models, [Fit05,
Pac05, Rub06b, Art07, Kuz08]).
1. JCS , JTCS , J4CS , and LPCS are complete w.r.t. the class of their F-
models that additionally satisfy
• Strong Evidence Property
2. JDCS and JD4CS with axiomatically appropriate CS are complete w.r.t.
the class of their F-models that additionally satisfy
• Strong Evidence Property
3. J5CS is complete w.r.t. the class of its F-models M = (W,R, V,A) with
Euclidean R that additionally satisfy
• Strong Evidence Property
• Anti-Monotonicity: if u /∈ A(t, F ) and uRw, then w /∈ A(t, F )
for any term t, any formula F , and any worlds u,w ∈ W .
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4. J45CS is complete w.r.t. the class of its F-models M = (W,R, V,A)
with Euclidean R that additionally satisfy
• Strong Evidence Property
• Stability: if uRw, then u ∈ A(t, F )⇐⇒ w ∈ A(t, F )
for any formula F , any term t, and any worlds u,w ∈ W .
5. JD45CS with an axiomatically appropriate CS is complete w.r.t. the
class of its F-models with Euclidean R that additionally satisfy
• Strong Evidence Property
• Stability
6. JT45CS is complete w.r.t. the class of its F-models, with R being an
equivalence relation, that additionally satisfy
• Strong Evidence Property
• Stability
7. In addition, for each of logics JCS , JDCS , JTCS , J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS ,
J5CS , J45CS , JD45CS , and JT45CS with a schematic and axiomatically
appropriate CS, the following property can be added to the list of re-
quirements on the model M = (W,R, V,A):
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• Fully Explanatory Property:
For any world u ∈ W and any formula F , if M, w  F for all w
such that uRw, there must exist a justification term t such that
M, u  t :F .
Note 3.3.22. For logics JDCS , JD4CS , and JD45CS , the axiomatic appropriate-
ness of CS is necessary already for the basic completeness theorem. For the
remaining seven logics, as will be seen from the proof below, the schemat-
icness and axiomatic appropriateness of CS is only used in the proof of the
Fully Explanatory Property.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.21. In the proof of Theorem 3.3.14, we have already es-
tablished the Strong Evidence Property of the canonical F-models for all the
ten logics. It suffices to show that the canonical F-model M = (W,R, V,A)
for each logic JLCS additionally satisfies the remaining properties:
• Fully Explanatory Property : If M,∆  F for all ∆ such that ΓR∆,
there must exist a justification term t such that M,Γ  t :F .
For some Γ ∈ W and some formula F , let
M,∆  F for all ΓR∆ . (3.3.24)
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Suppose towards a contradiction that
there is no justification term t such that M,Γ  t :F. (3.3.25)
Then, the set
Γ♯ ∪ {¬F} (3.3.26)
would have to be JLCS-consistent. Indeed, according to Lemma 2.6.2.9,
the inconsistency of set (3.3.26) would mean that
G1, . . . , Gn,¬F ⊢JLCS ⊥
for some Gi ∈ Γ♯, i = 1, . . . , n, or equivalently that
G1, . . . , Gn ⊢JLCS F (3.3.27)
for some terms si and formulas Gi, i = 1, . . . , n, such that si :Gi ∈ Γ.
Internalizing derivation (3.3.27) by Lemma 3.2.22, using axiomatic ap-
propriateness of CS, we would obtain a term t(x1, . . . , xn) with fresh
variables x1, . . . , xn such that
x1 :G1, . . . , xn :Gn ⊢JLCS t(x1, . . . , xn) :F . (3.3.28)
Finally, the simultaneous substitution of si for xi in (3.3.28), using
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schematicness of CS,4 would yield by Lemma 3.2.28
s1 :G1, . . . , sn :Gn ⊢JLCS t(s1, . . . , sn) :F ,
and by the Deduction Theorem 3.2.27,
JLCS ⊢ s1 :G1 ∧ . . . ∧ sn :Gn → t(s1, . . . , sn) :F .
For the maximal JLCS-consistent set Γ, by Lemma 2.6.2.5,
s1 :G1 ∧ . . . ∧ sn :Gn ∈ Γ .
Thus, by Lemma 2.6.2.4,
t(s1, . . . , sn) :F ∈ Γ ,
and, by the Truth Lemma 3.3.19,
M,Γ  t(s1, . . . , sn) :F ,
in clear violation of (3.3.25). This contradiction shows that set (3.3.26)
would have to be JLCS-consistent if (3.3.25) were true.
Further, if set (3.3.26) were JLCS-consistent, it could then be extended
by Lemma 2.6.2.8 to a maximal JLCS-consistent set ∆0 ⊇ Γ♯ ∪ {¬F}.
4Here we cannot allow renaming of constants in F ; therefore, axiomatic appropriateness
of CS alone is not sufficient.
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By the definition (3.3.21) of R for canonical F-models, ΓR∆0. But
since ¬F ∈ ∆0, by the Truth Lemma 3.3.19,
M,∆0 1 F ,
which would contradict (3.3.24). This contradiction completes the
proof of the Fully Explanatory Property.
• Anti-Monotonicity (for J5CS , J45CS , JD45CS , and JT45CS):
if Γ /∈ A(t, F ) and ΓR∆, then ∆ /∈ A(t, F )
Let Γ /∈ A(t, F ) for some term t, some formula F , and some Γ ∈ W ;
let ΓR∆ for some ∆ ∈ W . By the Completeness Theorem 3.3.14, the
canonical F-model for each of the four logics listed above satisfies both
the Negative Introspection Closure and the Strong Evidence Property.
By the former, Γ ∈ A(? t,¬t : F ). By the latter, M,Γ  ? t : ¬t : F .
By (3.3.18), M,∆  ¬t :F . So M,∆ 1 t :F and, by Strong Evidence,
∆ /∈ A(t, F ).
• Stability (for J45CS , JD45CS , and JT45CS):
if ΓR∆, then Γ ∈ A(t, F )⇐⇒ ∆ ∈ A(t, F ).
The =⇒ direction is equivalent to the Monotonicity condition that was
proven for these three logics in Theorem 3.3.14. The ⇐= direction is
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equivalent to Anti-Monotonicity demonstrated above.
• R is Euclidean (for J5CS , J45CS , JD45CS , and JT45CS):
Let ΓR∆ and ΓRΣ for some Γ,∆,Σ ∈ W . We need to prove that
∆RΣ, i.e., that ∆♯ ⊆ Σ.
For any t :F ∈ ∆, by the Truth Lemma 3.3.19, M,∆  t :F ; hence,
∆ ∈ A(t, F ). By Anti-Monotonicity proven for these logics earlier,
Γ ∈ A(t, F ) since ΓR∆. By Strong Evidence, proven in Completeness
Theorem 3.3.14, M,Γ  t :F . Since ΓRΣ, by (3.3.18), M,Σ  F and
finally, by the Truth Lemma 3.3.19, F ∈ Σ.
• R is an equivalence relation (for JT45CS):
Reflexivity of R for this logic was established in Completeness Theo-
rem 3.3.14. In addition, we have just shown that R must be Euclidean.
By Lemma 2.4.2, a reflexive Euclidean binary relation is an equivalence
relation.
This completes the proof of the Strong Completeness Theorem 3.3.21.
Given that one of the foci of this research is decidability, one would ex-
pect to find some version of Finite Model Property (FMP), which is an even
stronger version of the completeness theorem. But since the traditional for-
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mulation of FMP is not sufficient for justification logics, we postpone the
discussion of these stronger completeness results till Chapter 4.
3.3.3 M-Models vs. F-Models
It may be noted that in most cases, an M-model is nothing more than a single-
world F-model. It is not coincidental that the conditions on the admissible
evidence function are very similar and even bear the same name for M- and
F-models. The definition (3.3.18) of  for F-models with a single reflexive
world is equivalent to the definition (3.3.6) of  for M-models; similarly,
(3.3.18) for an F-model with a single irreflexive world is nothing but (3.3.7).
The reader is encouraged to explore the similarities further.
The completeness of justification logics (without negative introspection)
w.r.t. M-models shows that the machinery of admissible evidence functions
is really very strong and can often replace the whole Kripke structure of an
F-model. At the same time, in many cases F-models constructed to illustrate
specific epistemic situations such as Wise Men Puzzle (see [Art06]) or Gettier
Examples (see [Art07]) are simpler and more elegant than their equivalent
M-models.
On the other hand, being more laconic, M-models are often convenient for
proofs, especially constructive proofs and proofs involving complexity. It can
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be observed from the literature that there is something of a truce between the
two semantics. Instead of competing, they rather complement each other.
As will be discussed in Chapter 4, Theorem 3.3.4 establishes a very strong
form of the Finite Model Property for F-models: every satisfiable formula is
satisfiable in a single-world model.
There are two important exceptions to this rule:
• No M-models are known for justification logics with the Negative In-
trospection axiom A6.
• The Consistency Axiom A7 is treated differently in the two semantics.
One of the possible explanations is that a single-world model with a se-
rial accessibility relation is automatically reflexive, which would cause
an undesirable conflation of Consistency Axiom with the Factivity Ax-
iom A4. This prompts the transfer of the responsibilities carried out by
seriality of R in F-models to the Consistent Evidence condition on A
in M-models.
This transfer may be the best place to showcase the relationship between
the Kripke structure and the admissible evidence function apparatus. It may
seem strange that completeness w.r.t. F-models for logics with axiom A7
requires an extra condition on CS to be axiomatically appropriate. This
CHAPTER 3. JUSTIFICATION LOGICS DEFINED 87
condition is, nevertheless, necessary as the following example demonstrates:
Example 3.3.23. Consider JD0 with the empty constant specification. We can
freely use M-models for this logic by the Completeness Theorem 3.3.4. But
the empty constant specification is, of course, not axiomatically appropriate.
We will show that for distinct justification variables x and y, the formula
y :x :⊥, although satisfiable in M-models, cannot be satisfied in any F-model
for JD0.
Showing unsatisfiability in F-models is easier. Consider any F-model
M = (W,R, V,A) for JD0. Consider any world u ∈W . By (3.3.18), for
M, u  y :x :⊥
to hold, formula x :⊥ would have to be true in all the worlds accessible from u.
At least one such world exists by seriality of R. Let uRw, for instance. In
turn, by (3.3.18), for
M, w  x :⊥
to hold, ⊥ should be true in all the worlds accessible from w. Again, at least
one such world exists by seriality, but ⊥ cannot be true in it by (3.3.16).
This shows that ¬y :x :⊥ is valid w.r.t. F-models for JD0. But
JD0 0 ¬y :x :⊥
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because there is an M-model where y : x :⊥ is satisfied. Let for any term t
and any formula F
E(t, F )⇌
{
True if F = x :⊥ and t = t1 + . . .+ y + . . .+ tn ,
False otherwise ,
where t1 + . . .+ y + . . .+ tn is any sum of terms with one of the summands
being y (the order of summation is unimportant). Note that n may be equal
to zero, in which case the whole sum collapses to y.
Take an arbitrary M-type propositional valuation U . Then, N = (U, E)
is an M-model for JD0. The only thing we need to prove is the conditions on
the admissible evidence function.
CS Closure is vacuously satisfied since CS = ∅.
Consistent Evidence Condition is clearly satisfied since E(t, F ) only
holds for F = x :⊥ and never for F = ⊥.
Sum Closure is satisfied too. Indeed, if E(t, F ) holds, then t is a sum
containing y. Both t + s and s + t are also sums containing y; hence,
E(t+ s, F ) and E(s+ t, F ).
Application Closure is satisfied vacuously. Indeed, there is not a single
implication F → G for which E(t, F → G) would hold. This admissi-
ble evidence function is so tiny that we never have a chance to apply
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Application Closure.
We have shown that N is an M-model for JD0. It remains to note that
E(y, x :⊥) holds; therefore, by (3.3.7),
N  y :x :⊥ .
This contradiction shows that F-models are not adequate for JD0. In
particular, the canonical “F-model” for JD0 is not serial. Indeed, since the
set {y : x :⊥} is JD0-consistent, by Lemma 2.6.2.8, there exists a maximal
JD0-consistent set Γ ∋ y : x : ⊥. Unfortunately, this Γ is isolated in the
canonical model for JD0 because Γ
♯ ∋ x : ⊥. The set {x : ⊥} is perfectly
JD0-inconsistent, so by Lemma 2.6.2.2, no maximal JD0-consistent ∆ ⊇ Γ♯.
◭
Given that traditional F-models used for JD and JD45 in [Pac05], for JD45
in [Art07], and for JD and JD4 in [Kuz08] only work for axiomatically appro-
priate CS, it makes sense to define alternative F-models for JDCS , JD4CS , and
JD45CS that would work with an arbitrary CS. Below we develop a variant
of F-models specifically for this purpose.
Definition 3.3.24. Let CS be a constant specification for
JL ∈ {JD, JD4, JD45} .
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An Fk-model for JLCS is an F-model M = (W,R, V,A) for JLCS , except
that R is not required to be serial; instead, the following Consistent Evidence
condition is imposed on A:
• Consistent Evidence condition:
A(t,⊥) = ∅ for all terms t.
Theorem 3.3.25 (Completeness Theorem for Fk-models). JDCS , JD4CS ,
and JD45CS are sound and complete w.r.t. their Fk-models.
Proof. The proof mostly repeats the proof of Theorem 3.3.14. We will only
outline the differences.
In the soundness proof, the seriality of R was only used to show validity of
axiom A7, t :⊥ → ⊥. So for the new models, we need to reestablish validity
of A7, based on the Consistent Evidence condition. Let M = (W,R, V,A) be
an Fk-model for JLCS . Since for any term t, A(t,⊥) = ∅, we have w /∈ A(t,⊥)
for any w ∈ W . Thus, M, w 1 t :⊥ by (3.3.18). This is the only necessary
change in the soundness proof.
For completeness, we have to show that the canonical F-model M =
(W,R, V,A) for JLCS from Def. 3.3.17 is an Fk-model for JLCS , i.e., that it
additionally satisfies the Consistent Evidence Condition. For no term t is the
set {t :⊥} JLCS-consistent due to axiom A7. By Lemma 2.6.2.2, t :⊥ /∈ Γ for
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any maximal JLCS-consistent Γ ∈ W . So by definition (3.3.23), Γ /∈ A(t,⊥)
for any Γ ∈W .
As in the Strong Completeness Theorem 3.3.21, additional conditions can
be imposed on these Fk-models without losing completeness:
Theorem 3.3.26 (Strong Completeness Theorem for Fk-models).
1. JDCS and JD4CS are complete w.r.t. the class of their Fk-models that
additionally satisfy
• Strong Evidence Property
2. JD45CS is complete w.r.t. the class of their Fk-models with Euclidean R
that additionally satisfy
• Strong Evidence Property
• Stability
3. In addition, for any of the logics JDCS , JD4CS , or JD45CS with a schematic
and axiomatically appropriate CS
• Fully Explanatory Property
can be added to the list of requirements.
Proof. The proof repeats the proof of Theorem 3.3.21.
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3.3.4 Minimal Evidence Functions
It is important, especially for applications, to be able to effectively construct
models that satisfy particular conditions. Constructing a Kripke model in
modal logic is easy: the only difficulty might be showing that the accessibility
relation is reflexive, transitive, symmetric, and/or Euclidean, but we can
always resort to specifying some relation with the intention of taking its
reflexive, transitive, symmetric, and/or Euclidean closure.
Turning to models for justification logics, be it M- or F-models, we now
have to construct an admissible evidence function, which always requires
compliance with certain closure conditions. In this section, we intend to de-
scribe a general way of constructing models for justification logics along with
the closure procedures necessary for creating admissible evidence functions.
Definition 3.3.27. Let Tm and Fm stand for the sets of all terms and all
formulas respectively in language JL.
An M-type possible evidence function is any function
B : Tm× Fm→ {True,False} .
LetW be a set of possible worlds. An F-type possible evidence func-
tion on W 6= ∅ is any function
B : Tm× Fm→ 2W .
CHAPTER 3. JUSTIFICATION LOGICS DEFINED 93
◭
Note 3.3.28. Unlike in the case of admissible evidence functions, we never
need to know a binary relation R ⊆ W × W to work with a possible evi-
dence function on W . A possible evidence function does not depend on a
justification logic either.
An M-type (F-type) possible evidence function has the same input and
output as an admissible evidence function for M-models (F-models), but has
no closure or other conditions imposed on it. Naturally, every admissible
evidence function is also a possible evidence function of the respective type.
We will provide two proofs that for logics without negative introspection,
any possible evidence function can be extended to an admissible evidence
function; moreover, there is a minimal extension of this type. This operation
is routinely needed for constructing models for specific epistemic examples
as well as for proving decidability and evaluating complexity of justification
logics. In this section, we will present a non-constructive proof that a minimal
admissible evidence function always exists.
In Chapters 4 and 5, we will extensively use “finite” possible evidence
functions to show decidability or evaluate complexity of justification logics.
We will, therefore, describe an effective way to construct the minimal ad-
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missible evidence function if it exists. Then, also in Chapters 4 and 5, we
will use this constructive procedure in decision algorithms. There, it will be
made recursive under the additional requirement for CS to be recursive.
Definition 3.3.29. We say that an M-type possible evidence function B2 is
based on an M-type possible evidence function B1 and write B1 ⊆ B2 if, for
any term t and any formula F , statement B2(t, F ) holds whenever B1(t, F )
does.
Similarly, for a given set W 6= ∅, we say that an F-type possible evidence
function B2 on W is based on an F-type possible evidence function B1, also
on W , and write B1 ⊆ B2 if B1(t, F ) ⊆ B2(t, F ) for any term t and any
formula F . ◭
Definition 3.3.30. Let EF be
• a class of M-type possible evidence functions or
• a class of F-type possible evidence functions on the same set W 6= ∅.
A possible evidence function B ∈ EF is called the minimal 5 evidence
function in EF if
B ⊆ B′ ∀B′ ∈ EF . (3.3.29)
5It would, perhaps, be better to call it the minimum evidence function, but historically
the term “minimal” has already taken root.
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◭
Proposition 3.3.31. If the minimal function in a class exists, it is unique.
Definition 3.3.32 (Classes of admissible evidence functions).
1. Let CS be a constant specification for a justification logic
JL ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP} .
Let B be an M-type possible evidence function. We will denote the class
of all M-type admissible for JLCS evidence functions by AEFB(JLCS).
2. Let CS be a constant specification for a justification logic
JL ∈ {J, JD, JT} .
Let B be an F-type possible evidence function on W 6= ∅. We will
denote the class of all F-type admissible for JLCS evidence functions
on W by AEFB(JLCS ,W ).
3. Let CS be a constant specification for a justification logic
JL ∈ {J4, JD4, LP} .
Let B be an F-type possible evidence function on set W 6= ∅ and let
R ⊆ W ×W be a binary relation on W that is
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• transitive for JL = J4,
• transitive and serial for JL = JD4,
• transitive and reflexive for JL = LP.
We will denote the class of all F-type admissible for JLCS evidence
functions on (W,R) by AEFB(JLCS ,W,R).
Note 3.3.33. Although the type of evidence functions (M or F) is not explic-
itly present in the AEF -notation, it can be easily read from the number of
arguments of AEFB: M-type functions require only one argument, the logic,
whereas F-type functions take two or three arguments depending on whether
positive introspection is absent or present respectively.
Theorem 3.3.34.
1. Let CS be a constant specification for JL ∈ {J, JT, J4, LP}. For any
M-type possible evidence function B, the class
AEFB(JLCS) 6= ∅
and has a (unique) minimal element.
2. Let CS be a constant specification for JL ∈ {J, JD, JT}. For any F-type
possible evidence function B on a set W 6= ∅, the class
AEFB(JLCS ,W ) 6= ∅
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and has a (unique) minimal element.
3. Let CS be a constant specification for JL ∈ {J4, JD4, LP}. For any
F-type possible evidence function B on set W 6= ∅ and any binary
relation R ⊆ W ×W that is
• transitive for J4CS ,
• transitive and serial for JD4CS ,
• transitive and reflexive for LPCS ,
the class
AEFB(JLCS ,W,R) 6= ∅
and has a (unique) minimal element.
Proof.
1. The constant M-type evidence function
ATrue(t, F ) ≡ True for all terms t and formulas F
is clearly admissible for JCS , JTCS , J4CS , and LPCS because the Appli-
cation, Sum, CS, and Positive Introspection Closure conditions require
the admissible evidence function to be True in certain circumstances,
but never insist on it being False. It is equally clear that ATrue is
CHAPTER 3. JUSTIFICATION LOGICS DEFINED 98
based on every M-type possible evidence function imaginable. Thus,
ATrue ∈ AEFB(JLCS) for any of the four logics and any B.
To find the unique minimal element in AEFB(JLCS), we simply take
the “conjunction” of all functions from AEFB(JLCS): for all terms t
and formulas F ,
Amin(t, F )⇌


False if A(t, F ) = False
for some A ∈ AEFB(JLCS),
True otherwise.
(3.3.30)
Let us show that Amin is indeed an M-type admissible for JLCS evidence
function, i.e., that it satisfies all the necessary closure conditions.
– CS Closure: For any A ∈ AEFB(JLCS) and any c : A ∈ CS,
A(c, A) = True and, in addition,
A(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A) = True
for any integer n ≥ 1, by CS Closure for the admissible evidence
function A. Hence, for any c :A ∈ CS,
Amin(c, A) = True
and, in addition,
Amin(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A) = True
for any integer n ≥ 1.
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– Application Closure: Let
Amin(s, F → G) = True ,
Amin(t, F ) = True .
Then, by (3.3.30), for any A ∈ AEFB(JLCS),
A(s, F → G) = True ,
A(t, F ) = True .
By Application Closure, for any A ∈ AEFB(JLCS),
A(s · t, G) = True .
Therefore, by (3.3.30), Amin(s · t, G) = True.
– The arguments for the Positive Introspection Closure (for J4CS
and LPCS) and for the Sum Closure are similar to the one for the
Application Closure above.
Thus, Amin is an M-type admissible for JLCS evidence function.
For any term t and formula F such that B(t, F ) = True,
(∀A ∈ AEFB(JLCS)) A(t, F ) = True
since B ⊆ A for any such A. By (3.3.30), Amin(t, F ) = True. Thus,
B ⊆ Amin.
CHAPTER 3. JUSTIFICATION LOGICS DEFINED 100
It remains to show that Amin ⊆ A for every A ∈ AEFB(JLCS): this
easily follows from (3.3.30).
2–3. The F-type total evidence function on W
AtotW (t, F ) ≡ W for each term t and each formula F (3.3.31)
serves as an analog of ATrue for F-models. It is clearly admissible for
JCS , JDCS , JTCS , J4CS , JD4CS , and LPCS . The Monotonicity condition
for F-models still only asks for some worlds to be included into A(t, F ),
but never excluded, so AtotW satisfies Monotonicity independent of R.
AlsoAtotW is based on every possible evidence function onW imaginable.
Thus,
– AtotW ∈ AEFB(JLCS ,W ) for JCS , JDCS , and JTCS ;
– AtotW ∈ AEFB(JLCS ,W,R) for J4CS , JD4CS , and LPCS for any bi-
nary relation R on W .
Let AEFB denote either AEFB(JLCS ,W ) or AEFB(JLCS ,W,R), de-
pending on JLCS . To find the minimal element in AEFB, we “intersect”
all functions from it: for any term t and any formula F ,
Amin(t, F )⇌
⋂
A∈AEFB
A(t, F ) . (3.3.32)
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Let us show thatAmin is an F-type admissible for JLCS evidence function
on W or on (W,R) depending on JLCS , i.e., that Amin satisfies all the
necessary closure conditions.
– CS Closure: For any A ∈ AEFB and any c :A ∈ CS, A(c, A) = W
and, in addition,
A(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : . . . : ! c :c :A) =W
for any integer n ≥ 1, by CS Closure for the admissible evidence
function A. Hence, by (3.3.32), Amin(c, A) = W and
Amin(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : . . . : ! c :c :A) =W .
– Application Closure: Let u ∈ Amin(s, F → G) and u ∈ Amin(t, F ).
Then, by (3.3.32), u ∈ A(s, F → G) and u ∈ A(t, F ) for any
A ∈ AEFB. By Application Closure for any such A, we have
u ∈ A(s · t, G). Therefore, by (3.3.32), u ∈ Amin(s · t, G).
– The argument for the Positive Introspection Closure (for J4CS ,
JD4CS , and LPCS) and for the Sum Closure is similar to the one
for the Application Closure above.
– Monotonicity (for J4CS , JD4CS , and LPCS): Let u ∈ Amin(t, F )
and uRw. Then, by (3.3.32), u ∈ A(t, F ) for any A ∈ AEFB. By
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Monotonicity for any such A, we have w ∈ A(t, F ). By (3.3.32),
w ∈ Amin(t, F ).
Thus, Amin is an F-type admissible for JLCS evidence function.
B(t, F ) ⊆ A(t, F ) for all A ∈ AEFB since B ⊆ A. So
B(t, F ) ⊆
⋂
A∈AEFB
A(t, F ) = Amin(t, F ) .
Thus, B ⊆ Amin.
It remains to show that Amin ⊆ A for every A ∈ AEFB. But this is
immediate from (3.3.32).
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.3.34.
Note 3.3.35. Theorem 3.3.34.1 does not hold for JDCS and JD4CS ; Theo-
rem 3.3.34.2 does not hold for Fk-models for JDCS ; and Theorem 3.3.34.3
does not hold for Fk-models for JD4CS because of the Consistent Evidence
condition. This condition requires statements A(t, F ) or w ∈ A(t, F ) to be
false in certain cases, which may conflict with other closure conditions that
could require these statements to be true. The following example illustrates
such a situation:
Example 3.3.36. Let B(x, p → ⊥) = B(y, p) = True. Then, no M-type
admissible for JDCS or JD4CS evidence function can be based on B. Indeed,
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any such function A, according to Application Closure, would have A(x ·
y,⊥) = True, violating the Consistent Evidence condition.
This example shows that constructing an M- or an Fk-model with given
properties for JDCS or JD4CS may not be as easy as constructing an F-model.
It would, therefore, make sense to resort to F-models for axiomatically ap-
propriate CS. ◭
We will now describe minimal evidence functions axiomatically:
Definition 3.3.37. Let CS be a constant specification for one of justification
logics. The axioms and rules of ∗-calculi are as follows:
∗CS !. Axioms ∗(c, A) and ∗(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c : c : A),
where c :A ∈ CS and n ≥ 1 is an integer.
∗CS. Axiom ∗(c, A), where c :A ∈ CS.
∗A2. Application Rule ∗(s, F → G) ∗ (t, F )∗(s · t, G)
∗A3. Sum Rule ∗(s, F )∗(s+ t, F )
∗(t, F )
∗(s+ t, F )
∗A5. Positive Introspection Rule ∗(t, F )∗(! t, t :F )
◭
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Table 3.3.4: ∗-calculi for pure justification logics
Logic ∗CS ! ∗CS ∗A2 ∗A3 ∗A5 Calculus
JCS
√ √ √ ∗CS-calculus
JDCS
√ √ √ ∗CS-calculus
JTCS
√ √ √ ∗CS-calculus
J4CS
√ √ √ √ ∗!CS-calculus
JD4CS
√ √ √ √ ∗!CS-calculus
LPCS
√ √ √ √ ∗!CS-calculus
Note 3.3.38. As in Note 3.2.3, axiom ∗CS ! is derivable from axiom ∗CS and
rule ∗A5.
Definition 3.3.39. There are two types of ∗-calculi used for justification
logics:
• the ∗CS-calculus for JCS , JDCS , and JTCS and
• the ∗!CS-calculus for J4CS , JD4CS , and LPCS ,
both described in Table 3.3.4.
To conveniently use the ∗-calculi, we will need notation for translating
between formulas, statements about evidence functions, and ∗-expressions.
Definition 3.3.40. For an M-type possible evidence function B,
B∗ = {∗(t, F ) | B(t, F ) = True} . (3.3.33)
For an F-type possible evidence function B on W and w ∈ W ,
B∗w = {∗(t, F ) | w ∈ B(t, F )} . (3.3.34)
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Theorem 3.3.41.
1. Let JLCS ∈ {JCS , JDCS , JTCS}. For an M-type possible evidence func-
tion B, define an M-type possible evidence function A so that for any
term t and any formula F ,
∗(t, F ) ∈ A∗ ⇐⇒ B∗ ⊢∗CS ∗(t, F ) . (3.3.35)
Then, B ⊆ A. Moreover, if the class AEFB(JLCS) 6= ∅, then A is the
minimal admissible evidence function in it.
2. Let JLCS ∈ {J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS}. For an M-type possible evidence func-
tion B, define an M-type possible evidence function A so that for any
term t and any formula F ,
∗(t, F ) ∈ A∗ ⇐⇒ B∗ ⊢∗!CS ∗(t, F ) . (3.3.36)
Then, B ⊆ A. Moreover, if the class AEFB(JLCS) 6= ∅, then A is the
minimal admissible evidence function in it.
3. Let JLCS ∈ {JCS , JDCS , JTCS}. For an F-type possible evidence func-
tion B on W 6= ∅, define an F-type possible evidence function A on W
so that for any term t, any formula F , and any w ∈ W ,
∗(t, F ) ∈ A∗w ⇐⇒ B∗w ⊢∗CS ∗(t, F ) . (3.3.37)
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Then, B ⊆ A. Moreover, A is the minimal admissible evidence function
in the class AEFB(JLCS ,W ).
4. Let JLCS ∈ {J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS} and R be a binary relation on W that
is
• transitive for J4CS ,
• transitive and serial for JD4CS ,
• transitive and reflexive for LPCS .
For an F-type possible evidence function B on W 6= ∅, define an F-type
possible evidence function A on W so that for any term t, any formula
F , and any w ∈W ,
∗(t, F ) ∈ A∗w ⇐⇒ B∗w ∪
⋃
uRw
B∗u ⊢∗!CS ∗(t, F ) . (3.3.38)
Then, B ⊆ A. Moreover, A is the minimal admissible evidence function
in the class AEFB(JLCS ,W,R).
Proof. We will use AEFB for any of the classes of admissible evidence func-
tions based on B whenever safe. Essentially, we need to prove three things:
• B ⊆ A ,
• A ⊆ E for any E ∈ AEFB,
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• A is admissible.
We will prove them one by one. Throughout the proof, we will keep state-
ments concerning the M-type functions in the left column and statements
about F-type functions in the right column. ⊢ will stand for either ⊢∗CS
or ⊢∗!CS .
Let us start with B ⊆ A.
Suppose B(t, F ) = True. Suppose w ∈ B(t, F ).
Then, ∗(t, F ) ∈ B∗. Then, ∗(t, F ) ∈ B∗w.
So B∗ ⊢ ∗(t, F ). So B∗w ⊢ ∗(t, F ).
Hence, ∗(t, F ) ∈ A∗, i.e., Hence, ∗(t, F ) ∈ A∗w, i.e.,
A(t, F ) = True. w ∈ A(t, F ).
This completes the proof that B ⊆ A.
A ⊆ E for any E ∈ AEFB because the derivation rules in ∗-calculi are
nothing but reworded closure conditions on evidence functions. The proof
by induction on the ⊢-derivation can be found in Fig. 3.3.1 on p. 108.
Finally, the main part of the proof that A itself is an admissible evidence
function, namely, that it satisfies all the proper closure conditions, can be
found in Fig. 3.3.2 on p. 109. In the figure, ‘. . .’ is used to denote hypotheses
in a ⊢-derivation in the cases where the hypotheses are not changed by this
step.
The only condition not verified in Fig. 3.3.2 is the Consistent Evidence
condition for the M-type functions for JDCS (Clause 1) and JD4CS (Clause 2).
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Figure 3.3.1: Theorem 3.3.41: Proof that A ⊆ E for any E ∈ AEFB
∗CS ! ⊢ ∗(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, . . . : ! c :c :A), ⊢ ∗(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, . . . : ! c :c :A),
where c :A ∈ CS where c :A ∈ CS
and n ≥ 0 is an integer. But and n ≥ 0 is an integer. But
E(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, . . . : ! c :c :A) = True E(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, . . . : ! c :c :A) = W
by the CS ! Closure. So by the CS ! Closure. So
∗(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, . . . : ! c :c :A) ∈ E∗. ∗(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, . . . : ! c :c :A) ∈ E∗w
for any w ∈ W .
∗CS is an instance of ∗CS !.
Hyp Let ∗(t, F ) ∈ B∗. Let ∗(t, F ) ∈ B∗w.
Then, B(t, F ) = True. Then, w ∈ B(t, F ).
Since B ⊆ E , Since B ⊆ E ,
E(t, F ) = True. w ∈ E(t, F ).
So ∗(t, F ) ∈ E∗. So ∗(t, F ) ∈ E∗w.
Hyp Let ∗(t, F ) ∈ B∗u for uRw.
in Then, u ∈ B(t, F ).
Clause Since B ⊆ E , u ∈ E(t, F ).
4 w ∈ E(t, F )
by Monotonicity of E .
So ∗(t, F ) ∈ E∗w.
∗A2 By IH, ∗(s1, G→ F ) ∈ E∗ By IH, ∗(s1, G→ F ) ∈ E∗w
and ∗(s2, G) ∈ E∗. and ∗(s2, G) ∈ E∗w.
Then, E(s1, G→ F ) = True Then, w ∈ E(s1, G→ F )
and E(s2, G) = True. Hence, and w ∈ E(s2, G). Hence,
by Application Closure, by Application Closure,
E(s1 · s2, F ) = True. So w ∈ E(s1 · s2, F ). So
∗(s1 · s2, F ) ∈ E∗. ∗(s1 · s2, F ) ∈ E∗w.
∗A3 is similar to ∗A2.
∗A5 is similar to ∗A2 (used only for J4CS , JD4CS , and LPCS).
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Figure 3.3.2: Theorem 3.3.41: Proof that A ∈ AEFB (main part)
Appl. Let A(s, F → G) = True Let w ∈ A(s, F → G)
clos. and A(t, F ) = True. and w ∈ A(t, F ).
Then, . . . ⊢ ∗(s, F → G) Then, . . . ⊢ ∗(s, F → G)
and . . . ⊢ ∗(t, F ). and . . . ⊢ ∗(t, F ).
Hence, . . . ⊢ ∗(s · t, G) Hence, . . . ⊢ ∗(s · t, G)
by ∗A2. So by ∗A2. So
A(s · t, G)=True. w ∈ A(s · t, G).
Sum Closure is similar to Application Closure.
Positive Introspection Closure is similar to Application Closure
(used only for J4CS , JD4CS , and LPCS).
CS Let c :A ∈ CS and n ≥ 0. Let c :A ∈ CS and n ≥ 0.
clos. By ∗CS ! (or ∗CS and ∗A5), By ∗CS ! (or ∗CS and ∗A5),
⊢ ∗(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, . . . : ! c :c :A). ⊢ ∗(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, . . . : ! c :c :A).
Thus, Thus,
A(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, . . . : ! c :c :A) = True. A(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, . . . : ! c :c :A) = W .
Monot. Let uRw and u ∈ A(t, F ).
cond. Then, B∗u ∪
⋃
zRu
B∗z ⊢∗!CS ∗(t, F ).
zRu implies zRw
since R is transitive. So
B∗u ∪
⋃
zRu
B∗z ⊆ B∗w ∪
⋃
zRw
B∗z .
Thus, B∗w ∪
⋃
zRw
B∗z ⊢∗!CS ∗(t, F ).
Therefore, w ∈ A(t, F )
(used only for
J4CS , JD4CS , and LPCS).
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This is how we deal with the potential problem described in Note 3.3.35.
Let JLCS ∈ {JDCS , JD4CS}. Let us assume that AEFB(JLCS) 6= ∅.6 Let
E ∈ AEFB(JLCS). By the Consistent Evidence condition for E , for every
term t, E(t,⊥) = False. Since we proved A ⊆ E , it follows that for every
term t, A(t,⊥) = False. Thus, the last of the conditions on A is satisfied,
and the proof of Theorem 3.3.41 is complete.
Combining the results of Theorems 3.3.34 and 3.3.41 we conclude that
Corollary 3.3.42.
1. For any logic
JLCS ∈ {JCS , JDCS , JTCS , J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS} ,
any F-type possible evidence function B on W 6= ∅, and any suitable
binary relation R ⊆ W × W , there exists a unique F-type minimal
admissible for JLCS evidence function on W or on (W,R) based on B,
defined according to
• (3.3.37) for JLCS ∈ {JCS , JDCS , JTCS} or
• (3.3.38) for JLCS ∈ {J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS}.
6This is the only place in the proof of Theorem 3.3.41 where this assumption is used.
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2. For any logic
JLCS ∈ {JCS , JTCS , J4CS , LPCS}
and any M-type possible evidence function B, there exists a unique M-
type minimal admissible for JLCS evidence function based on B, defined
by
• (3.3.35) for JLCS ∈ {JCS , JTCS} or
• (3.3.36) for JLCS ∈ {J4CS , LPCS}.
Minimal functions do not work for negative introspection.
Unfortunately, the apparatus of minimal functions breaks down in the pres-
ence of negative introspection, which is a major obstacle in proving decid-
ability. Minimal functions are the main tool in building countermodels con-
structively. So far, no similar tool has been found for logics J5CS , J45CS ,
JD45CS , and JT45CS ; thus, the only robust model we have for them is the
canonical model.
The Strong Evidence Property is one source of trouble. Consider an
admissible evidence function A on (W,R) for JT45CS . It is still not trivial
to construct a full F-model. Whenever u ∈ A(t, F ), by Strong Evidence,
u  t :F must be guaranteed; the latter depends on the truth value of F in
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all the worlds accessible from u. It is not immediately clear how to define a
propositional valuation V to comply with this requirement or even how to
determine whether such V exists.
But usually, instead of a complete admissible evidence function A we
are given some conditions it should satisfy, most commonly in the form of a
possible evidence function that A should be based on. It is equally unclear
how to construct A in this case. It is true that the total function Atot from
the proof of Theorem 3.3.34 satisfies all the closure conditions, including the
Negative Introspection Closure. But it assigns evidence terms to too many
formulas in too many worlds, notably to ⊥, which can never be true, a clear
violation of the Strong Evidence Property.
Minimality seems to be the answer. Unfortunately, there is no such thing
as a minimal function satisfying the Negative Introspection Closure, as the
following example shows:
Example 3.3.43. Consider, for instance, the simplest case of J50 and the
empty F-type possible evidence function B∅ on {w}:
B∅(t, F ) ≡ ∅ for all terms t and formulas F .
As a reminder, J50 has CS = ∅. Let us try to construct an F-type admissible
for J50 evidence function on {w}.
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Since for a justification variable x and a sentence letter p, both sets
{x :p, ¬ ? x :¬x :p} and {¬x :p}
are J50-consistent,
7 by Lemma 2.6.2.8, there must exist maximal J50-consistent
sets
Γ ⊃ {x :p, ¬ ?x :¬x :p} and ∆ ∋ ¬x :p
in the canonical F-model Mcan = (Wcan, Rcan, Vcan,Acan) for J50. Consider
two admissible for J50 evidence functions on {w} obtained by restricting Acan
to Γ and ∆ respectively:
w ∈ AΓ(t, F ) ⇐⇒ Γ ∈ Acan(t, F )
w ∈ A∆(t, F ) ⇐⇒ ∆ ∈ Acan(t, F )
Note that we are not building a model on {w}: we have not even defined V
or R. Our goal is to show that there can be no minimal admissible for J50
evidence function on {w}.
It should be clear that both AΓ and A∆ satisfy all the closure conditions.
Indeed, Acan does satisfy them and all conditions for J50 are local, i.e., operate
wholly within each world.
7Their consistency can be shown the same way the consistency of J50 was proven in
Theorem 3.2.21, i.e., by using the forgetful projection.
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Now x : p ∈ Γ; hence, Γ ∈ Acan(x, p) by definition (3.3.23) of Acan.
Therefore, w ∈ AΓ(x, p). At the same time, ? x :¬x :p /∈ Γ by Lemma 2.6.2.3,
so Γ /∈ Acan(?x,¬x :p) by (3.3.23). Thus, w /∈ AΓ(?x,¬x :p).
Similarly, w /∈ A∆(x, p) because ¬x :p ∈ ∆. Since
J50 ⊢ ¬x :p→ ?x :¬x :p ,
? x : ¬x : p ∈ ∆ by Lemma 2.6.2.6 and Lemma 2.6.2.4, which again implies
that w ∈ A∆(? x,¬x :p).
To summarize,
w ∈ AΓ(x, p) , w /∈ AΓ(?x,¬x :p) ,
w /∈ A∆(x, p) , w ∈ A∆(? x,¬x :p) .
So these functions are clearly incomparable: AΓ * A∆ and A∆ * AΓ. But
there can be no smaller admissible for J50 evidence function A on {w} such
that A ⊆ AΓ and A ⊆ A∆. Such A would have to satisfy
w /∈ A(x, p) , w /∈ A(?x,¬x :p) ,
which contradicts the Negative Introspection Closure. ◭
3.3.5 Historical Survey
M-models were originally developed by Alexey Mkrtychev in [Mkr97] for LPCS .
More precisely, Mkrtychev defined there two types of models, proved their
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equivalency, and showed soundness and completeness w.r.t. them. The mod-
els presented in Def. 3.3.1 correspond to what he called pre-models .
Later these models were generalized in [Kuz00] to JCS , JDCS , JTCS , J4CS ,
and JD4CS , and a soundness and completeness proof was provided.
The term evidence function was introduced by Melvin Fitting in [Fit03b]
for what is now called F-models (see Sect. 3.3.2). Mkrtychev originally used
the term proof-theorem assignment . The definition of an admissible evidence
function we used here originates from Sergei Artemov (see [Art07]).
F-models were first developed for LPCS by Fitting in [Fit03b] (see also [Fit05]),
where he showed soundness and completeness of LPCS w.r.t. them. More
precisely, he introduced two types of models and showed soundness and com-
pleteness w.r.t. both semantics. F-models are what Fitting called weak mod-
els.
Fully Explanatory Property (see Theorem 3.3.21) was introduced by Fit-
ting in [Fit05] as an additional condition for his strong models for LPCS .
In addition, in [Fit05], Fitting also considered F-models for J, JT, and J4.
In two independent works [Pac05] and [Rub06a], presented almost simul-
taneously, Eric Pacuit and Natalia Rubtsova suggested very similar formula-
tions of F-models for JT45. Pacuit, in addition, developed F-models for J5
and JD45. Soundness and completeness proofs for J, JD, and J5 can be
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found in [Pac05]. It was also noted there that a combination of these results
with Fitting’s technique from [Fit05] would yield soundness and complete-
ness results for JD45 and JT45. A direct proof for JT45 can also be found
in [Rub06b].
Sergei Artemov in [Art07] systematized and unified the existing results,
streamlined models for logics with negative introspection, and introduced F-
models for J45. There, Stability (see Theorem 3.3.21) and Strong Evidence
Property were first formulated; full soundness and completeness proofs for JT
and J4 first appeared there.
The F-models for JD4 were, perhaps, first explicitly formulated in [Kuz08].
It should be noted that both Pacuit’s F-models for logics J5CS , JD45CS ,
and JT45CS and Rubtsova’s F-models for JT45CS differed from the ones pre-
sented in Def. 3.3.6, which follows [Art07]. Instead of the Strong Evidence
Property, Pacuit used Anti-Monotonicity (see Theorem 3.3.21) in conjunc-
tion with the requirement for R to be Euclidean. Rubtsova, while using a
property easily equivalent to the Strong Evidence, required that R be an
equivalence relation on W , i.e., reflexive, transitive, and symmetric, whereas
in Def. 3.3.6 it is only required to be reflexive and transitive.
As Artemov showed in [Art07], these formulations are equivalent to the
one given here (see Theorem 3.3.21).
CHAPTER 3. JUSTIFICATION LOGICS DEFINED 117
The new notation we used for the ∗-calculus is an homage to Mkrtychev,
who was the first to use the machinery of minimal functions for his symbolic
models of LPCS in [Mkr97]. He used ∗ in place of A.
3.4 Reflected Fragments of Pure Justification
Logics
Definition 3.4.1. For a justification logic JLCS , its reflected fragment rJLCS
is defined as
rJLCS = {t :F | JLCS ⊢ t :F} . (3.4.1)
◭
The study of reflected fragments was initiated by Nikolai Krupski in [Kru03]
(see also [Kru06a, Kru06b]), who found an axiomatization for rLPCS with an
arbitrary constant specification CS.
The reflected fragments of justification logics happen to have a rather
elegant axiomatization of their own that resembles the closure conditions
on admissible evidence functions, which will be actively exploited in future
decidability and complexity proofs.
Theorem 3.4.2.
1. The reflected fragment rJLCS of JLCS ∈ {JCS , JDCS , JTCS} is axiomatized
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by the ∗CS-calculus:
rJLCS ⊢ t :F ⇐⇒ JLCS ⊢ t :F ⇐⇒ ∗CS-calculus ⊢ ∗(t, F ) .
2. The reflected fragment rJLCS of JLCS ∈ {J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS} is axioma-
tized by the ∗!CS-calculus:
rJLCS ⊢ t :F ⇐⇒ JLCS ⊢ t :F ⇐⇒ ∗!CS-calculus ⊢ ∗(t, F ) .
Corollary 3.4.3. If CS can serve as a constant specification for justification
logics JLCS and JL
′
CS , either both from Clause 1 or both from Clause 2 of
Theorem 3.4.2, then
rJLCS = rJL
′
CS .
Note 3.4.4. Cor. 3.4.3 by no means implies that, for instance, rLP = rJ4
or that rJ = rJD. Each of these logics uses its respective total constant
specification: T CSLP, T CSJ4, T CSJ, or T CSJD. Thus, T CSLP ) T CSJ4,
whereas T CSJ ( T CSJD.
Proof of Theorem 3.4.2. The left equivalence in both clauses is by Def. 3.4.1
of the reflected fragment.
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The ⇐= direction of the right equivalence is easily proven by induction
on the derivation in the respective ∗-calculus (we will use ⊢∗ to denote deriva-
tions in either ∗-calculus whenever safe):
∗CS !. (Clause 1.) For each c :A ∈ CS and each integer n ≥ 0, by R4!CS ,
JLCS ⊢ ! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c : . . . : ! c :c :A .
∗CS. (Clause 2.) For each c :A ∈ CS, by R4CS ,
JLCS ⊢ c :A .
∗A2. Let
⊢∗ ∗(s,H → G) and ⊢∗ ∗(s′, H) .
By IH,
JLCS ⊢ s : (H → G) and JLCS ⊢ s′ :H .
By A2,
JLCS ⊢ s : (H → G)→ (s′ :H → s · s′ :G) .
So, using modus ponens twice, we get
JLCS ⊢ s · s′ :G .
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Rules ∗A3 and ∗A5, the latter being necessary only in Clause 2, are
similar to rule ∗A2.
It now remains to demonstrate the =⇒ direction of the right equivalence.
Let JLCS ⊢ t :F . Suppose towards a contradiction that 0∗ ∗(t, F ) for the
respective ∗-calculus. Consider W = {w} and R = {(w,w)}. Let B∅ ≡ ∅ be
the empty possible evidence function on W . By Cor. 3.3.42.1, the minimal
function exists in the class
• AEFB∅(JLCS ,W ), defined by (3.3.37) for Clause 1;
• AEFB∅(JLCS ,W,R), defined by (3.3.38) for Clause 2.
Let us denote this minimal admissible evidence function by A.
Note that the chosen R is reflexive, serial, and transitive. Moreover, for
this R and for B∅, (3.3.37) turns into
w ∈ A(t, F ) ⇐⇒ ⊢∗CS ∗(t, F ) ,
whereas (3.3.38) becomes
w ∈ A(t, F ) ⇐⇒ ⊢∗!CS ∗(t, F ) .
In either case, we assume the right side to be false, which would require
the common left side to be false too, i.e., w /∈ A(t, F ). Let us choose an
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arbitrary propositional valuation V to get an F-model M = (W,R, V,A).
Since all conditions on R and A are satisfied, M is an F-model for JLCS .
In this model, M, w 1 t :F since w /∈ A(t, F ). By soundness of JLCS ,8 this
would contradict the initial assumption that JLCS ⊢ t :F . This contradiction
completes the proof of the =⇒ direction and of Theorem 3.4.2.
It would seem that Theorem 3.4.2 can be easily extended to derivations
from hypotheses, but the situation is not so simple. Imagine a set of formulas
Γ = {si :Gi | i = 1, . . . , n} that is JLCS-inconsistent. Then, using classical
propositional logic, Γ ⊢JLCS t : F for any t : F . But it may not be that
Γ ⊢rJLCS t :F in the absence of the basic level of propositional reasoning as
the following example shows:
Example 3.4.5. The set {x :⊥} is JT-inconsistent for any justification vari-
able x. Indeed, JT ⊢ x :⊥ → ⊥ is an instance of axiom A4. Hence,
x :⊥ ⊢JT ⊥
and, more generally, for any formula F ,
x :⊥ ⊢JT F
8JLCS is sound w.r.t. F-models even if CS is not axiomatically appropriate (see
Note 3.3.15).
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In particular, for a sentence letter p,
x :⊥ ⊢JT x :p .
At the same time,
∗(x,⊥) 0∗T CSJT ∗(x, p) .
◭
Inconsistency of Γ may be sufficient but is certainly not necessary to break
the equivalence:
Example 3.4.6. Since by Factivity Axiom A4, JT0 ⊢ y :x :p→ x :p for distinct
justification variables x and y and for a sentence letter p,
y :x :p ⊢JT0 x :p .
But it is clear that
∗(y, x :p) 0∗∅ ∗(x, p) .
◭
Nevertheless, one direction does hold for derivations from hypotheses:
Definition 3.4.7. For a set X of ∗-expressions of type ∗(t, F ),
X : = {t :F | ∗(t, F ) ∈ X} .
◭
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Lemma 3.4.8. Let X be a set of ∗-expressions.
1. For JLCS ∈ {JCS , JDCS , JTCS}
X ⊢∗CS ∗(t, F ) =⇒ X : ⊢JLCS t :F .
2. For JLCS ∈ {J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS}
X ⊢∗!CS ∗(t, F ) =⇒ X : ⊢JLCS t :F .
Proof. Proof by induction on the ∗-derivation.
∗CS !. (Clause 1.) For any c :A ∈ CS and any integer n ≥ 0, by R4!CS ,
JLCS ⊢ ! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A .
∗CS. (Clause 2.) For any c :A ∈ CS, by R4CS , JLCS ⊢ c :A.
Hyp. If ∗(t, F ) ∈ X, then t :F ∈ X : , so X : ⊢JLCS t :F .
∗A2. Application Rule ∗(s1, G→ F ) ∗ (s2, G)∗(s1 · s2, F )
By IH, X : ⊢JLCS s1 : (G → F ) and X : ⊢JLCS s2 :G. By Application
Axiom A2 and modus ponens, X : ⊢JLCS s1 · s2 :F .
∗A3. Sum Rule and Positive Introspection Rule (the latter only for Clause 2)
are similar.
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Another interesting connection between ∗-calculi and justification logics
is the ability to “strip” the outer terms from a ∗-derivation.
Definition 3.4.9. For a set X of ∗-expressions of type ∗(t, F ),
X♯ = {F | ∗(t, F ) ∈ X} .
◭
Lemma 3.4.10. Let X be a set of ∗-expressions.
1. For JLCS ∈ {JCS , JDCS , JTCS},
X ⊢∗CS ∗(t, F ) =⇒ X♯ ⊢JLCS F .
2. For JLCS ∈ {J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS},
X ⊢∗!CS ∗(t, F ) =⇒ X♯, X : ⊢JLCS F .
Proof. Proof by induction on the ∗-derivation.
∗CS !. (Clause 1.) For any c :A ∈ CS and any integer n ≥ 1,
⊢∗CS ∗(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A) .
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We can use R4!CS to show
JLCS ⊢ ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A .
In addition, for any c :A ∈ CS, ⊢∗CS ∗(c, A). Here JLCS ⊢ A because
A is an axiom of JLCS .
∗CS. (Clause 2.) For any c :A ∈ CS, ⊢∗!CS ∗(c, A). Again JLCS ⊢ A because
A is an axiom of JLCS .
Hyp. If ∗(t, F ) ∈ X, then F ∈ X♯, so X♯ ⊢JLCS F .
∗A2. Application Rule ∗(s1, G→ F ) ∗ (s2, G)∗(s1 · s2, F )
Let Y denote X♯ for the ∗CS-calculus or X♯ ∪X : for the ∗!CS-calculus.
By IH, Y ⊢JLCS G→ F and Y ⊢JLCS G. By modus ponens, Y ⊢JLCS F .
∗A3. Sum Rule is similar to ∗A2.
∗A5. (Clause 2.) Positive Introspection Rule ∗(s,G)∗(! s, s :G)
By Lemma 3.4.8.2, X : ⊢JLCS s :G.
Note 3.4.11. The addition of X : to the set of hypotheses in the case of the
∗!CS-calculus is necessary, as was first pointed out by Vladimir Krupski in a
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private conversation. The following example is due to him:
∗(x, p) ⊢∗!CS ∗(!x, x :p) ,
but
p 0JLCS x :p
for any justification logic JLCS with Positive Introspection Axiom, any justi-
fication variable x, and any sentence letter p.
3.5 Hybrid Justification Logics
Modality and justifications present two sides of the epistemic coin. The use
of modality to represent knowledge, although convenient, does not reflect
the “justified” part of the centuries-old definition of knowledge as justified
true belief, which goes back to Plato. (Needless to say, as any centuries-old
idea, this definition has been hotly contested from the very beginning, even
by Plato himself. Its detailed analysis by means of justification logic with a
survey of literature can be found in [Art07].) Using justification terms seems
to take care of this gap. At the same time, an assumption that we will always
be given a concrete justification seems to be overoptimistic. We may know
but not know why we know, in which case modality seems a better choice
than a justification term. Hybrid logics combine the two worlds allowing to
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use both explicitly stated reasons t :F and knowledge without specifying any
reason F .
We will consider a multiple agent situation. Therefore, in this section,
modalities will be denoted by Ki, i = 1, . . . , n, rather than by i. We will
also assume that any evidence is undeniable and is accepted by all the agents.
These assumptions underly the axiom systems described below.
3.5.1 Axiom Systems for Hybrid Justification Logics
Definition 3.5.1. Formulas of hybrid justification language HLn are
obtained by combining modal constructs from languageMLn with justifica-
tion constructs from JL:
F ::= pi | ⊥ | (F → F ) | (KjF ) | (t :F ) (3.5.1)
where pi, i = 0, 1, 2, . . ., are sentence letters, t is a justification term of JL,
and j = 1, . . . , n.
We will call these formulas hybrid justification formulas, or simply hybrid
formulas. The set of all hybrid formulas in language HLn will be denoted
by Fmn. ◭
Note 3.5.2. We will continue to denote hybrid formulas by Latin letters.
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Definition 3.5.3. The size of hybrid formulas and terms is measured in the
same way as in Def. 3.1.4, with an addition of a new case
|KiG| = |G|+ 1 ,
where G is a hybrid formula, i ≥ 1 is an integer. ◭
Definition 3.5.4. Axioms and rules of TnLPCS include
Propositional part
A1. Finitely many schemes of classical propositional logic in language
HLn along with
Modus Ponens Rule
F → G F
G
Justification part
A2. Application Axiom s : (F → G)→ (t :F → s · t :G)
A3. Monotonicity Axiom s :F → s+ t :F
t :F → s+ t :F
A4. Factivity Axiom t :F → F
A5. Positive Introspection t :F → ! t : t :F
R4CS . Axiom Internalization Rule
c :A ∈ CS
c :A
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Modal part
Ki. Normality Axiom for Ki Ki(F → G)→ (KiF → KiG)
Ti. Reflexivity Axiom for Ki KiF → F
Neci. Modal Necessitation Rule for Ki
⊢ F
⊢ KiF
and the Connection Principle that details the relationship between
justifications and knowledge
C1. Connection principle t :F → KiF
where F and G are hybrid formulas in languageHLn, t and s are justification
terms in language JL, A is an axiom of the logic, c is an justification constant,
and 1 ≤ i ≤ n is an integer. ◭
Definition 3.5.5. The system S4nLPCS is obtained by adding to the modal
section of TnLPCS ’s axioms the following
4i. Modal Positive Introspection for Ki KiF → KiKiF ◭
Definition 3.5.6. The system S5nLPCS is obtained by adding to the modal
section of S4nLPCS ’s axioms the following
5i. Modal Negative Introspection for Ki ¬KiF → Ki¬KiF ◭
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Definition 3.5.7. As with justification logics, the total constant specifi-
cation for HL ∈ {TnLP, S4nLP, S5nLP} is
T CSHL = {c :A | c is a justification constant, A is an axiom of HL} .
TnLP, S4nLP, and S5nLP will denote respective logics with their respective
total constant specifications.
For n = 1, we will often omit the index and write TLP, S4LP, and S5LP
instead of T1LP, S41LP, and S51LP respectively.
We will use the term hybrid logic for any of TnLPCS , S4nLPCS , S5nLPCS .
◭
Hybrid logics enjoy the standard set of properties, such as Lifting Lemma,
Deduction Theorem, and Substitution Property.
Lemma 3.5.8 (Lifting Lemma, [AN04, Art04a]). For any hybrid logic HLCS
with axiomatically appropriate CS, if
F1, . . . , Fm, y1 :G1, . . . , yk :Gk ⊢HLCS B ,
then there exists a term t(x1, . . . , xm) for some fresh justification variables
xi, i = 1, . . . ,m, such that
x1 :F1, . . . , xm :Fm, y1 :G1, . . . , yk :Gk ⊢HLCS t(x1, . . . , xm) :B .
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In particular, for k = 0,
Corollary 3.5.9 (Internalization Property). For any hybrid logic HLCS
with axiomatically appropriate CS, if
F1, . . . , Fm ⊢HLCS B ,
then there exists a term t(x1, . . . , xm) for some fresh justification variables
xi, i = 1, . . . ,m, such that
x1 :F1, . . . , xm :Fm ⊢HLCS t(x1, . . . , xm) :B .
If both k and m are put to 0,
Corollary 3.5.10 (Constructive Necessitation). For any hybrid logic HLCS
with axiomatically appropriate CS, if
HLCS ⊢ B ,
then there exists a ground term t such that
HLCS ⊢ t :B .
Lemma 3.5.11 (Deduction Theorem, [AN04, Art04a]). For any hybrid
logic HLCS , if
Γ, F ⊢HLCS G ,
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then
Γ ⊢HLCS F → G .
Lemma 3.5.12 (Substitution Property, [AN04, Art04a]). For any hybrid
logic HLCS with schematic CS, if
Γ ⊢HLCS F ,
then
Γ[s\x,G\p] ⊢HLCS F [s\x,G\p] ,
where [s\x,G\p] means substituting justification term s for justification vari-
able x and/or formula G for sentence letter p.
Lemma 3.5.13 (Substitution Property with renaming of constants).
For any hybrid logic HL and any axiomatically appropriate CS for HL, if
Γ ⊢HLCS F ,
then
Γ[s\x,G\p] ⊢HLCS F [s\x,G\p] ,
where [s\x,G\p] means substituting justification term s for justification vari-
able x and/or formula G for sentence letter p, and formula F is obtained from
formula F by replacing some justification constants with other constants.
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3.5.2 Semantics for Hybrid Logics
Definition 3.5.14. AnAF-model for a hybrid logic HLCS in languageHLn
is an (n+ 4)-tuple
M = (W,Re, R1, . . . , Rn, V,A) ,
where W 6= ∅ is a set of worlds, Ri ⊆ W ×W , i = 1, . . . , n, and Re ⊆ W ×W
are binary accessibility relations on W ,
V : SLet→ 2W (3.5.2)
is a propositional valuation that assigns to each sentence letter p a set of
worlds where p is true,
A : Tm× Fm→ 2W (3.5.3)
is an admissible evidence function. Informally, A(t, F ) ⊆ W is a set of worlds
where term t is considered admissible evidence for formula F .
Accessibility relations Ri, i = 1, . . . , n, must be reflexive; Re must be
reflexive and transitive. Ri ⊆ Re, i = 1, . . . , n.
In addition, for S4nLPCS , binary relations Ri, i = 1, . . . , n, must be tran-
sitive.
For S5nLPCS , binary relations Ri, i = 1, . . . , n, must also be symmetric
and transitive.
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The admissible evidence function A must satisfy the following closure
conditions:
• Application Closure: A(s, F → G) ∩ A(t, F ) ⊆ A(s · t, G);
• Sum Closure: A(s, F ) ∪ A(t, F ) ⊆ A(s+ t, F );
• Simplified CS Closure: if c :A ∈ CS, then
A(c :A) = W ;
• Positive Introspection Closure:
A(t, F ) ⊆ A(! t, t :F );
• Monotonicity :
u ∈ A(t, F ) and uRev yield v ∈ A(t, F )
for any formulas F and G in language HLn, any terms t and s in lan-
guage JL, any justification constant c, any axiom A of the hybrid logic,
and any worlds u, v ∈ W .
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The truth relation M, u  H is defined as follows:
M, u  p ⇌ u ∈ V (p) (3.5.4)
M, u 2 ⊥ (3.5.5)
M, u  F → G ⇌ M, u 2 F or M, u  G (3.5.6)
M, u  KiF ⇌ M, w  F for all uRiw (3.5.7)
M, u  t :F ⇌ M, w  F for all uRew and u ∈ A(t, F ) (3.5.8)
As usual, a formula F is called valid in an AF-model M = (W,R, V,A),
M  F , if F is true at every world w ∈W :
M, w  F for each w ∈W .
A formula F is called HLCS-valid if F is valid in all AF-models of HLCS . ◭
Theorem 3.5.15 (Completeness Theorem, [Art04a]). Let
HL ∈ {TnLP, S4nLP, S5nLP} .
Then, the following holds:
HLCS ⊢ F ⇐⇒ F is HLCS-valid.
F-models are instances of AF-models with n = 1, R1 = Re, and with
M, w  F defined as in (2.4.4).
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Theorem 3.5.16 (Completeness Theorem, [AN04, Fit04b]). S4LP is
sound and complete w.r.t. F-models for LP.
Corollary 3.5.17. Hybrid logics TnLPCS , S4nLPCS , S5nLPCS are consistent.
Proof. It is sufficient to present one model for each. We will present one
model that fits all of them. Let W = {w}, Ri = Re = {(w,w)}, V (p) = W ,
and A(t, F ) = W . It is easy to verify that all conditions for any of the logics
are satisfied.
3.5.3 Minimal Evidence Functions for AF-Models
We will now extend the main results about the minimal evidence functions
to hybrid logics. Most proofs and some definitions can be applied literally,
so we will only outline the necessary changes, if any.
F-type possible evidence functions (see Def. 3.3.27) can still be used for
AF-models with a natural proviso that formulas now include all hybrid for-
mulas. The definitions of one possible function being based on another (see
Def. 3.3.29) and of the minimal evidence function in the given class of pos-
sible evidence functions (see Def. 3.3.30) also remain unchanged. Proposi-
tion 3.3.31 still holds.
Theorem 3.5.18. Let HLCS ∈ {TnLPCS , S4nLPCS , S5nLPCS}. For any (A)F-
type possible evidence function B on set W and any reflexive and transitive
CHAPTER 3. JUSTIFICATION LOGICS DEFINED 137
binary relation Re ⊆ W ×W , the class AEFB(HLCS ,W,Re) is not empty and
has a (unique) minimal element.
Note 3.5.19. For AF-models, the Monotonicity Condition involves only Re,
hence its appearance in the formulation in place of R in Theorem 3.3.34.3.
Note also that the justification part for all these hybrid logics is of LP type,
hence the requirements of transitivity and reflexivity on Re.
Proof. The proof is a word-for-word repetition of the proof of Theorem 3.3.34
for LPCS with the only change: R in the Monotonicity Condition has to be
replaced by Re.
We will use the ∗!CS-calculus from Def. 3.3.39 (see also Table 3.3.4 and
Def. 3.3.37) with rules ∗CS, ∗A2, ∗A3, and ∗A5 that was used for LPCS .
Theorem 3.5.20. Let HLCS ∈ {TnLPCS , S4nLPCS , S5nLPCS}, and let Re be
a reflexive and transitive binary relation on W . For any (A)F-type possible
evidence function B on W , define an (A)F-type possible evidence function A
on W according to
∗(t, F ) ∈ A∗w ⇐⇒
⋃
uRew
B∗u ⊢∗!CS ∗(t, F ) . (3.5.9)
Then, A ∈ AEFB(HLCS ,W,Re) is the minimal function in this class.
Note 3.5.21. Note that B∗w is not a separate term in the union, unlike (3.3.38).
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Proof. Again, we need to prove that
• A is based on B,
• A ⊆ E for any E ∈ AEFB(HLCS ,W,Re),
• A is admissible.
Suppose w ∈ B(t, F ). Then, ∗(t, F ) ∈ B∗w . Relation Re is reflexive, so
wRew. Thus,
⋃
uRew
B∗u ⊢∗!CS ∗(t, F ). Hence, ∗(t, F ) ∈ A∗w , i.e., w ∈ A(t, F ).
This completes the proof that A is based on B.
The proof that any function E ∈ AEFB(HLCS ,W,Re) must be based on A
is a repetition of the cases for LPCS in Theorem 3.3.41, with R replaced by Re
again.
Finally, we need to show that A itself is an admissible for HLCS evidence
function on (W,Re), namely, that it satisfies all the closure conditions. The
only change necessary here is to the Monotonicity Condition:
Let uRw and u ∈ A(t, F ). Then,
⋃
zReu
B∗z ⊢∗!CS ∗(t, F ). By transitivity
of Re, if zReu, then zRew. So
⋃
zReu
B∗z ⊆
⋃
zRew
B∗z . Thus,
⋃
zRew
B∗z ⊢∗!CS ∗(t, F ).
Therefore, w ∈ A(t, F ).
Thus, the proof of Theorem 3.5.20 is complete.
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3.5.4 Reflected Fragments of Hybrid Logics
Definition 3.5.22. Again, for each hybrid logic HLCS its reflected frag-
ment rHLCS is defined as
rHLCS = {t :F | HLCS ⊢ t :F} . (3.5.10)
◭
Theorem 3.5.23. Let HLCS ∈ {TnLPCS , S4nLPCS , S5nLP}. Its reflected frag-
ment rHLCS is axiomatized by the ∗!CS-calculus:
rHLCS ⊢ t :F ⇐⇒ HLCS ⊢ t :F ⇐⇒ ∗!CS-calculus ⊢ ∗(t, F )
Corollary 3.5.24. If CS can serve as a constant specification for both hybrid
logics HL and HL′, then
rHLCS = rHL
′
CS .
Proof of Theorem 3.5.23. The left equivalency is by Def. 3.5.22 of the re-
flected fragment.
The⇐= direction of the right equivalence is easily proven by induction on
the derivation in the ∗!CS-calculus (see an identical proof in Theorem 3.4.2).
It now remains to demonstrate the =⇒ direction of the right equivalence.
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Let HLCS ⊢ t : F . Suppose towards a contradiction that 0∗!CS ∗(t, F ).
Let W = {w} and Re = R1 = . . . = Rn = {(w,w)}. Let B∅ ≡ ∅ be
the empty possible evidence function on W . By Theorem 3.5.20, the class
AEFB∅(HLCS ,W,Re) has a minimal function defined by (3.5.9). Let us denote
this minimal function by A.
Note that the chosen Re and Ri, i = 1, . . . , n, are reflexive, transitive,
and symmetric; Re ⊆ Ri for i = 1, . . . , n. Moreover, for this Re and for B∅,
(3.5.9) becomes
w ∈ A(t, F ) ⇐⇒ ⊢∗!CS ∗(t, F ) .
We assumed the right side to be false, which requires the left side to be false
too, i.e., w /∈ A(t, F ). Choose a propositional valuation V arbitrarily to get
an AF-model M = (W,Re, R1, . . . , Rn, V,A) for HLCS . All conditions on Re
and Ri are satisfied.
In this model, M, w 1 t : F since w /∈ A(t, F ). By soundness of HLCS ,
this contradicts the initial assumption that HLCS ⊢ t :F . The contradiction
completes the proof of the =⇒ direction and of Theorem 3.5.23.
Lemma 3.5.25. Let HL ∈ {TnLP, S4nLP, S5nLP} and CS be a constant spec-
ification for HL. Then,
X ⊢∗!CS ∗(t, F ) =⇒ X : ⊢HLCS t :F
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Proof. The proof repeats word-for-word the proof of Lemma 3.4.8.
3.5.5 Historical Survey
The first studies of hybrid logics combining modal operators with justification
terms were started by Sergei Artemov in [Art94] and Elena Nogina in [Nog94]
where the authors were trying to model arithmetical provability without any
operations on justification terms. This line of research was continued by
Tatiana Yavorskaya (Sidon) in [Sid97, Yav01a] and in joint work by Artemov
and Nogina [AN04]. In these works, Kripke-style models were developed and
arithmetical completeness and decidability were demonstrated. Our research
is concentrated on the epistemic modal logics rather than on modeling the
properties of arithmetical proofs; therefor, the logics involving GL or Grz are
outside of the scope of this thesis.
The first paper to combine the epistemic modal logic S4 with justification
terms was [AN04]. Two systems were introduced there, LPS4 and LPS4−.
The former can be identified with S41LP in the modern notation, whereas the
latter is obtained by adding to it the weak principle of negative introspection,
also called explicit negative introspection principle
¬t :F → ¬t :F .
LPS4
− was supplied with a somewhat antiquated Kripke-style semantics
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whereas S41LP turned out to be sound w.r.t. F-models.
The completeness of S41LP w.r.t. F-models was shown by Melvin Fitting
in [Fit04b].
Artemov in [Art04a] (see also [Art06]) generalized S41LP to multiple
modalities of one of the three types: T, S4, or S5, thus creating logics
TnLP, S4nLP, and S5nLP. In that paper he used the term logics of evidence-
based knowledge for the logics we call hybrid here. Artemov suggested AF-
models as the new semantical framework that generalizes F-models and
proved soundness and completeness of all three series of hybrid logics w.r.t.
their respective AF-models.
AF-models were applied in [AN05a] (see also [AN05c, AN05b]) to cre-
ate a more elegant semantics for LPS4− rebranded S4LPN. Namely, it was
shown that S4LPN is sound and complete w.r.t. AF-models with symmet-
ric Re. Note that Re must also be reflexive and transitive, which makes it
an equivalence relation.
In all these logics the justification part is based on LP. Natalia Rubtsova
considered logics with justifications based on JT45: S4nLP(S5) in [Rub06a]
and S5nLP(S5) in [Rub06c, Rub06d]. But these logics remain outside the
scope of this thesis.
Chapter 4
Decidability
Finite Model Property (FMP) is often the tool used for proving decidability
in modal logic. As we discussed in Sect. 3.3.3, in many cases M-models are
nothing but one-world F-models. Thus, completeness w.r.t. M-models is a
very strong form of FMP. The question of decidability should then be closed?
Unfortunately, the situation is not as simple as it may seem (actually, it is
not simple in modal logic either). No matter how small W is in an F-model
(Fk-model, AF-model), the admissible evidence function is necessarily not a
finite object. We need, therefore, to generalize the FMP traditionally used.
We will start by its detailed analysis. Because of the extreme sensitivity of
the issue, we will resort to quotes from popular textbooks and monographs
in the next section.
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4.1 Finite Model Property vs. Finite Frame
Property
Here is how the Finite Model Property (FMP) and the finite frame property
are traditionally defined:1
Definition 4.1.1. A logic L has the Finite Model Property if it is com-
plete with respect to some class of finite Kripke models. ◭
Definition 4.1.2. A logic L is said to be finitely approximable (or to
have the finite frame property) if there is a class CF of finite frames such
that
L = {ϕ | ∀F ∈ CF ϕ is valid in F} .
◭
Proving one of those properties is a road to establishing decidability by
means of Post’s argument:
Theorem 4.1.3 (Post’s Theorem). If both a set and its complement are
recursively enumerable, then the set is decidable.
Usually the set of theorems of a logic is recursively enumerable. So the
finite frame property can be used to ensure that the complement of the
1These formulations are taken from [CZ97, p.119] and [CZ97, p.49] respectively.
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logic, the set of all refutable formulas is recursively enumerable too. The
idea is to enumerate refutable formulas of the logic through an enumeration
of refuting frames from class CF . Indeed, Lemma 16.12 in [CZ97, p.497]
explicitly states:2
If L is characterized by recursively enumerable class of finite
[...] frames [...] then the set of formulas which do not belong to L
is recursively enumerable[...]
even though the requirement of being recursively enumerable is omitted from
Harrop’s Theorem 16.13 in [CZ97, p.497]:
Theorem 4.1.4 (Harrop’s Theorem). Every finitely axiomatizable and
finitely approximable logic L is decidable.
This omitted assumption rarely comes into play since most commonly
studied modal logics are complete w.r.t decidable classes of Kripke frames,
let alone recursively enumerable. In particular, all the classes of frames
described in Theorem 2.4.15 are clearly decidable.
Switching from frames to models involves another hidden assumption, this
time an assumption that paves the way to generalizing FMP to F- and AF-
models. The problem is that the set of all (distinct representations of) finite
2In all the quotes in this section boldface is by RK.
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models is uncountable, so it clearly cannot be recursively enumerable. Even
the class of all single-world models is already uncountable because there are
uncountably many propositional valuations for the countably many sentence
letters. That is why the model variant of Harrop’s Theorem in [BdRV01] is
formulated with care (see Theorem 6.7 in [BdRV01, p.340]):
If L is a normal modal logic that has the strong Finite Model
Property with respect to a recursive set of models CM , then L
is decidable.3
A formulation more akin to Harrop’s Theorem would be
If L is a finitely axiomatizable normal modal logic that has the
Finite Model Property with respect to a recursively enumer-
able set of models CM , then L is decidable.
Note the requirement for the class of refuting models to be recursively
enumerable. We need the generalized FMP to be formulated in a way that
would guarantee such recursive enumerability.
Later in the same textbook, there is an application to K4 (see proof of
Corollary 6.8 in [BdRV01, pp.340–341]):
3Strong Finite Model Property is the requirement for the size (number of worlds) of
the countermodel to be a computable function of the length of formula to be refuted. It
is necessary here as is decidability of the class of models because the logic is not required
to be finitely axiomatizable.
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K4 has the f[inite] m[odel] p[roperty] with respect to the set of
finite transitive models [...] It remains to check that the relevant
sets of finite models are recursive. Checking for membership in
these sets boils down to checking that the models possess [...]
such properties as [...] transitivity [...] It is clearly possible to
devise algorithms to test for the relevant properties [...]
The argument would have been correct were the set of all finite transitive
models countable. As it is not, the desired algorithm does not exist for a
trivial reason: the set of all finite transitive models cannot be encoded in any
finite alphabet. This is exactly the problem pointed out in [FHMV95, p.63]):
There is no general procedure for doing model checking in an
infinite Kripke structure. Indeed, it is not even possible to
represent arbitrary infinite structures effectively.
The reason this small, but important point is often being silently bypassed
lies, perhaps, in the following theorem (see, for example, [BdRV01, Theo-
rem 3.28]):
Theorem 4.1.5. A normal modal logic has the finite frame property iff it
has the Finite Model Property.
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Even though the set of all finite models is uncountable, the set of all finite
frames is certainly countable, and that is exactly what Blackburn et al. mean
by “checking for membership in these sets.”
When efficiency becomes important, for instance, when complexity of the
decision procedure is being studied, even more care is necessary. Another
hidden assumption is uncovered in [FHMV95]. Not only is it stated that
the class of models should be effectively described, but it is also made ex-
plicit that, to obtain a recursive enumeration of all refutable formulas from
a recursive enumeration of all refuting models, it is necessary to be able to
effectively check whether a given formula is true at a given world of a given
model. Here is a sample proposition to this effect (see Proposition 3.2.1 in
[FHMV95, p.63]):4
There is an algorithm that, given a [Kripke model] M, a [world] w
of M, and a formula ϕ ∈MLn, determines, in timeO(||M||×|ϕ|),
whether M, w  ϕ.
Here ||M|| for a model M = (W,R, V ) is the number of worlds in W plus
the number of pairs in R.
This proposition, though false, probably best exemplifies the problems
we are facing when an admissible evidence function is superimposed over a
4The notation in the quote is converted to the one used in this thesis.
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Kripke model. The proposition is false because the problem in question is
undecidable. In fact, it is not hard to construct a one-world model where
this problem would be undecidable already for sentence letters. The recipe
is simple: take an undecidable valuation V .
4.2 Hidden Assumptions in FMP
Not surprisingly, the culprit is again the propositional valuation function,
which is an infinitary object, a function with an infinite (though countable)
domain. This makes the set of all finite models uncountable because 2ℵ0 = c.
But most authors, as we saw, ignore the infinitary nature of V , and they
have good reasons too. To refute one formula, say ϕ, we only need to take
care of the sentence letters occurring in ϕ. All other sentence letters have no
effect on the truth value of ϕ. But each formula contains only finitely many
sentence letters, which effectively turns the propositional valuation into a
finitary object.
There are two ways to make this official: ignoring the other variables
altogether as in [BdRV01, p. 10]:5
Although we generally assume that the set SLet of sentence let-
ters is a countably infinite set {p0, p1, . . .}, occasionally we need
5Again the notation is changed from the original.
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to make other assumptions. For instance, when we are after
decidability results, it may be useful to stipulate that SLet is
finite [...]
as in “restricted to the sentence letters occurring in the formula.” Later it is
formulated quite clearly (see [BdRV01, p.335]):
[W]hen evaluating a formula ϕ in some model, the only relevant
information in the valuation is the assignments made to proposi-
tion letters actually occurring in ϕ [...] Thus, instead of working
with V , we can work with the finite valuation V ′ which is defined
on the (finite) language consisting of exactly the proposition let-
ters in ϕ, and which agrees with V on these letters.
In effect, this requires to consider partial Kripke models that are formula-
dependent, or rather models in which some formulas are true, some are false,
and some are undefined (if the formula has variables not assigned a truth
value by the finite valuation). Soundness does not hold with respect to
these models, but certain variant of completeness does, namely, a formula is
refutable iff it is refutable in such a partial model. This is exactly what is
needed to prove decidability via Post’s argument. The set of all partial Kripke
models is decidable and truth in such models can be effectively determined,
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so all the hurdles are cleared.
The alternative is to acknowledge the unimportance of most variables by
forcibly making them all false. Consider a subclass of Kripke models with
finitely true valuations:
Definition 4.2.1. A propositional valuation V : SLet→ 2W is called finitely
true if the set
{p | V (p) 6= ∅}
is finite. ◭
In this way we change neither language nor models. Theorem 2.4.15 lists
the restrictions on the accessibility relation R for common modal logics. The
soundness and completeness statements survive the restriction of W to finite
sets and the restriction of V to finitely true valuations.
Which of the two ways is more elegant is, of course, a matter of taste.
The former solution, partial models, is, in a way, reader-friendly because
many of the inelegant details (such as partial soundness) are relegated to
the depths of the completeness proof, the reader does not have to deal with
them while applying the theorem. The latter solution, on the contrary, keeps
the completeness proof relatively tidy, but shifts part of the responsibility to
the reader by requiring him/her to conform to the additional (rather trivial)
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restriction on valuations.
To emphasize that care is indeed needed around FMP, it is useful to keep
in mind the Alasdair Urquhart’s example of a recursively enumerable modal
logic with a finite model property that is nevertheless undecidable ([Urq81]).
This example shows that even within modal logic the hidden assumptions in
FMP are a treacherous ground the moment you leave the beaten path.
4.3 Finitary Model Property
To summarize the discussion, restricting the class of models to finite ones does
not by itself yield decidability as even a finite model harbors an infinitary
object (propositional valuation). Let us factor all the hidden assumptions
back into the formulation of FMP:
Lemma 4.3.1. Let finitely axiomatizable logic L be sound and complete with
respect to a class of models CM , such that
• Class CM is recursively enumerable;
• the binary relation “formula ϕ is satisfiable in model M” between for-
mulas and models from CM is decidable.
Then, L is decidable.
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Proof. It is well known that a finitely axiomatizable logic is recursively enu-
merable.
Here is an algorithm recursively enumerating the complement of the logic.
Since both the set of models and the set of well-formed formulas are recur-
sively enumerable, there exists an enumeration of all pairs (M, ϕ). For each
pair in this enumeration the algorithm checks whether ¬ϕ is satisfiable in M.
If it is, the algorithm outputs ϕ, otherwise it skips to the next pair. In this
way, the algorithm will list all the non-theorems of L, so the complement of L
is recursively enumerable too.
By Post’s Theorem, L is decidable.
This leads to a formulation of a more specific finitary model property for
Kripke models (not necessarily for modal logic):
Definition 4.3.2. A logic L has the finitary model property if it is sound
and complete with respect to a class CM of finite models, such that
• All models M ∈ CM can be encoded in one finite alphabet;
• Ternary relation pMq, w  ϕ between codes of models from CM , worlds
in such a model, and formulas is decidable. ◭
Theorem 4.3.3. A recursively enumerable logic that has the finitary model
property is decidable.
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Proof. The models are encoded in a finite alphabet. Encoding here does not
mean that all the words in this alphabet must be codes of some models.
Rather it means that it is decidable whether a given word is a code of some
model, and if yes, then this model can be effectively restored. Therefore, the
set of all such models is recursively enumerable.
Each model is finite; satisfiability in the model is defined as satisfiability in
some world of that model. Since there is an algorithm checking satisfiability
at a particular world and the number of worlds is finite, it is easy to check
satisfiability in the whole model.
Now decidability follows from Lemma 4.3.1.
We will now apply this framework to showing decidability of various logics
described in Sect. 3.
4.4 Decidability Results
We will start with justification logics. We need to present a suitable encoding
for finite models, notably an encoding for admissible evidence functions, and
then present an algorithm for determining truth of a given formula at a given
world.
Definition 4.4.1. A possible evidence function B : Tm × Fm → 2W on a
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finite set of worlds W is called finitary if the set of pairs
{(t, F ) | B(t, F ) 6= ∅}
is finite. ◭
A finitary possible evidence function B can be easily encoded by the set
pBq = {(w, t, F ) | w ∈ B(t, F )} . (4.4.1)
Proposition 4.4.2. The set pBq is finite for any finitary possible evidence
function B on a finite set W .
Proof. By Def. 4.4.1, there are only finitely many pairs (t, F ) to be taken
into account. For each of them there may be only finitely many w ∈W .
The finite set W and any accessibility relation R on W can be encoded
by listing all worlds w ∈ W and all pairs (u,w) ∈ R respectively. Note that
a binary relation on a finite set is always finite.
Finally, any finitely true valuation V can be encoded by
pV q = {(w, p) | w ∈ V (p)} . (4.4.2)
Proposition 4.4.3. The set pV q is finite for any finitely true valuation V
on a finite set W .
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Proof. By Def. 4.2.1, there are only finitely many sentence letters p to look at.
For each of them there may be only finitely many w ∈ W .
Definition 4.4.4. For each pure justification logic JLCS we will consider
the class CJLCS of all finitary F-models for JLCS , i.e., of all models M =
(W,R, V,A) for JLCS with
• finite W ,
• finitely true V , and
• A that is the minimal evidence function based on a finitary possible
evidence function B
encoded by quadruples
pMq = (W,R, pV q, pBq) . (4.4.3)
◭
Definition 4.4.5. Similarly, for each hybrid logic HLCS we will consider
the class CHLCS of all finitary AF-models for HLCS , i.e., of all models
M = (W,Re, R1, . . . , Rn, V,A) for HLCS with
• finite W ,
• finitely true V , and
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• A that is the minimal evidence function based on a finitary possible
evidence function B
encoded by tuples
pMq = (W,Re, R1, . . . , Rn, pV q, pBq) . (4.4.4)
◭
Lemma 4.4.6.
1. The encoding of finitary F-models from CJLCS described in (4.4.3) is
effective for any JLCS ∈ {JCS , JDCS , JTCS , J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS}.
2. The encoding of finitary AF-models from CHLCS described in (4.4.4) is
effective for any HLCS ∈ {TnLPCS , S4nLPCS , S5nLPCS}.
Proof. The proof is almost trivial. The only thing we need from the encoding
is to be able to effectively tell codes of models from non-codes.
This involves verifying conditions on R for pure justification logics or
on Ri, i = 1, . . . , n, and Re for hybrid logics. All these conditions, i.e.,
transitivity, reflexivity, seriality, and/or Ri ⊆ Re, depending on the logic, are
clearly decidable for a finite domain W .
Needless to say, finiteness of W is implied by the fact that it can be fully
written in the finite code.
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Clearly, any finite set pV q of type (4.4.2) describes a finitely true valuation
V (p) = {w | (w, p) ∈ pV q} . (4.4.5)
No additional conditions are imposed on the propositional valuation for any
of the logics.
Similarly, the possible evidence function
B(t, F ) = {w | (w, t, F ) ∈ pBq} (4.4.6)
is finitary. By Theorem 3.3.34.2 and 3.3.34.3, for any such B there exists
a unique minimal admissible for JLCS evidence function based on B. By
Theorem 3.5.18, for any such B there exists a unique minimal admissible
for HLCS evidence function based on B.
Lemma 4.4.7. Let M be
1. a finitary F-model (W,R, V,A) for a pure justification logic
JLCS ∈ {JCS , JDCS , JTCS , J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS}
with a decidable schematic CS, or
2. a finitary AF-model (W,Re, R1, . . . , Rn, V,A) for a hybrid logic
HLCS ∈ {TnLPCS , S4nLPCS , S5nLPCS}
with a decidable schematic CS
CHAPTER 4. DECIDABILITY 159
with A encoded through a finitary possible evidence function B. Then, the
ternary relation
w ∈ A(t, F )
between worlds w ∈W , terms t, and formulas F is decidable.
Proof. The admissible evidence function A based on B is fully described at
any given world w
• by (3.3.37) for JCS , JDCS , and JTCS ;
• by (3.3.38) for J4CS , JD4CS , and LPCS ;
• by (3.5.9) for hybrid logics.
Let ∗B,w stand for the set of hypotheses allowed in the ∗-derivation in the
right side of the respective equivalence:
∗B,w =


B∗w for JCS , JDCS , and JTCS
B∗w ∪
⋃
uRw
B∗u for J4CS , JD4CS , and LPCS⋃
uRew
B∗u for hybrid logics
Note that in all cases ∗B,w is a finite set. Thus, to show decidability we need
a decision algorithm for ∗CS- and ∗!CS-derivations from a finite set ∗B,w.
First of all, given the particular term t we only need to check derivability
of ∗(s,G) for subterms s of t since both ∗-calculi increase the complexity of
the first term-argument after each rule application.
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We would like to organize the derivation in such a way that after f(k)
steps we would know all formulas in the sets
∗(s) = {G | ∗B,w ⊢∗ ∗(s,G)}
for all subterms |s| ≤ k, where f is some computable function. This way
we would be able to complete the first f(|t|) steps, and then check whether
∗B,w ⊢∗ ∗(t, F ) for the given formula F .
Unfortunately, the sets ∗(s) can be infinite already for atomic terms s, in
particular, for justification constants. Therefore, to perform the procedure
constructively, we will need to represent these infinite sets in a finite way.
We will employ variables P , Q, . . . over formulas and also variables over
justification terms (they will not be present explicitly, but they are never-
theless necessary to write justification axiom schemes such as A4). We will
use letters X, Y , . . . to denote schemes of formulas as opposed to F , G,
. . . reserved for formulas themselves. In this extended language, infinitely
many axioms can be compressed into finitely many axiom schemes, which
will require the use of unification in the course of a ∗-derivation.
In this extended language we construct a sequence of sets
∗0 ⊆ ∗1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ ∗n ⊆ . . . ,
each set containing finitely many schemes of formulas, in the following way.
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Let ∗0 = ∗B,w. Let ∗n+1 be obtained from ∗n by applying the following
procedures corresponding to the rules and axioms of the respective ∗-calculus
adjusted for schemes of formulas:
∗CS. (Only for J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS and hybrid logics.) Since CS is schematic
it is possible to write each set ∗(c) as a finite number of schemes of
axioms for each justification constant c. For each subterm c of t and
each axiom scheme X ∈ ∗(c) add ∗(c,X) to ∗1 if it was not in ∗0. Do
not do anything on further steps.
∗CS !. (Only for JCS , JDCS , and JTCS .) For ∗1 do the same as in ∗CS. For
each ∗(c,X) added to ∗1 in this step, add
∗(! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n
c, ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :X)
to ∗n+1 if it was not in ∗n.
∗A2. For any ∗(s1, X1 → Y1) ∈ ∗n and any ∗(s2, X2) ∈ ∗n, where s1 · s2 is a
subterm of t, find the most general unifier (mgu) σ of X1 and X2. If it
exists, add ∗(s1 · s2, Y1σ) to ∗n+1 if it was not in ∗n. If X1 and X2 do
not unify, do not add anything.
For any ∗(s1, P ) ∈ ∗n, where P is a variable over formulas, and any
∗(s2, X2) ∈ ∗n, where s1 · s2 is a subterm of t, add ∗(s1 · s2, Q) to ∗n+1
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if it was not in ∗n, where Q is a fresh variable over formulas.
∗A3. For any ∗(s1, X) ∈ ∗n and any s2 such that s1 + s2 is a subterm of t,
add ∗(s1 + s2, X) to ∗n+1 if it was not in ∗n.
For any ∗(s2, X) ∈ ∗n and any s1 such that s1 + s2 is a subterm of t,
add ∗(s1 + s2, X) to ∗n+1 if it was not in ∗n.
∗A5. (Only for J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS and hybrid logics.) For any If ∗(s,X) ∈ ∗n,
where ! s is subterm of t, add ∗(! s, s :X) to ∗n+1 if it was not in ∗n.
It should be clear the each of the sets ∗n is finite. Moreover, each ∗n can
be effectively constructed.
Construct ∗|t|. We claim that
F unifies with one of the X such that ∗(t,X) ∈ ∗|t| iff ∗B,w ⊢∗ ∗(t, F )
Indeed, the procedure above faithfully represents the rules of the respective
∗-calculus as far as subterms of t are concerned. Finally, on step n, we only
add ∗(s,X) with |s| ≥ n. Therefore, no new ∗(t,X) can be added after
step |t|.
Corollary 4.4.8. Let M be
1. a finitary F-model (W,R, V,A) for a pure justification logic
JLCS ∈ {JCS , JDCS , JTCS , J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS}
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with a decidable schematic CS, or
2. a finitary AF-model (W,Re, R1, . . . , Rn, V,A) for a hybrid logic
HLCS ∈ {TnLPCS , S4nLPCS , S5nLPCS}
with a decidable schematic CS
with a finitely true V and with A encoded based on a finitary possible evidence
function B on W . Then, binary relation
M, w  F
between worlds w ∈W and formulas F is decidable.
Proof. We prove decidability by induction on the size of F .
Deciding whether M, w  p for a given world w and a given sentence
letter p amounts to deciding whether w ∈ V (p), which is equivalent to
(w, p) ∈ pV q by (4.4.2).
Boolean cases are trivial.
Deciding whether M, w  t :G requires checking whether (1) M, u  G
for all wReu and (2) w ∈ A(t, G). There are only finitely many such
u’s and G has size smaller than t : G, which allows us to verify (1).
Decidability of (2) was demonstrated in Lemma 4.4.7.
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Deciding whether M, w  KiG (for hybrid logics) requires checking
whether M, u  G for all wRiu. There are only finitely many such u’s
and G has size smaller than G.
Only one thing remains to be shown to prove the finitary model property
of pure and hybrid justification logics with decidable schematic CS, namely
completeness w.r.t to models encoded as described above.
Theorem 4.4.9. 1. A pure justification logic
JLCS ∈ {JCS , JTCS , J4CS , LPCS}
with a decidable schematic CS is sound and complete w.r.t. the class
of its finitary models CJLCS .
2. A pure justification logic
JLCS ∈ {JDCS , JD4CS}
with a decidable, schematic, and axiomatically appropriate CS is sound
and complete w.r.t. the class of its finitary models CJLCS .
3. A hybrid logic
HLCS ∈ {TnLPCS , S4nLPCS , S5nLPCS}
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with a decidable schematic CS is sound and complete w.r.t. the class
of its finitary models CHLCS .
Note 4.4.10. An additional requirement in Case 2 for CS to be axiomati-
cally appropriate is inherited from Theorem 3.3.14.2: without it there is no
completeness whatsoever, let alone completeness w.r.t. finitary models.
Proof. Since finitary models are actual F-models (AF-models), soundness
follows from Theorem 3.3.14 (from Theorem 3.5.15 respectively).
We will, therefore, prove completeness in the following formulation:
L 0 F =⇒ (∃pMq) M 1 F ,
where L stands for any justification or hybrid logic considered in the theorem,
M is a finitary model for that logic that can be encoded by pMq.
We will once again resort to maximal consistent sets construction of a
canonical model. But this time, to keep the number of such sets finite, we
will focus our attention on sets of subformulas of the given F .
Definition 4.4.11. Let Sub(F ) be the set of all subformulas of F ,
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namely the smallest set of formulas such that
F ∈ Sub(F ) (4.4.7)
G→ H ∈ Sub(F ) =⇒ G ∈ Sub(F ) and H ∈ Sub(F ) (4.4.8)
t :G ∈ Sub(F ) =⇒ G ∈ Sub(F ) (4.4.9)
KiG ∈ Sub(F ) =⇒ G ∈ Sub(F ) (4.4.10)
◭
Definition 4.4.12. Let us define two types of extended subformula sets
Sub¬(F ) = Sub(F ) ∪ {¬G | G ∈ Sub(F )} (4.4.11)
Subn (F ) = Sub
¬(F ) ∪ {Kit :G,¬Kit :G | i = 1, . . . , n, t :G ∈ Sub(F )}
(4.4.12)
◭
Lemma 4.4.13. All three subformula sets are linear in the size of F :
|Sub(F )| = O(|F |)
|Sub¬(F )| = O(|F |)
|Subn (F )| = O(|F |)
Proof. The set of subformulas Sub(F ) has no more elements than the number
of main connectives in F , which is no larger than |F |.
The size of Sub¬(F ) is twice that of Sub(F ) ≤ |F |.
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The size of Subn (F ) is at most (2n+ 2) times larger than the size of |F |.
All maximal L-consistent sets from Def. 2.6.1 are, of course, infinite.
We will, therefore, use the relativized version of maximal consistency from
Def. 2.6.3 with X being one of the subformula sets. In that case we can
further refine Lemma 2.6.4.
Lemma 4.4.14. Let
• L be one of pure justification logics and X be Sub¬(F ), or
• L be TnLPCS , S4nLPCS , or S5nLPCS and X be Subn (F )
for some formula F . Maximal L-consistent sets relative to X exist and for
any such set Γ ⊆ X:
1. Γ is finite.
2. For each formula G ∈ Sub(F ) set Γ contains exactly one of G and ¬G.
3. If Γ ⊢L G for some G ∈ X, then G ∈ Γ.
4. Set Γ is closed under modus ponens, i.e., for any formulas G and H,
if G→ H ∈ Γ, G ∈ Γ, then H ∈ Γ.
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5. Set Γ is closed under conjunctions, i.e., for any formulas G and H, if
G ∈ Γ, H ∈ Γ, and G ∧H ∈ Sub(F ), then G ∧H ∈ Γ.
6. L ∩X ⊆ Γ.
7. For each ∆ ⊆ X that is L-consistent relative to X, there exists a set ∆′
that is maximal L-consistent relative to X such that X ⊇ ∆′ ⊇ ∆.
8. For L ∈ {JTCS , LPCS ,TnLPCS , S4nLPCS , S5nLPCS}, if t : G ∈ Γ, then
G ∈ Γ.
9. For any hybrid logic L, if KiG ∈ Γ, then G ∈ Γ.
10. In case X = Subn (F ), if t :G ∈ Γ, then Kit :G ∈ Γ, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof. We first prove that such maximal consistent sets exist. By Def. 4.4.12
of extended subformula sets, {F,¬F} ⊆ X. Either {F} or {¬F} must be
L-consistent. Otherwise both L ⊢ ¬F and L ⊢ ¬¬F , which would imply
inconsistency of L itself. By Lemma 2.6.4.6, this consistent singleton set can
be extended to a maximal consistent relative to X set, which will have at
least one element.
1. The size of Γ ⊆ X cannot be larger than the size of X, which is linear
in |F | by Lemma 4.4.13.
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2. By Lemma 2.6.4.1 since Sub¬(F ) contains all subformulas of F together
with their negations.
3. By Lemma 2.6.4.2
4. By Lemma 2.6.4.3: If G→ H ∈ Γ, then H ∈ Γ by (4.4.8).
5. By Lemma 2.6.4.4 since Sub(F ) ⊂ Sub¬(F ) and Sub(F ) ⊂ Subn (F ).
6. Identical to Lemma 2.6.4.5.
7. Identical to Lemma 2.6.4.6.
8. t :G ∈ Γ ⊆ X, hence t :G ∈ Sub(F ) and G ∈ Sub(F ). For these logics
L ⊢ t :G→ G, hence Γ ⊢L G. By Clause 3, G ∈ Γ.
9. If KiG ∈ Γ ⊆ X, then either KiG ∈ Sub(F ) or G = t :H, in which case
t :H ∈ Sub(F ) for some t. In either case G ∈ Sub(F ). For hybrid logics
L ⊢ KiG→ G, so Γ ⊢L G. By Clause 3, G ∈ Γ.
10. If t :G ∈ Γ ⊆ Subn (F ), then t :G ∈ Sub(F ) and Kit :G ∈ Subn (F ).
For hybrid logics L ⊢ t :G → Kit :G, so Γ ⊢L Kit :G. By Clause 3,
Kit :G ∈ Γ.
In Clause 10, the derivation of t : G → Kit : G in hybrid logics is easy to
obtain from Positive Introspection t :G→ ! t : t :G and Connection Principle
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! t : t :G→ Kit :G by Syllogism.
We are now ready to construct the finitary canonical model with the
domain being the set of all maximal consistent sets relative to the given
formula F .
Note 4.4.15. Unlike the case of infinite canonical models, we will have to
take extra precautions to ensure transitivity of the frame in these finitary
models. In the proofs of Theorems 3.3.14 and 3.5.15, transitivity of, say, R
was guaranteed by the fact that t : G ∈ Γ entails ! t : t : G ∈ Γ for any
maximal consistent set Γ. For a finitary maximal consistent Γ this may not
hold simply because ! t : t :G may not be a subformula of F .
We will, therefore, need to adjust the definition of Γ♯ appropriately:
Definition 4.4.16. Let Γ be a set of pure justification formulas.
Γ♭ = {G, t :G | t :G ∈ Γ}
◭
Definition 4.4.17. Let Γ be a set of hybrid formulas.
Γ♯i = {G | KiG ∈ Γ}
◭
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Definition 4.4.18. Let Γ be a set of hybrid formulas.
Γ♭i = {KiG,G | KiG ∈ Γ}
◭
Definition 4.4.19. The finitary canonical model for a pure justification
logic JLCS relative to a formula F is a quadruple
M = (W,R, V,A)
defined as follows:
W = {Γ | Γ is maximal JLCS-consistent relative to Sub¬(F )} (4.4.13)
ΓR∆⇌ Γ♯ ⊆ ∆ for JCS , JDCS , JTCS (4.4.14)
ΓR∆⇌ Γ♭ ⊆ ∆ for J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS (4.4.15)
V (p) = {Γ ∈W | p ∈ Γ} (4.4.16)
A = the minimal admissible for JLCS evidence function
based on B(t, G) = {Γ ∈ W | t :G ∈ Γ} . (4.4.17)
◭
Definition 4.4.20. The finitary canonical model for a hybrid logic
HLCS ∈ {TnLPCS , S4nLPCS , S5nLPCS} relative to a formula F is a tuple
M = (W,Re, R1, . . . , Rn, V,A)
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defined as follows:
W = {Γ | Γ is maximal HLCS-consistent rel. to Subn (F )} (4.4.18)
ΓRe∆⇌ Γ
♭ ⊆ ∆ (4.4.19)
ΓRi∆⇌ Γ
♯i ⊆ ∆ for TnLPCS (4.4.20)
ΓRi∆⇌ Γ
♭i ⊆ ∆ for S4nLPCS (4.4.21)
ΓRi∆⇌ Γ
♭i ⊆ ∆ and ∆♭i ⊆ Γ for S5nLPCS (4.4.22)
V (p) = {Γ ∈ W | p ∈ Γ} (4.4.23)
A = the minimal for HLCS admissible evidence function
based on B(t, G) = {Γ ∈W | t :G ∈ Γ} . (4.4.24)
◭
We will now prove that the finitary canonical models so defined are indeed
finitary models for their respective logics.
Lemma 4.4.21. Let L be
• a justification logic JCS , JTCS , J4CS , LPCS ,
• a justification logic JDCS , JD4CS with an axiomatically appropriate CS,
or
• a hybrid logic TnLPCS , S4nLPCS , S5nLPCS .
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Let F be a pure or hybrid justification formula respectively. Then, the finitary
canonical model for formula F of logic L is indeed a finitary model for L.
Proof. We need to show that
1. W is finite.
All Γ ∈ W are subsets of one of the extended subformula sets of F ,
which are linear in |F |. The number of such subsets is at most 2O|F |.
2. W 6= ∅.
By Lemma 4.4.14.
3. R is reflexive (for JTCS and LPCS).
For any t :G ∈ Γ, by Lemma 4.4.14.8, G ∈ Γ. Thus, both Γ♯ ⊆ Γ and
Γ♭ ⊆ Γ, and for all the logics ΓRΓ either by (4.4.14) or by (4.4.15).
4. Re is reflexive (for hybrid logics).
Similar to the previous clause, using (4.4.19) for Re instead of (4.4.14)
and (4.4.15) for R.
5. Ri is reflexive (for hybrid logics).
For any KiG ∈ Γ, by Lemma 4.4.14.9, G ∈ Γ. Thus, both Γ♯i ⊆ Γ
and Γ♭i ⊆ Γ, and for all the logics ΓRiΓ by one of (4.4.20), (4.4.21),
or (4.4.22).
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6. R is transitive (for J4CS , JD4CS , and LPCS).
Let ΓR∆ and ∆RΣ. By (4.4.15) , Γ♭ ⊆ ∆ and ∆♭ ⊆ Σ. For any
t :G ∈ Γ, we have t :G ∈ ∆ and {t :G,G} ⊆ Σ by Def. 4.4.16. Hence,
ΓRΣ by (4.4.15).
7. Re is transitive (for hybrid logics).
Similar to the previous clause, using (4.4.19) for Re instead of (4.4.15)
for R.
8. Ri is transitive (for S4nLPCS and S5nLPCS).
Let ΓRi∆ and ∆RiΣ.
For S4nLPCS , by (4.4.21), Γ
♭i ⊆ ∆ and ∆♭i ⊆ Σ. For any KiG ∈ Γ,
we have KiG ∈ ∆ and {KiG,G} ⊆ Σ by Def. 4.4.18. Hence, ΓRiΣ
by (4.4.21).
For S5nLPCS , by (4.4.22), in addition ∆
♭i ⊆ Γ and Σ♭i ⊆ ∆. For any
KiG ∈ Σ, we have KiG ∈ ∆ and {KiG,G} ⊆ Γ by Def. 4.4.18. Here
both Γ♭i ⊆ Σ and Σ♭i ⊆ Γ Hence, ΓRiΣ by (4.4.22).
9. Ri is symmetric (for S5nLPCS).
Let ΓRi∆. By (4.4.22), Γ
♭i ⊆ ∆ and ∆♭i ⊆ Γ. Hence, ∆RiΓ by (4.4.22).
10. Ri ⊆ Re (for hybrid logics).
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Let ΓRi∆. For any t :G ∈ Γ, by Lemma 4.4.14.10, Kit :G ∈ Γ, so that
t :G ∈ ∆ by Lemma 4.4.14.9 and G ∈ ∆ by Lemma 4.4.14.8. Thus,
Γ♭ ⊆ ∆, i.e., ΓRe∆.
11. R is serial (for JDCS and JD4CS with axiomatically appropriate CS).
Let Γ ∈W . We need to show that there is ∆ ∈W such that ΓR∆.
The set Γ itself is L-consistent. We claim that Γ♯ for L = JDCS and
Γ♭ for L = JD4CS are L-consistent too. In both cases we will use proofs
by contradiction.
Suppose towards a contradiction that Γ♯ is not JDCS-consistent, i.e.,
G1, . . . , Gk ⊢JDCS ⊥
for some sj : Gj ∈ Γ, j = 1, . . . , k. Internalizing this derivation by
Lemma 3.2.22, which requires CS to be axiomatically appropriate, we
get
x1 :G1, . . . , xk :Gk ⊢JDCS t(x1, . . . , xk) :⊥
for some fresh justification variables x1, . . . , xk and some term t. The
simultaneous substitution of sj for xj by Lemma 3.2.30, which again
requires CS to be axiomatically appropriate, will yield
s1 :G1, . . . , sk :Gk ⊢JDCS t(s1, . . . , sk) :⊥
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for some other term t, obtained from t by possibly renaming constants.
Therefore,
Γ ⊢JDCS t(s1, . . . , sk) :⊥
and since JDCS ⊢ t(s1, . . . , sk) :⊥ → ⊥
Γ ⊢JDCS ⊥,
which contradict JDCS-consistency of Γ. This contradiction shows that
Γ♯ is JDCS-consistent.
Suppose towards a contradiction that Γ♭ is not JD4CS-consistent, i.e.,
G1, . . . , Gk, q1 :H1, . . . , ql :Hl ⊢JD4CS ⊥
for some sj : Gj ∈ Γ, j = 1, . . . , k and some qm : Hm ∈ Γ,
m = 1, . . . , l. Lifting this derivation by Lemma 3.2.25, which requires
CS to be axiomatically appropriate, we get
x1 :G1, . . . , xk :Gk, q1 :H1, . . . , ql :Hl ⊢JD4CS t(x1, . . . , xk, q1, . . . , ql) :⊥
for some fresh justification variables x1, . . . , xk and some term t. The
simultaneous substitution of sj for xj by Lemma 3.2.30, which again
requires CS to be axiomatically appropriate, will yield
s1 :G1, . . . , sk :Gk, q1 :H1, . . . , ql :Hl ⊢JD4CS t(s1, . . . , sk, q1, . . . , ql) :⊥
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for some other term t, obtained from t by possibly renaming constants.
Therefore,
Γ ⊢JD4CS t(s1, . . . , sk, q1, . . . , ql) :⊥
and since JD4CS ⊢ t(s1, . . . , sk, q1, . . . , ql) :⊥ → ⊥
Γ ⊢JD4CS ⊥,
which contradict JD4CS-consistency of Γ. This contradiction shows that
Γ♭ is JD4CS-consistent.
Whenever Γ ⊆ Sub¬(F ), both Γ♯ ⊆ Sub(F ) and Γ♭ ⊆ Sub(F ).
Thus, by Lemma 4.4.14.7, either of L-consistent sets Γ♯ or Γ♭ can be
extended to a maximal L-consistent relative to Sub¬(F ) set ∆ ∈ W .
For JDCS , ∆ ⊇ Γ♯, hence ΓR∆. For JD4CS , ∆ ⊇ Γ♭, hence ΓR∆.
12. V is finitely true.
If V (p) 6= ∅, i.e., (∃Γ)Γ ∈ V (p), then (∃Γ)p ∈ Γ, which can only happen
for p ∈ Sub(F ). Formula F has finitely many sentence letters occurring
in it; hence, V is finitely true by Def. 4.2.1.
13. B is a finitary possible evidence function.
If B(t, G) 6= ∅, i.e., (∃Γ)Γ ∈ B(t, G), then (∃Γ)t :G ∈ Γ, which can only
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happen for t :G ∈ Sub(F ). Since Sub(F ) is a finite set, B is finitary by
Def. 4.4.1.
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.4.21 that the finitary canonical model
is an actual model.
We now prove the relativized
Lemma 4.4.22 (Truth Lemma). Let M be a finitary canonical model for
formula F constructed in Def. 4.4.19 or Def. 4.4.20. For any G ∈ Sub(F ),
M,Γ  G ⇐⇒ G ∈ Γ
Proof. Induction on complexity of formula G:
G = p. A sentence letter. Follows directly from (4.4.16) and (3.3.15) for F-
models or from (4.4.23) and (3.5.4) for AF-models, in other words
M,Γ  p ⇐⇒ Γ ∈ V (p) ⇐⇒ p ∈ Γ
Boolean cases are trivial.
G = t :H. Let t :H ∈ Γ. First of all, by (4.4.17) or (4.4.24), Γ ∈ B(t,H). Since
A is based on B, also Γ ∈ A(t,H).
For F-models H ∈ ∆ for any ∆ that is R-accessible from Γ by (4.4.14)
or (4.4.15). For AF-models H ∈ ∆ for any ∆ that is Re-accessible
from Γ by (4.4.19).
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In either case, by IH, M,∆  H for any ΓR∆ (ΓRe∆ respectively).
Combined with Γ ∈ A(t,H), this yields M,Γ  t :H.
Let t :H /∈ Γ. Then, by (4.4.17) or (4.4.24), Γ /∈ B(t,H). But can it
happen that despite it Γ ∈ A(t,H)? The answer is negative. We will
prove it by contradiction.
Suppose towards a contradiction that Γ ∈ A(t,H). This implies that
by Theorem 3.3.41 and Theorem 3.5.20
– B∗Γ ⊢∗CS ∗(t,H) for JCS , JDCS , JTCS per (3.3.37),
– B∗Γ ∪
⋃
∆RΓ
B∗∆ ⊢∗!CS ∗(t,H) for J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS per (3.3.38),
or
–
⋃
∆ReΓ
B∗∆ ⊢∗!CS ∗(t,H) for TnLPCS , S4nLPCS , S5nLPCS per (3.5.9).
In the latter two cases B∗∆ ⊆ B∗Γ for any ∆RΓ or ∆ReΓ. Indeed, if
∗(s, E) ∈ B∗∆, i.e., ∆ ∈ B(s, E), then s :E ∈ ∆ by (4.4.17) or (4.4.24).
Thus, s : E ∈ Γ by (4.4.15) or (4.4.19). Therefore, Γ ∈ B(s, E)
by (4.4.17) or (4.4.24). In other words, ∗(s, E) ∈ B∗Γ. Thus, in all
three cases
B∗Γ ⊢∗ ∗(t,H)
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for the respective ⊢∗. By Lemma 3.4.8
(B∗Γ) : ⊢L t :H ,
where L is the respective logic. Note that (B∗Γ) : ⊆ Γ. Indeed,
s :E ∈ (B∗Γ) : ⇔ ∗(s, E) ∈ B∗Γ ⇔ Γ ∈ B(s, E) ⇔ s :E ∈ Γ
Hence,
Γ ⊢L t :H
and by Lemma 4.4.14.3, t : H ∈ Γ. This contradiction shows that
Γ /∈ A(t,H).
Therefore, M,Γ 1 t :H.
G = KiH. (Only for hybrid logics.) Let KiH ∈ Γ. Then, H ∈ ∆ for any ∆ that
is Ri-accessible from Γ by one of (4.4.20), (4.4.21), or (4.4.22).
In all cases, by IH, M,∆  H for any ΓRi∆, which yields M,Γ  KiH.
Let KiH /∈ Γ. We need to prove the existence of a ∆ that is Ri-
accessible from Γ but does not contain H, which by IH entails that H
is false at ∆. The construction of ∆ depends on which hybrid logic we
are dealing with.
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TnLPCS . We claim that Γ
♯i ∪ {¬H} is TnLPCS-consistent. Proof by contra-
diction. If not, then
E1, . . . , Ek ⊢TnLPCS H
for some KiEm ∈ Γ, m = 1, . . . , k. Then, by Deduction Theorem
for TnLPCS ,
TnLPCS ⊢ E1 → (. . .→ (Ek → H) . . .) .
Using Ki-necessitation and distributing Ki through implication in
the usual modal manner, we get
TnLPCS ⊢ KiE1 → (. . .→ (KiEk → KiH) . . .)
and
KiE1, . . . , KiEk ⊢TnLPCS KiH .
Therefore,
Γ ⊢TnLPCS KiH .
Given that KiH ∈ Sub(F ), by Lemma 4.4.14.3, KiH ∈ Γ. This
contradiction shows that Γ♯i ∪ {¬H} is TnLPCS-consistent.
Since KiH ∈ Sub(F ), clearly ¬H ∈ Subn (F ). Therefore,
Γ♯i ∪{¬H} ⊆ Subn (F ) and it can be extended by Lemma 4.4.14.7
to a maximal TnLPCS-consistent relative to Sub

n (F ) set ∆.
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By (4.4.20), ΓRi∆.
Clearly, H ∈ Sub(F ). Since ¬H ∈ ∆, by Lemma 4.4.14.2, H /∈ ∆.
So by IH, M,∆ 1 H.
Thus, M,Γ 1 KiH.
S4nLPCS . We claim that Γ
♭i ∪ {¬H} is S4nLPCS-consistent. Proof by con-
tradiction. If not, then
E1, . . . , Ek, KiD1, . . . , KiDl ⊢S4nLPCS H
for some KiEm ∈ Γ, m = 1, . . . , k, and some KiDj ∈ Γ,
j = 1, . . . , l. Again using Deduction Theorem, Ki-necessitation,
distributing Ki through implications, and using modus ponens, we
get
KiE1, . . . , KiEk, KiKiD1, . . . , KiKiDl ⊢S4nLPCS KiH .
Since S4nLPCS ⊢ KiDj → KiKiDj, j = 1, . . . , l, we can strip the
second modalities:
KiE1, . . . , KiEk, KiD1, . . . , KiDl ⊢S4nLPCS KiH .
Therefore,
Γ ⊢S4nLPCS KiH .
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Given that KiH ∈ Sub(F ), by Lemma 4.4.14.3, KiH ∈ Γ. This
contradiction shows that Γ♭i ∪ {¬H} is S4nLPCS-consistent.
Since KiH ∈ Sub(F ), clearly ¬H ∈ Subn (F ). Therefore,
Γ♭i ∪{¬H} ⊆ Subn (F ) and it can be extended by Lemma 4.4.14.7
to a maximal S4nLPCS-consistent relative to Sub

n (F ) set ∆.
By (4.4.21), ΓRi∆.
Clearly, H ∈ Sub(F ). Since ¬H ∈ ∆, by Lemma 4.4.14.2, H /∈ ∆.
So by IH, M,∆ 1 H.
Thus, M,Γ 1 KiH.
S5nLPCS . We claim that
Z = Γ♭i ∪ {¬KiC | ¬KiC ∈ Γ} ∪ {¬H}
is S5nLPCS-consistent. Proof by contradiction. If not, then
E1, . . . , Ek, KiD1, . . . , KiDl, ¬KiC1, . . . ,¬KiCr ⊢S5nLPCS H
for some KiEm ∈ Γ, m = 1, . . . , k, some KiDj ∈ Γ, j = 1, . . . , l,
and some ¬KiCh ∈ Γ, h = 1, . . . , r. Again using the Deduction
Theorem, Ki-necessitation, distributing Ki through implications,
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and using modus ponens, we get
KiE1, . . . , KiEk, KiKiD1, . . . , KiKiDl,
Ki¬KiC1, . . . , Ki¬KiCr ⊢S5nLPCS KiH .
Since S5nLPCS ⊢ KiDj → KiKiDj, j = 1, . . . , l, and in addition
S5nLPCS ⊢ ¬KiCh → Ki¬KiCh, h = 1, . . . , r, we can strip the
second modalities:
KiE1, . . . , KiEk, KiD1, . . . , KiDl,
¬KiC1, . . . ,¬KiCr ⊢S5nLPCS KiH .
Therefore,
Γ ⊢S5nLPCS KiH .
Given that KiH ∈ Sub(F ), by Lemma 4.4.14.3, KiH ∈ Γ. This
contradiction shows that Z is S5nLPCS-consistent.
Since KiH ∈ Sub(F ), clearly ¬H ∈ Subn (F ). So Z ⊆ Subn (F )
and it can be extended by Lemma 4.4.14.7 to a maximal S5nLPCS-
consistent relative to Subn (F ) set ∆.
Clearly, Γ♭i ⊆ ∆. To show that ΓRi∆, according to (4.4.22),
we also need to show that ∆♭i ⊆ Γ. Let KiC ∈ ∆ ⊆ Subn . If
KiC /∈ Γ, it would be that ¬KiC ∈ Γ by Lemma 2.6.4.1. But then
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¬KiC ∈ Z ⊆ ∆, which contradicts KiC ∈ ∆. This contradiction
shows that KiC ∈ Γ, in which case C ∈ Γ by Lemma 4.4.14.9.
This completes the proof that ∆♭i ⊆ Γ, and hence that ΓRi∆.
Clearly, H ∈ Sub(F ). Since ¬H ∈ ∆, by Lemma 4.4.14.2, H /∈ ∆.
So by IH, M,∆ 1 H.
Thus, M,Γ 1 KiH.
For all hybrid logics we have shown that KiH /∈ Γ entails M,Γ 1 KiH.
This completes the proof of the Truth Lemma 4.4.22.
We are finally ready to finish the completeness part of the proof of Theo-
rem 4.4.9. Take any formula F that is not derivable in logic L. Let M be the
finitary canonical model relative to ¬F . By Lemma 4.4.21, M is a finitary
model. Since L 0 F , the set {¬F} is L-consistent by Lemma 2.6.2.7. Clearly,
¬F ∈ Sub(¬F ), so there must be a maximal L-consistent relative to Subn (F )
or to Subn (¬F ) set Γ ∋ ¬F . This Γ is one of the worlds of the canonical
model M. By the Truth Lemma 4.4.22, M,Γ  ¬F , hence
M,Γ 1 F ,
i.e., F is refuted in one of the finitary models. Theorem 4.4.9 is proven.
As a corollary, we immediately obtain
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Corollary 4.4.23.
1. A pure justification logic
JLCS ∈ {JCS , JTCS , J4CS , LPCS}
with a decidable schematic CS,
2. A pure justification logic
JLCS ∈ {JDCS , JD4CS}
with a decidable, schematic, and axiomatically appropriate CS, and
3. A hybrid logic
HLCS ∈ {TnLPCS , S4nLPCS , S5nLPCS}
with a decidable schematic CS
all have the finitary model property.
Usually, finite axiomatizability is sufficient to conclude that the logic is
recursively enumerable. Unfortunately, the hidden assumption underlying
this transition is that there are only finitely many effective inference rules,
which is true for common modal logics. The R4CS and R4
!
CS do not fit into
that paradigm because they do not require assumptions. They are, in fact,
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a lot like axioms. So we need to be careful about claiming JLCS or HLCS to
be recursively enumerable.
Lemma 4.4.24. Let L be a pure or hybrid justification logic and CS be
a constant specification for it. If CS is recursively enumerable, the set of
theorems of LCS is also recursively enumerable.
Proof. We will briefly outline the procedure. The set of axioms is clearly
recursively enumerable (RE). If R4!CS is used, then the set of all formulas
obtained by it is still RE. Create an enumeration of all theorems by taking the
next axiom, then next R4!CS-formula, applying modus ponens to all theorems
obtained so far in all possible ways, for hybrid logics apply all modal rules
to all theorems obtained so far, add the next axiom, etc.
Theorem 4.4.25.
1. A pure justification logic
JLCS ∈ {JCS , JTCS , J4CS , LPCS}
with a decidable schematic CS,
2. A pure justification logic
JLCS ∈ {JDCS , JD4CS}
with a decidable, schematic, and axiomatically appropriate CS, and
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3. A hybrid logic
HLCS ∈ {TnLPCS , S4nLPCS , S5nLPCS}
with a decidable schematic CS
all are decidable.
Proof. By Lemma 4.4.24, each logic is recursively enumerable. By Cor. 4.4.23
they have finitary model property. Hence, by Theorem 4.3.3 these logics are
decidable.
Theorem 4.4.26. Justification logics J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP and hybrid
logics TnLP, S4nLP, S5nLP are decidable.
Proof. The total constant specification T CS for each of these logics is clearly
decidable, schematic, and axiomatically appropriate.
Theorem 4.4.27. Justification logics J0, JT0, J40, LP0 and hybrid logics
TnLP0, S4nLP0, S5nLP0 are decidable.
Proof. The empty constant specification CS = ∅ for each of these logics is
clearly decidable and schematic.
Theorem 4.4.28.
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1. A pure justification logic
LCS ∈ {JCS , JTCS , J4CS , LPCS}
with a decidable almost schematic CS,
2. A pure justification logic
JLCS ∈ {JDCS , JD4CS}
with a decidable, almost schematic, and axiomatically appropriate CS,
and
3. A hybrid logic
LCS ∈ {TnLPCS , S4nLPCS , S5nLPCS}
with an almost schematic decidable CS
all are decidable.
Proof. Since CS is almost schematic, CS = CS1∪CS2, where CS1 is schematic,
CS2 is finite, and CS1∩CS2 = ∅. Derivability in LCS can be reduced to deriv-
ability in LCS1 by the Deduction Theorem:
LCS ⊢ F ⇐⇒ CS2 ⊢LCS1 F ⇐⇒ LCS1 ⊢
∧
CS2 → F
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CS2 is decidable as any finite set; hence, CS1 = CS \ CS2 is decidable.
In Clauses 1 and 3, derivability in LCS1 is decidable by Theorem 4.4.25.
Therefore, so is derivability in LCS .
For Clause 2 we additionally need to prove that CS1 is axiomatically
appropriate. Suppose it is not, i.e., there is an axiom A such that c : A /∈
CS1 for any justification constant c. Since CS1 is schematic, for any axiom
A′ from the same axiom scheme as A we would also have c : A′ /∈ CS1.
Each axiom scheme has infinitely many instances. Hence, the finite constant
specification CS2 cannot provide justification constants for all axioms A′
not justified in CS1. This contradiction shows that CS1 is axiomatically
appropriate. Thus, Theorem 4.4.25 is once again applicable.
Corollary 4.4.29. Justification logics JCS , JTCS , J4CS , LPCS and hybrid log-
ics TnLPCS , S4nLPCS , S5nLPCS with finite CS’s are decidable.
Proof. A finite CS is almost schematic since CS = ∅ ∪ CS and the empty
constant specification is schematic. Any finite set is decidable. The statement
follows by Cor. 4.4.28.
4.5 Undecidability Results
The requirement for CS to be schematic cannot be dropped from Theo-
rem 4.4.25.
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Theorem 4.5.1. Let L be any pure or hybrid justification logic. There exists
a decidable CS for L such that LCS is undecidable.
Proof. The proof is by reducing the Halting Problem to provability in LCS
for a particular CS. Let Ti stand for the ith Turing machine with one input;
let Ti(m) ↓ mean that Ti halts on input m. Let A1, A2, . . . be an effective
enumeration of all axioms of L. Consider the following CS:
CS = {a : (Ai → (Aj → Ai)) | Ti(i) ↓ after at most j steps} ∪
{b :Ai | i = 1, 2, . . .} .
Clearly this CS is decidable. At the same time, it can be easily shown that
LCS ⊢ (a · b) · b :Ai ⇐⇒ Ti(i) ↓ .
The right side of this equivalence is the Halting Problem, which is known to
be undecidable.
Note 4.5.2. The constant specification CS in the proof involves only two
proof constants, a and b. A slightly more complex construction can be used
to produce an undecidable theory LPCS with a decidable CS involving only
one constant.
Note 4.5.3. The CS used in the proof of Theorem 4.5.1 is, of course, neither
schematic nor almost schematic.
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4.6 Historical Survey
Decidability of LPCS with any finite CS was established by Sergei Artemov
in [Art95].
Later Alexey Mkrtychev in [Mkr97] showed that LPCS with any schema-
tic CS is decidable. Since T CSLP is schematic, decidability of LP is an easy
corollary.
Decidability of JCS , JTCS , and J4CS with schematic CS follows from the
results of [Kuz00].
An example of an undecidable LPCS with decidable CS was first presented
in [Kuz05].
Decidability of TnLPCS , S4nLPCS and S5nLPCS with schematic CS is a
new result, although decidability of S4LP was proven in [Kuz06a].
Several decidability results for single-conclusion justification logic were
obtained by Vladimir Krupski in [Kru97, Kru01, Kru06d, Kru06c].
Decidability of several hybrid logics describing arithmetical provability
was established by Tatiana Yavorskaya (Sidon) in [Sid97, Yav01a] and by
Sergei Artemov and Elena Nogina in [AN04]. The attachment to arithmetical
interpretations leads to the requirement for CS to be finite in all these logics,
so these decidability results apply to finite CS only.
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Decidability of S4LPNCS with finite CS was established in [AN04] using
Kripke-style semantics.
Chapter 5
Complexity
5.1 Upper Bounds for Reflected Fragments
One of the staples of all decision procedures for pure and hybrid justification
logics as well as for their reflected fragments is the use of minimal functions
pioneered by Alexey Mkrtychev in [Mkr97]. Theorems 3.3.41 and 3.4.2 for
pure justification logics and Theorems 3.5.20 and 3.5.23 for hybrid logics out-
line the relationship between minimal evidence functions, reflected fragments,
and ∗-calculi. This relationship allowed Nikolai Krupski to show in [Kru03]
that rLP is in NP. We will generalize this result to all pure and hybrid justifi-
cation logics with a decidable almost schematic CS and formulate it in terms
of ∗-calculi. We will also extend the complexity estimate to derivations with
hypotheses.
Theorem 5.1.1. Let CS be a decidable schematic constant specification for
194
CHAPTER 5. COMPLEXITY 195
one of pure or hybrid justification logics.
1. There exists an NP algorithm for determining for any given finite set S
of ∗-expressions and a given ∗(t, F ) whether
S ⊢∗CS ∗(t, F ) .
2. There exists an NP algorithm for determining for any given finite set S
of ∗-expressions and a given ∗(t, F ) whether
S ⊢∗!CS ∗(t, F ) .
Proof. We will present two algorithms: ∗CS-DERIVE and ∗!CS-DERIVE, for
the respective calculi that are essentially effective implementations of the de-
cision procedure for checking whether w ∈ A(t, F ) for the minimal admissible
evidence function A based on a given finitary possible evidence function B
from the proof of Lemma 4.4.7.
As in that proof, we will use variables P , Q, . . . over formulas and variables
over justification terms (not present explicitly). We will use letters X, Y , . . .
to denote schemes. Each axiom scheme can be written as one formula in
this extended language. Let us write F ∈ X if formula F is an instance of
scheme X. We will also consider the empty scheme ∅ for which F /∈ ∅ for
all F .
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We will view schemes both as formulas in extended language and sets
of formulas in the basic language hoping that the reader will be able to
disambiguate between these two uses.
procedure ∗CS-DERIVE〈S, ∗(t, F )〉;
1. For each occurrence of a subterm s in t, where ∗(s,G) ∈ S for some G,
non-deterministically choose one of two symbols: ‘S’ or ‘⊢’.
If ‘S’ was chosen for an occurrence of s′ of which s is a proper suboc-
currence, change the chosen symbol for s to ‘#’ no matter what was
chosen for s originally.
2. For each occurrence of operation + in t, non-deterministically choose
one of two symbols: ‘l’ or ‘r’, unless this occurrence of + is contained
within an occurrence of s for which ‘S’ was chosen in Step 1.
3. For each occurrence of r = ! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c in t for a constant c and an integer
n ≥ 0, non-deterministically choose an axiom scheme X such that
c :X ⊆ CS and make the assignment

! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : . . . : ! c :c :X for n ≥ 1, or
c X for n = 0
to this occurrence of ! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, unless it is contained within an occurrence
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of s for which ‘S’ was chosen in Step 1 or within an occurrence of ! r
in t.
4. For each occurrence of a justification variable x, make the assignment
x ∅
to this occurrence of x, unless it is contained within an occurrence of s
for which ‘S’ was chosen in Step 1.
5. For each occurrence of s for which ‘S’ was chosen in Step 1, non-
deterministically choose a formula G such that ∗(s,G) ∈ S and make
the following assignment to this occurrence of s:
s G .
repeat Steps 6–8 until an assignment is made to t.
6. Non-deterministically choose an occurrence of a subterm s1 + s2 in t
such that assignments to these occurrences of s1 and s2 have already
been made:
s1  X1 , s2  X2 ,
but no assignment has been made to this occurrence of s1 + s2. Make
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the following assignment to this occurrence of s1 + s2:{
s1 + s2  X1 if ‘l’ was chosen for this + ;
s1 + s2  X2 if ‘r’ was chosen for this + .
7. Non-deterministically choose an occurrence of a subterm ! s in t such
that an assignment to this occurrence of s has already been made,
but no assignment has been made to this occurrence of ! s. Make the
following assignment to this occurrence of ! s:
! s ∅ .
8. Non-deterministically choose an occurrence of a subterm s1 ·s2 in t such
that assignments to these occurrences of s1 and s2 have already been
made:
s1  Z1 , s2  X2 ,
but no assignment has been made to this occurrence of s1 · s2. Make
the following assignment to this occurrence of s1 · s2:

s1 · s2  ∅ if Z1 = ∅ or X2 = ∅ ;
s1 · s2  Y1σ if Z1 = X1 → Y1 and σ = mgu(X1, X2) ;
s1 · s2  ∅ if Z1 = X1 → Y1 and ¬∃mgu(X1, X2) ;
s1 · s2  Q if Z1 = P and X2 6= ∅ ;
s1 · s2  ∅ otherwise ,
where P is any variable over formulas, Q is a fresh variable over for-
mulas, X1 and Y1 are any schemes.
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end repeat
Let X be the scheme assigned to t.
9. return true if F is unifiable with X.
10. backtrack and use other choices in Steps 1–5 if F is not unifiable
with X or if X = ∅.
11. return false if all choices in Steps 1–5 are exhausted.
The procedure ∗!CS-DERIVE is obtained by replacing Steps 3 and 7 in
∗CS-DERIVE by the following steps
3!. For each occurrence of a constant c in t, non-deterministically choose
an axiom scheme X such that c :X ⊆ CS and make the assignment
c X
to this occurrence of c, unless it is contained within an occurrence of s
for which ‘S’ was chosen in Step 1.
7!. Non-deterministically choose an occurrence of a subterm ! s in t such
that an assignment s  X has already been made to this occurrence
of s, but no assignment has been made to this occurrence of ! s. Make
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the following assignment to this occurrence of ! s:{
! s s :X if X 6= ∅ ;
! s ∅ if X = ∅ .
Lemma 5.1.2 (Correctness of ∗CS-DERIVE and ∗!CS-DERIVE).
1. ∗CS-DERIVE〈S, ∗(t, F )〉 returns true iff S ⊢ ∗CS ∗ (t, F ).
2. ∗!CS-DERIVE〈S, ∗(t, F )〉 returns true iff S ⊢ ∗!CS ∗ (t, F ).
Proof. Note that no assignments are ever made to a proper suboccurrence of
any occurrence of s for which ‘S’ was chosen in Step 1. Hence, in Step 6, the
occurrence of s1 + s2 cannot be inside any such s so that some choice of ‘l’
or ‘r’ must have been made for this occurrence of + in Step 2. Having this
choice made is necessary to decide what to assign to s1 + s2.
For the ‘only if’ direction we will show that
s X =⇒ (∀G ∈ X)S ⊢∗ ∗(s,G) ,
where ⊢∗ corresponds to the procedure used. We will use an induction over
the assignments made by the procedure.
Step 3. For c :X ⊆ CS and any axiom A from scheme X, by ∗CS !, ⊢∗CS ∗(c, A)
and for any integer n ≥ 1
⊢∗CS ∗(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : . . . : ! c :c :A)
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Step 3!. For c :X ⊆ CS and any axiom A from scheme X, by ∗CS
⊢∗!CS ∗(c, A)
Step 5. If ∗(s,G) ∈ S then for either calculus
S ⊢∗ ∗(s,G)
Step 6. By IH, S ⊢∗ ∗(s1, G1) for any G1 ∈ X1 and S ⊢∗ ∗(s2, G2) for any
G2 ∈ X2. Therefore, by ∗A3
S ⊢∗ ∗(s1 + s2, G1) and S ⊢∗ ∗(s1 + s2, G2)
for any G1 ∈ X1 and any G2 ∈ X2. This takes care of both possible
assignments in this step.
Step 7!. By IH, S ⊢∗!CS ∗(s,G) for any G ∈ X. Therefore, for any G ∈ X
by ∗A5
S ⊢∗!CS ∗(! s, s :G)
Step 8. – Let Z1 = X1 → Y1 and σ = mgu(X1, X2). For any G ∈ Y1σ there
must exist a substitution τ such thatG = Y1στ . Since σ is the mgu
of X1 and X2, we have X1σ = X2σ. Therefore, X1στ = X2στ .
If this expression is still a scheme, i.e., it still has variables over
formulas and/or over terms, instantiate these variables arbitrarily
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by a substitution τ ′. Since G = Y1στ is a formula, not a scheme,
substitution τ ′ does not affect G: Y1σττ
′ = Y1στ = G. X2σττ
′ is
an instance of scheme X2; therefore, by IH
S ⊢∗ ∗(s2, X2σττ ′) .
Similarly,
Z1σττ
′ = X1σττ
′ → Y1σττ ′ = X2σττ ′ → G .
By IH,
S ⊢∗ ∗(s1, X2σττ ′ → G) .
Therefore, by ∗A2
S ⊢∗ ∗(s1 · s2, G) .
– Let Z1 = P and X2 6= ∅. Any formula G ∈ Q for a variable over
formulas Q. Let E ∈ X2. Then, by IH, S ⊢∗ ∗(s2, E). Since P is
a variable over formulas, E → G ∈ P . By IH, S ⊢∗ ∗(s1, E → G).
By ∗A2
S ⊢∗ ∗(s1 · s2, G) .
This completes the proof of the ‘only if’ direction.
Let us now prove the ‘if’ direction. Suppose S ⊢∗ ∗(s,G). Throughout
the remainder of the proof, we will talk about suboccurrences rather than
CHAPTER 5. COMPLEXITY 203
subterms because a term may occur several times in t. For instance, one
constant can be used for different axioms on different derivation branches.
There is a natural association of nodes in the ⊢∗-derivation with occur-
rences of subterms of t whereby
• each use of ∗CS ! rule in a ∗CS-derivation is associated with a particular
occurrence of ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n
c for some constant c and some integer n ≥ 0 (no
nodes are associated with proper suboccurrences of ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n
c for n > 0);
• each use of ∗CS rule in a ∗!CS-derivation is associated with a particular
occurrence of a constant c;
• each use of a hypothesis ∗(s,G) ∈ S is associated with an occurrence
of s in t (no nodes are associated with proper suboccurrences of s);
• the root of the derivation tree is associated with term t itself;
• assumption(s) of each rule ∗A2, ∗A3, or ∗A5 is(are) associated with
the immediate subterm(s) of the conclusion of the same rule.
We will now show how to make non-deterministic choices based on this deriva-
tion so as to end up with true as the returned value.
• In Step 1, choose ‘S’ for all occurrences of subterms s that are asso-
ciated with the use of hypotheses in the derivation. Choose ‘⊢’ for all
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other occurrences of such s. If s is a proper suboccurrence of s′ and
‘S’ was chosen for this occurrence of s, it cannot happen that ‘S’ is also
chosen for this occurrence of s′. Indeed, the subterms with chosen ‘S’
are associated with the leaves of ⊢∗-derivation. A proper suboccurrence
is associated with a node higher on the same branch of the derivation,
and two leaves cannot be on the same branch. Hence, no ‘S’ will be
changed to ‘#’ in Step 1.
• In Step 2, let an occurrence of s1 + s2 be associated with a non-leaf
node in the derivation. It must be a conclusion of a ∗A3 rule of one of
two forms:
∗(s1, G)
∗(s1 + s2, G) or
∗(s2, G)
∗(s1 + s2, G) .
Choose ‘l’ for this occurrence of + in the former case or ‘r’ in the latter.
This rule dictates the choice only for those occurrences of + that are
not within any term with chosen ‘S’, which complies with Step 2.
• In Step 3, let an occurrence of ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n
c, n ≥ 0, be associated with a node
in the ⊢∗CS -derivation. It can only be a leaf node. Let this node be
either ∗(c, A) for n = 0 or
∗(! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c, ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : . . . : ! c :c :A)
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for n ≥ 1, an instance of ∗CS ! rule rather than a hypothesis. Let
axiom A belong to an axiom scheme X. Then assign c  X to this
occurrence of c (for n = 0) or assign
! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n−1
c : . . . : ! c :c :X
to this occurrence of ! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
c (for n ≥ 1). This rule dictates the choice
only for those occurrences of ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n
c, n ≥ 0 that are not within either
any term with chosen ‘S’ or a term of the form ! ! . . . !︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1
c, which complies
with Step 3.
• In Step 3!, let an occurrence of a constant c be associated with a node
in the ⊢∗!CS -derivation. It can only be a leaf node. Let this node be
an instance ∗(c, A) of ∗CS rule rather than a hypothesis. Let axiom A
belong to an axiom scheme X. Then assign c  X to this occurrence
of c. This rule dictates the choice only for those occurrences of c that
are not within any term with chosen ‘S’, which complies with Step 3!.
• In Step 5, let an occurrence of s with chosen ‘S’ be associated with
a leaf node of the derivation where a hypothesis ∗(s,G) ∈ S is used.
Assign s G to this occurrence of s.
We will now prove that after these choices are made, for each assign-
ment s  X with X 6= ∅ made by the procedure to an occurrence s, the
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corresponding node in the derivation is ∗(s,G), where G ∈ X. All assign-
ments made so far in Steps 3, 3!, and 5 satisfy this property.
• For Step 6, assume w.l.o.g. that ‘l’ was chosen for the occurrence
of + in this occurrence of s1 + s2 (the case of chosen ‘r’ is completely
analogous) and that a scheme X1 6= ∅ was assigned to s1. By IH, the
node associated with s1 is ∗(s1, G) for some G ∈ X1. Since ‘l’ was
chosen for this +, rule ∗A3 was used after this node in the derivation
in the form
∗(s1, G)
∗(s1 + s2, G)
Thus, the successor node is ∗(s1 + s2, G) with G ∈ X1. This complies
with the assignment of X1 to s1 + s2 made in this Step 6.
• For Step 7!, assume that a scheme X 6= ∅ was assigned to s. By IH,
the node associated with s is ∗(s,G) for some G ∈ X. Since s is the
immediate suboccurrence of ! s in t, rule ∗A5 was used after this node
in the derivation:
∗(s,G)
∗(! s, s :G)
Thus, the successor node is ∗(! s, s :G) with s :G ∈ s :X. This complies
with the assignment of s :X to ! s made in this Step 7!.
• For Step 8, two situations lead to a non-empty assignment
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– Assume that a scheme Z1 = X1 → Y1 was assigned to s1 and a
scheme X2 6= ∅ was assigned to s2. Let σ = mgu(X1, X2). By IH,
the node associated with s1 is ∗(s1, H → E) for some H ∈ X1
and E ∈ Y1, and the node associated with s2 is ∗(s2, H ′) for
some H ′ ∈ X2. Since s1 and s2 are the immediate suboccurrences
of s1 · s2 in t, rule ∗A2 was used after this node in the derivation.
This requires that H = H ′:
∗(s1, H → E) ∗ (s2, H)
∗(s1 · s2, E)
Thus, the successor node is ∗(s1 · s2, E). This Step 8 assigns Y1σ
to s1 · s2, so we need to show that E ∈ Y1σ.
Since (H → E) ∈ (X1 → Y1) there must exist a substitution τ ′
such that X1τ
′ = H and Y1τ
′ = E. Since X1τ
′ ∋ H = H ′ ∈ X2
and σ = mgu(X1, X2), there must exist a substitution τ such that
τ ′ = στ . Therefore, E = Y1τ
′ = Y1στ is an instance of Y1σ.
– Assume that a variable over formulas P was assigned to s1 and a
scheme X2 6= ∅ was assigned to s2. By IH, the node associated
with s1 is ∗(s1, G) for some G, and the node associated with s2
is ∗(s2, H) for some H ∈ X2. Since s1 and s2 are the immediate
suboccurrences of s1 · s2 in t, rule ∗A2 was used after this node in
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the derivation. This requires that G = H → E for some E:
∗(s1, H → E) ∗ (s2, H)
∗(s1 · s2, E)
Thus, the successor node is ∗(s1 ·s2, E) with E ∈ Q. This complies
with the assignment of Q to s1 · s2 made in this Step 8.
This completes the proof of Correctness Lemma 5.1.2.
It remains to show that both procedures run in non-deterministic poly-
nomial time (polynomial in the total of sizes of all ∗-expressions from S plus
the size of ∗(t, F )).
Lemma 5.1.3.
1. ∗CS-DERIVE is an NP algorithm.
2. ∗!CS-DERIVE is an NP algorithm.
Proof. Steps 1–5 provide no more than |t| various choices: for each occurrence
of ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n
c for a constant c and an integer n ≥ 0, each occurrence of +, and
each occurrence of a subterm s such that ∗(s,G) ∈ S. The choice for each +
is binary. The choice for ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n
c, n ≥ 0, is finite since there are only finitely
many axiom schemes to choose from. Not all schemes might be applicable
to a particular constant depending on the CS. The set of applicable schemes
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for each constant is decidable since CS is. The choice for subterms s with
∗(s,G) ∈ S is linear in the number of ∗-expressions in S.
Note that there is at most one scheme (possibly ∅) assigned to every
subterm of t. Therefore, the number of productive steps in the 5–8 loop is
bounded by |t|.
It is clear that each step requires only polynomial time. The only step
where it is not completely evident is Step 8 in the case when X1 → Y1 is
assigned to s1. In this case, the algorithm tries to unify X1 with X2 and pro-
duces their most general unifier if possible. This can be done in polynomial
(quadratic) time in the total of sizes of dags representing schemes X1 and X2
using the modified Robinson’s unification algorithm from [CB83]. Moreover,
the constructed mgu can be simultaneously applied to Y1. The use of this
algorithm requires that all schemes be stored in dags rather than trees.
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.1.1.
Corollary 5.1.4. Let CS be a decidable almost schematic constant specifi-
cation for one of pure or hybrid justification logics.
1. There exists an NP algorithm for determining for any given finite set X
of ∗-expressions and a given ∗(t, F ) whether
S ⊢∗CS ∗(t, F ) .
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2. There exists an NP algorithm for determining for any given finite set
X of ∗-expressions and a given ∗(t, F ) whether
S ⊢∗!CS ∗(t, F ) .
Proof. Since CS is almost schematic, it can be broken into two disjoint parts:
CS = CS1 ∪ CS2, where CS1 is schematic and decidable, CS2 is finite (and
hence decidable), and CS1 ∩ CS2 = ∅.
S ⊢∗CS ∗(t, F ) ⇐⇒ S ∪ CS∗2 ⊢∗CS1 ∗(t, F )
S ⊢∗!CS ∗(t, F ) ⇐⇒ S ∪ CS∗2 ⊢∗!CS1 ∗(t, F )
Derivability of the right sides can be determined non-deterministically in
polynomial time by Theorem 5.1.1 since CS1 is schematic and decidable while
S ∪ CS∗2 is still finite.
Theorem 5.1.5. Let CS be a decidable almost schematic constant specifica-
tion for
L ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP,TnLP, S4nLP, S5nLP} .
Then, rLCS is in NP.
Proof. According to Theorem 3.4.2 for pure justification logics and Theo-
rem 3.5.23 for hybrid logics,
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• rLCS ⊢ t :F ⇐⇒ ∗CS-calculus ⊢ ∗(t, F )
for L ∈ {J, JD, JT}, and
• rLCS ⊢ t :F ⇐⇒ ∗!CS-calculus ⊢ ∗(t, F )
for L ∈ {J4, JD4, LP,TnLP, S4nLP, S5nLP}.
The right side of each equivalence can be decided using ∗CS-DERIVE
and ∗!CS-DERIVE procedures respectively, which, by Cor. 5.1.4, are both
NP-algorithms provided CS is decidable and almost schematic.
Theorem 5.1.6. rJ, rJD, rJT, rJ4, rJD4, rLP, rTnLP, rS4nLP, rS5nLP are
all in NP.
5.2 Upper Bounds for Pure Justification Log-
ics
Theorem 5.2.1 ([Art98, Mil07]). LPCS with a finite CS or decidable injec-
tive CS is in co-NP.
Theorem 5.2.2 ([Kuz00]). JCS , JTCS , J4CS , LPCS with a decidable almost
schematic CS are in Πp2.
Proof. The decision procedure for any of these logics consists of two parts.
First a propositional tableau procedure is performed with two additional
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rules. The rules to be added for JCS and J4CS are
T s :G
T ∗(s,G)
F s :G
F ∗(s,G) (5.2.1)
The rules to be added for JTCS and LPCS are
T s :G
T G
T ∗(s,G)
F s :G
F ∗(s,G) F G
(5.2.2)
The ∗-expressions are not analyzed further in the first tableau part of the
algorithm.
As in the propositional case, whenever TG and FG appear on the same
branch, such a branch is propositionally closed .
As in the propositional case, all rules decrease the complexity of formulas,
therefore, each branch can be either completed or propositionally closed.
The second stage of the algorithm starts when all branches are either
completed or propositionally closed. For each completed branch that is not
propositionally closed, we attempt to close it using ∗-expressions. Namely,
let X be the set of all ∗-expressions with prefix T on this branch. For every
∗-expression F ∗ (s,G) on this branch, we run
• ∗CS-DERIVE〈X, ∗(s,G)〉 for JCS and JTCS or
• ∗!CS-DERIVE〈X, ∗(s,G)〉 for J4CS and LPCS .
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If any such run returns true we close this branch. We will call such branches
∗-closed. Otherwise, this branch is announced open.
Lemma 5.2.3 (Correctness of the algorithm). For each of justification
logics JCS , JTCS , J4CS , LPCS , a formula G is not derivable in it iff there is a
completed tableau constructed by the rules for that logic for F G with at least
one branch open, i.e., neither propositionally closed nor ∗-closed.
Proof. Firstly, suppose G is not derivable. Then, by the Completeness The-
orem 3.3.4, there exists an M-model M = (V,A) such that M  ¬G. We
will show that there will always be an open branch, i.e., a branch that is
neither propositionally nor ∗-closed. Namely, we will show that throughout
the tableau procedure there is at least one branch with all prefixed state-
ments satisfied, i.e., with all T -prefixed formulas true, all F -prefixed formu-
las false, all T -prefixed ∗-expressions true for A∗, and with and F -prefixed
∗-expressions false for A∗.
M  ¬G so F G is satisfied in the model.
The propositional cases are treated in the standard way. It remains to
note that the new rules are synchronized with the definition of  for justifi-
cation formulas in M-models. More precisely,
• For logics JCS and J4CS . Let T t :H be on a branch with all prefixed
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statements satisfied. By IH, M  t : H. By (3.3.7), A(t,H) holds;
hence, T ∗ (t,H) is satisfied.
Let F t :H be on a branch with all prefixed statements satisfied. By
IH, M 1 t :H. By (3.3.7), A(t,H) does not hold; hence, F ∗ (t,H) is
satisfied.
• For logics JTCS and LPCS . Let T t :H be on a branch with all prefixed
statements satisfied. By IH, M  t :H. By (3.3.6), A(t,H) holds and
M  H; hence, both T ∗ (t,H) and T H are satisfied.
Let F t :H be on a branch with all prefixed statements satisfied. By IH,
M 1 t : H. By (3.3.6), either A(t,H) does not hold or M 1 H.
In the former case F ∗ (t,H) is satisfied; in the latter case F H is
satisfied. Thus, at least one of the two resulting branches will still have
all prefixed statements satisfied.
Thus, by the time the tableau is completed, there must remain a branch
with all prefixed statements satisfied. Since it is not possible to satisfy T H
and F H at the same time, this branch is not propositionally closed.
It remains to show that this branch is not ∗-closed either. A proof by
contradiction. Suppose towards a contradiction that this branch is ∗-closed.
It means that one of the runs of ∗(!)CS-DERIVE〈X, ∗(s,G)〉 returned true,
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where X is the set of all T -prefixed ∗-expressions on this branch and state-
ment F ∗ (s,G) is also on this branch. By Lemma 5.1.2, X ⊢∗ ∗(s,G) for
the ∗-calculus of this logic. Let BX be an M-type possible evidence function
defined by
BX(t,H) = True ⇐⇒ ∗(t,H) ∈ X (5.2.3)
By Corollary 3.3.42.2, E(s,G) holds for the minimal admissible evidence func-
tion E based on BX . Since all the T -prefixed ∗-expressions on the branch are
satisfied, A is also an admissible evidence function based on BX . There-
fore, E ⊆ A and A(s,G) holds. On the other side, A(s,G) cannot hold
because F ∗ (s,G) has to be satisfied. This contradiction shows that no
∗(!)CS-DERIVE run can return true, and this branch is not ∗-closed.
This completes the proof of the ‘only if’ direction.
Let us now prove the ‘if’ direction. Suppose there is a completed tableau
with an open branch. We will construct an M-model based on this open
branch. Let
V (p) = True iff T p is on the open branch (5.2.4)
Let A be the minimal evidence function based on BX from (5.2.3) for this
branch. We claim that for M = (V,A) all prefixed expressions from the open
branch are satisfied.
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First of all, A is based on BX , i.e., A(t,H) holds for each T ∗ (t,H) on
the branch.
Since A is the minimal function it is defined either by (3.3.35) for JCS
and JTCS or by (3.3.36) for J4CS and LPCS . For any F ∗ (s,G) on the branch
the ∗(!)CS-DERIVE〈X, ∗(s,G)〉 returned false because the branch is open.
Therefore, X 0∗ ∗(s,G) and A(s,G) does not hold.
Now let us prove that all prefixed formulas on the branch are satisfied
in M by induction on the size of a formula. If T p is on the branch, then
V (p) = True, so M  p. If F p is on the branch, T p is not on the branch
because the branch is open. V (p) = False, so M 1 p.
The Boolean cases are standard.
If T t :H is on the branch, then
• For JCS and J4CS , T ∗ (t,H) must be on the branch because the branch
is completed. Therefore, A(t,H) holds.
• For JTCS and LPCS , in addition, T H must be on the branch, and by IH,
M  H.
In either case M  t :H.
If F t :H is on the branch, then
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• For JCS and J4CS , F ∗ (t,H) must be on the branch because the branch
is completed. Therefore, A(t,H) does not hold.
• For JTCS and LPCS , in addition, another possibility is that F H could
be on the branch if the right branch of the β-rule is open, in which
case, by IH, M 1 H.
In either case M 1 t :H.
In particular, F G, the root of the branch must be satisfied, therefore,
M 1 G; hence, G is not derivable.
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.2.3.
It remains to show that the complexity of this algorithm is Πp2. The
complexity of the propositional tableau procedure is NP. The new rules for
formulas of type t :H clearly do not change that. This means that to show
that a formula is not derivable we need to guess which branch of the tableau
is open. The branch itself is of polynomial length, in fact linear in |G|.
Complexity of ∗(!)CS-DERIVE for a decidable almost schematic CS is NP.
In other words, to get the answer true it is sufficient to guess a ∗-calculus
derivation of polynomial length. To show that a branch of the tableau is not
∗-closed we, on the contrary need to check all F -prefixed ∗-expressions and
obtain the answer false for all of them. This requires checking all possible
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∗-calculus derivation and is hence a dual problem, co-NP.
The size ofX, ∗(s,H) for each call of ∗(!)CS-DERIVE is clearly polynomial
in |G|. Thus, the overall complexity of determining that G is not derivable
is Σp2 and the dual Validity Problem is in Π
p
2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.2.2.
The same result was announced in [Kuz00] for JDCS and JD4CS . Recently
an omission was found in that proof. These logics feature an additional
Consistent Evidence Condition on the admissible evidence function. This
condition requires A(t,⊥) to be False for all terms t, not only for the sub-
terms of a given G. This may make the set of prefixed ∗-statements on the
branch inconsistent even though all ∗(!)CS-DERIVE runs returned false. We
will now correct the proof of the upper bound for JDCS .
Theorem 5.2.4. JDCS with a decidable, almost schematic, and axiomatically
appropriate CS is in Πp2.
Proof. Following the ideas of Fitting and Massacci from [Fit72, Mas94, FM98,
Mas00], we will use integer prefixes for our already prefixed formulas TG
and FG. To disambiguate the two types of prefixes we will address them as
a truth prefix and integer prefix respectively.
For most modal logics, sequences of integers are used as prefixes rather
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than single integers. In this respect, our integer prefixes resemble prefixes
for S5 where single integers suffice. There is a crucial difference though.
Prefixes for S5 represent different worlds in the same Kripke model. The
accessibility relation is assumed to be total, i.e. any world/prefix is accessible
from any other world/prefix.
In our case, integer prefixes will represent different M-models with the
underlying intuition that the existence of the (n+1)st M-model justifies the
Consistent Evidence condition for the nth M-model.
This is how we amend the tableau rules for JDCS . All the propositional
rules act the same way with respect to formulas and truth prefixes; they
do not change the integer prefix. The rule for n F s :G remains the same
as for JCS and J4CS with the addition of integer prefix that once again is
unchanged. The only significant change is in the rule for n T s :G:
n T s :G
n T ∗(s,G)
n+1 T G
(5.2.5)
Whenever n T G and n F G appear on the same branch, such a branch
is propositionally closed .
As in the propositional case, all rules decrease the complexity of formu-
las regardless of whether the integer prefix is incremented. Therefore, each
branch can be either completed or propositionally closed.
CHAPTER 5. COMPLEXITY 220
The second stage of the algorithm starts when all branches are either
completed or propositionally closed. For each completed branch that is not
propositionally closed, we attempt to close it using ∗-expressions. Namely, let
Xn be the set of all ∗-expressions with prefix n T on this branch. For every
integer prefix n occurring on this branch and every ∗-expression n F ∗ (s,G)
from the branch, we run ∗CS-DERIVE〈Xn, ∗(s,G)〉. If any such run returns
true, we close this branch. We will call such branches ∗-closed . Otherwise,
the branch is announced open.
Lemma 5.2.5 (Correctness of the algorithm). JDCS 0 G iff there is a
completed JDCS-tableau for 1 F G with at least one branch open, i.e., neither
propositionally closed nor ∗-closed.
Proof. First suppose G is not derivable. Then, by the Completeness Theo-
rem 3.3.4, there exists an M-model M = (V,A) such that M 1 G. We will
define an infinite sequence of M-models
M1 = (V1,A1), . . . ,Mn = (Vn,An), . . .
by induction on n. The first model in the sequence will be
M1 = M .
Let M-model Mn = (Vn,An) be already constructed. The admissible
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evidence function An is clearly based on itself. Not surprisingly, it is also
the minimal such M-type admissible evidence function. Therefore, by Theo-
rem 3.3.41.1,
∗(s,H) ∈ A∗n ⇐⇒ A∗n ⊢∗CS ∗(s,H)
By Consistent Evidence condition for An,
∗(s,⊥) /∈ A∗n
for any term s. Therefore,
A∗n 0∗CS ∗(s,⊥)
for any s. We will prove by contradiction that
(A∗n)♯ 0JDCS ⊥ (5.2.6)
Suppose towards a contradiction that ⊥ is derivable from (A∗n)♯. Only
finitely many formulas can be used in this derivation, so
H1, . . . , Hk ⊢JDCS ⊥ ,
where An(si, Hi) = True, i = 1, . . . , k, for some terms s1, . . . , sk. Internaliz-
ing this derivation by Lemma 3.2.22, we would get
x1 :H1, . . . , xk :Hk ⊢JDCS t(x1, . . . , xk) :⊥
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for fresh justification variables x1, . . . , xk and some term t (we use the fact
that CS is axiomatically appropriate). The simultaneous substitution of si’s
for xi’s would yield by Lemma 3.2.30 (again axiomatic appropriateness of CS
is used)
s1 :H1, . . . , sk :Hk ⊢JDCS t(s1, . . . , sk) :⊥ .
Since JDCS ⊢ t(s1, . . . , sk) :⊥ → ⊥, in this case the set
{s1 :H1, . . . , sk :Hk} (5.2.7)
would be JDCS-inconsistent. But An(si, Hi) = True and hence, by (3.3.7),
Mn  si :Hi for all i = 1, . . . , k clearly making Mn an M-model for set (5.2.7).
This contradiction completes the proof of (5.2.6).
Thus, (A∗n)♯ is JDCS-consistent. By Lemma 2.6.2.8, it can be extended to
a maximal consistent set Γ ⊇ (A∗n)♯. By Lemma 3.3.5, there is a canonical
M-model Mn+1 for Γ such that
Mn+1  F ⇐⇒ F ∈ Γ .
This will be our next M-model. In particular,
An(s, F ) = True =⇒ Mn+1  F . (5.2.8)
We will show that there will always be an open branch, i.e., a branch that
is neither propositionally nor ∗-closed. Namely, we will show that through-
CHAPTER 5. COMPLEXITY 223
out the tableau procedure there is at least one branch where the following
conditions are satisfied:
1. for all n T H on the branch Mn  H
2. for all n F H on the branch Mn 1 H
3. for all n T ∗ (s,H) on the branch An(s,H) = True
4. for all n F ∗ (s,H) on the branch An(s,H) = False
As usual, the proof is by induction on the tableau derivation. We start
with 1 F G at the root node of the future tableau, for which we know that
M1 1 G.
The propositional cases do not change the integer prefix and, therefore,
can be dealt with in the standard manner within each model.
Let us then look closely at the new rules for justification formulas. Let
n F t :H be on a branch with all conditions 1–4 satisfied. By IH, Mn 1 t :H.
By (3.3.7), An(t,H) = False; hence, condition 4 is satisfied for n F ∗ (t,H).
Let n T t : H be on a branch with all conditions 1–4 satisfied. By IH,
Mn  t :H. By (3.3.7), An(t,H) = True; hence, condition 3 is satisfied for
n T ∗ (t,H). In addition, by (5.2.8), Mn+1  H, which satisfies condition 1
for n+1 T H.
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Thus, by the time the tableau is completed, there is still a branch with
all conditions 1–4 satisfied. Since it is not possible to satisfy condition 1
for n T H and condition 2 for n F H at the same time, this branch is not
propositionally closed.
It remains to show that this branch is not ∗-closed either. A proof by
contradiction. Suppose towards a contradiction that this branch is ∗-closed.
It means that one of the runs of ∗CS-DERIVE〈Xn, ∗(s,G)〉 returned true,
where Xn is the set of all n T -prefixed ∗-expressions on this branch and, in
addition, n F ∗ (s,G) is also on this branch. By Lemma 5.1.2.1,
Xn ⊢∗CS ∗(s,G) . (5.2.9)
Let BXn be an M-type possible evidence function defined by
BXn(t,H) = True ⇐⇒ ∗(t,H) ∈ Xn (5.2.10)
By condition 3, An is based on BXn . So such admissible evidence functions
do exist. By Theorem 3.3.41.1, there exists the minimal admissible evidence
function En based on BXn that satisfies
∗(s,H) ∈ E∗n ⇐⇒ Xn ⊢∗CS ∗(s,H) (5.2.11)
by (3.3.35). Being the minimal function, En ⊆ An. Then, by (5.2.9) and (5.2.11),
An(s,G) = True .
CHAPTER 5. COMPLEXITY 225
On the other hand, An(s,G) = False according to condition 4 for n F ∗(s,G)
on the branch. This contradiction shows that no ∗CS-DERIVE run can return
true, and this branch is not ∗-closed.
This completes the proof of the ‘only if’ direction.
Let us now prove the ‘if’ direction. Suppose there is a completed tableau
with an open branch. We will construct a sequence of M-models based on
this open branch. Let N be the largest integer prefix occurring on the open
branch. Let
Vn(p) = True iff n T p is on the open branch (5.2.12)
Let An be the defined by (3.3.35) based on BXn from (5.2.10) for this branch.
We claim that An’s are admissible evidence functions and that for the se-
quence Mn = (Vn,An) conditions 1–4 are satisfied. The proof will be by
induction on N − n.
Base. N−n = 0, i.e, N = n. The absence of (N+1) T H on the branch
implies the absence of N T t :H and hence of N T ∗ (t,H) too. In
other words, XN = ∅ and BXN (t,H) is always False. By consistency
of JDCS (Theorem 3.2.21), there exist M-models with some admissi-
ble for JDCS evidence functions, which are, of course, based on the
empty BXN . Thus, by Theorem 3.3.41.1, AN is the minimal M-type
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admissible for JDCS evidence function based on BXN .
Now that we know MN is an M-model, we are ready to prove condi-
tions 1–4 for n = N .
Condition 3 is vacuously satisfied since there are no N T ∗ (t,H) on
the branch.
For any N F ∗ (s,G) on the branch, the ∗CS-DERIVE〈XN , ∗(s,G)〉
returned false because the branch is open. Therefore, XN 0∗CS ∗(s,G)
and AN(s,G) = False.
Now let us prove that conditions 1–2 are satisfied for N by induction
on the size of formula. If N T p is on the branch, VN(p) = True, so
MN  p. If N F p is on the branch, N T p is not on the branch
because the branch is open. VN(p) = False, so MN 1 p.
The Boolean cases are standard.
N T t :H does not occur on the branch.
If N F t :H is on the branch, then N F ∗(t,H) must be on the branch
because the branch is completed. Therefore, by just proven condition 4,
AN(t,H) = False and MN 1 t :H.
Step. Let Ak+1 be an admissible for JDCS evidence function and let condi-
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tions 1–4 be satisfied for n = k+1.
Let us prove that Ak is also an admissible for JDCS evidence func-
tion. In the proof of Theorem 3.3.41 all the closure conditions for JDCS
were verified based solely on (3.3.35), except for the Consistent Ev-
idence condition, for which an extra assumption of non-emptiness of
AEFB(JDCS) was used. As was noted in Footnote 6 on p. 110, this
extra assumption is not used anywhere else in the proof. It follows
that to show that Ak is an admissible evidence function, it suffices to
verify the Consistent Evidence condition for it.
Proof by contradiction. Suppose Ak(s,⊥) = True. Then, by (3.3.35)
Xk ⊢∗CS ∗(s,⊥) .
By Lemma 3.4.10.1,
(Xk)
♯ ⊢JDCS ⊥ ,
i.e., (Xk)
♯ is JDCS-inconsistent. For any H ∈ (Xk)♯ there must be some
k T t :H on the branch. Since the branch is completed, there also must
be k+1 T H on the same branch. By IH, Mk+1  H. Therefore, the
inconsistent set (Xk)
♯ is satisfiable in the model
Mk+1  (Xk)
♯ .
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This contradiction shows that the Consistent Evidence condition forAk
is satisfied.
Now that we know Mk is an M-model for JDCS , we are ready to prove
conditions 1–4 for n = k.
For any k T ∗ (s,G) on the branch, ∗(s,G) ∈ Xk. Then, obviously,
Xk ⊢∗CS ∗(s,G); therefore, Ak(s,G) = True.
For any k F ∗ (s,G) on the branch, the ∗CS-DERIVE〈Xk, ∗(s,G)〉 re-
turned false because the branch is open. Therefore, Xk 0∗CS ∗(s,G)
and Ak(s,G) = False.
Now let us prove that conditions 1–2 are satisfied for k by induction
on the size of formula. If k T p is on the branch, Vk(p) = True, so
Mk  p. If k F p is on the branch, k T p is not on the branch because
the branch is open. Vk(p) = False, so Mk 1 p.
The Boolean cases are standard.
If k T t :H, then k T ∗(t,H) must be on the branch because the branch
is completed. Therefore, by just proven condition 3, Ak(t,H) = True
and Mk  t :H.
If k F t :H is on the branch, then k F ∗ (t,H) must be on the branch
because the branch is completed. Therefore, by just proven condition 4,
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Ak(t,H) = False and Mk 1 t :H.
This completes the proof by induction on N − n.
In particular, by condition 2 for statement 1 F G at the root of the
tableau, M1 1 G; hence, G is not derivable.
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.2.5.
It remains to show that the complexity of this algorithm is Πp2. The
complexity of the propositional tableau procedure is NP. The new rules for
t :H clearly do not change that. Note that ∗-expressions are not analyzed
further. Note also that even when switching to the next model (incrementing
the integer index), the complexity of the formulas strictly decreases on every
step. Thus, the length of each tableau branch is still polynomial (in fact
linear) in |G| for a given formula G that we try to refute. Since only some
tableau steps warrant switches to a new model, the integer prefixes are also
bounded by some N = O(|G|).
Thus, the tableau portion including checking for propositional closures
is NP as usual: to show that a formula is not derivable we need to guess
which branch of polynomial length is open.
Complexity of each ∗CS-DERIVE call for a decidable almost schematic CS
is NP. In other words, to get the answer true, it is sufficient to guess a
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∗CS-calculus derivation of polynomial length. To show that a branch of the
tableau is not ∗-closed, on the contrary, we need to check for each k all k F -
prefixed ∗-expressions and obtain the answer false for them. This requires
checking all possible ∗CS-calculus derivation and is hence a dual problem, a
co-NP one.
The size of Xn, ∗(s,H) for each call of ∗CS-DERIVE is clearly polynomial
in |G|. Thus, the overall complexity of determining that G is not derivable
is Σp2 and the dual Validity Problem is in Π
p
2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.2.4.
Note 5.2.6. The prefixed tableaux method used for JDCS does not work
for JD4CS . The problem is that JD4CS-consistency of X
♯ does not guarantee
the existence of an admissible for JD4CS evidence function based on BX . For
instance, the set
Y = {p, ¬x :p}
is perfectly JD4CS-consistent (it is sufficient to take A to be the minimal
admissible for JD4CS function and make sure that V (p) = True).
On the other hand, for the set of ∗-expressions
X = {∗(x, p), ∗(y,¬x :p)}
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with X♯ = Y there is no admissible evidence function A such that
∗(s,H) ∈ X =⇒ A(s,H) = True
The reason is very simple: there exists a term t such that
X ⊢∗!CS ∗(t,⊥)
for any axiomatically appropriate CS. Indeed,
JD4CS ⊢ ¬x :p→ (x :p→ ⊥) .
Depending on the axiomatization, this may or may not be an axiom, but
by the Constructive Necessitation (Cor. 3.2.24) there must exist a ground
term s such that
JD4CS ⊢ s : [¬x :p→ (x :p→ ⊥)] .
It follows that
⊢∗!CS ∗(s,¬x :p→ (x :p→ ⊥)) .
Here is a derivation showing that any attempt to construct an admissible
evidence function based on BX would violate the Consistent Evidence con-
dition:
··
∗(s,¬x :p→ (x :p→ ⊥)) ∗ (y,¬x :p)
∗(s · y, x :p→ ⊥)
∗(x, p)
∗(! x, x :p)
∗((s · y) · ! x,⊥)
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Thus, the trick of reducing verification of the Consistent Evidence condi-
tion to checking satisfiability of simpler formulas does not work for JD4CS .
5.3 Lower Bounds for Pure Justification Log-
ics
There is a trivial lower bound for all justification logics:
Theorem 5.3.1. Let JL be any of pure justification logics J, JD, JT, J4,
JD4, LP, J5, J45, JD45, JT45, and CS be any constant specification for JL.
Then, JLCS is co-NP-hard.
Proof. The result follows from
Lemma 5.3.2. Let JL be any of pure justification logics J, JD, JT, J4, JD4,
LP, J5, J45, JD45, JT45, and CS be any constant specification for JL. Then,
JLCS is conservative over classical propositional logic.
Proof. Indeed, consider the following propositional translation []r from jus-
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Table 5.3.1: Propositional translation of axioms of justification logics are
propositional tautologies
JL axiom Its translation
A1 instance of A1 another instance of A1
A2 s : (F → G)→ (t :F → s · t :G) (F r → Gr)→ (F r → Gr)
A3 s :F → s+ t :F F r → F r
A3 t :F → s+ t :F F r → F r
A4 t :F → F F r → F r
A5 t :F → ! t : t :F F r → F r
A6 ¬t :F → ? t :¬t :F ¬F r → ¬F r
A7 t :⊥ → ⊥ ⊥ → ⊥
tification language to propositional language:
⊥r ⇌ ⊥
pr ⇌ p
(F → G)r ⇌ F r → Gr
(t :F )r ⇌ F r
By induction on the JLCS-derivation we show that propositional translation
of any JLCS-derivable formula is a propositional tautology.
As Table 5.3.1 shows, propositional translation of all justification axioms
are either propositional axioms or simple propositional tautologies.
Translation of a modus ponens instance is another instance of modus
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ponens :
F → G F
G
 
F r → Gr F r
Gr
Translation of the conclusion of a R4CS or a R4
!
CS instance yields a trans-
lation of some axiom, which is shown to be a tautology in Table 5.3.1:
(
c :A
)r
= Ar(
! . . . ! c : . . . : ! c :c :A
)r
= Ar
Suppose LCS ⊢ F for some propositional formula F . Then, F r is a propo-
sitional tautology, but F = F r. This completes the proof of Lemma 5.3.2.
We are now ready to finish the proof of Theorem 5.3.1. As usual in the
presence of conservativity, the identity function from the propositional lan-
guage into the justification language provides for a polynomial-time reduction
from classical propositional logic to JLCS . Classical propositional logic was
shown to be co-NP-hard by Stephen Cook in [Coo71].
Theorem 5.3.3 ([Mil07]).
1. J4CS with a decidable schematic CS is Πp2-hard.
2. LPCS with a decidable schematically injective axiomatically appropri-
ate CS is Πp2-hard.
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Corollary 5.3.4 ([Mil07]).
1. J4CS with a decidable schematic CS is Πp2-complete.
2. LPCS with a decidable, schematically injective, and axiomatically ap-
propriate CS is Πp2-complete.
Corollary 5.3.5 ([Mil07]). J4 is Πp2-complete.
Note 5.3.6. T CSLP is not schematically injective, so Theorem 5.3.3 does not
give a lower bound on the complexity of LP itself.
There exists an elegant reduction of the Satisfiability Problem for Int
to the Satisfiability Problem for JDCS for a certain schematic though not
axiomatically appropriate CS:
Lemma 5.3.7. Consider the axiomatization of classical propositional logic
that consists of a complete axiomatization of the intuitionistic propositional
logic Int with the law of double negation ¬¬F → F as an additional axiom
scheme. Let
CS = {c :A | A is an intuitionistic axiom instance} .
Clearly such CS is a decidable schematic constant specification for any justi-
fication logic.
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Let x be a fixed justification variable, Q be any propositional formula. The
following statements are equivalent.
1. Q is Int-satisfiable
2. Int 0 ¬Q
3. Q 0Int ⊥
4. there is no justification term t such that ∗(x,Q) ⊢∗CS ∗(t,⊥)
5. x :Q is JDCS-satisfiable
But this reduction does not entail PSPACE-hardness of this JDCS . Un-
like classical logics, where the complexity of the validity problem is typically
dual to the complexity of the satisfiability problem (cf. SAT is NP-complete,
whereas classical propositional logic is co-NP-complete), intuitionistic logic
is different. As noted in [Sˇve03, Remark 2 on p.715], “the set of all intuition-
istically satisfiable formulas equals the set SAT of all classically satisfiable
formulas.” This statement easily follows from Glivenko Theorem, for in-
stance.
Therefore, rather counterintuitively, the Satisfiability Problem for Int is
NP-complete even though the Validity Problem is PSPACE-complete.
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So the reduction in Lemma 5.3.7 does not improve the trivial co-NP-hard
lower bound for JDCS . For this reason we omit the proof of Lemma 5.3.7
here.
5.4 Complexity of Hybrid Logics
Theorem 5.4.1.
• TnLPCS , n ≥ 1, is PSPACE-hard.
• S4nLPCS , n ≥ 1, is PSPACE-hard.
• S5nLPCS , n ≥ 2, is PSPACE-hard.
• S51LPCS is co-NP-hard.
Proof. The results follow from
Lemma 5.4.2.
• TnLPCS is conservative over Tn.
• S4nLPCS is conservative over S4n.
• S5nLPCS is conservative over S5n.
Proof. We will prove conservativity semantically. We need to prove that any
modal formula ϕ ∈MLn is derivable in a hybrid logic iff it is derivable in the
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corresponding modal logic, i.e., in the modal logic whose name is obtained
by omitting the LPCS suffix from the name of the hybrid logic:
Mn ⊢ ϕ ⇐⇒ MnLPCS ⊢ ϕ ,
where M ∈ {T, S4, S5}.
The =⇒ direction is trivial since any Mn-derivation is also an MnLPCS-
derivation.
Let us now prove the⇐= direction, or rather its contrapositive. Suppose
Mn 0 ϕ. By completeness of Mn w.r.t. its Kripke models there exists a Kripke
model K = (W,R1, . . . , Rn, V ) and a world w ∈ W such that K, w 1 ϕ.
Let Atot be the total evidence function from (3.3.31), i.e.
Atot(t, F ) = W
for any term t and any hybrid formula F . This function was shown to be an
admissible evidence function for any hybrid logic on any model with any Re
in the proof of Theorem 3.3.34.
Let Re = W ×W . Clearly, such a binary relation is reflexive, symmetric,
and transitive. It also contains all Ri, whatever they are.
The conditions on Ri are the same for Kripke models of Mn and for AF-
models of MnLPCS .
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Therefore, M = (W,Re, R1, . . . , Rn, V,A) with W , Ri’s, and V taken
from K is an AF-model for MnLPCS .
It remains to note that the definition of  for purely modal formulas in
Kripke models coincides with that for AF-models. Thus, M, w 1 ϕ for the
same world w, and MnLPCS 1 ϕ.
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.4.2.
We are now ready to finish the proof of Theorem 5.4.1. As usual in
the presence of conservativity, the identity function from MLn into HLn
provides for a polynomial-time reduction from Mn to MnLPCS . Therefore,
the lower bounds for hybrid logics follow from PSPACE-hardness of Tn, S4n
for n ≥ 1 and S5n for n ≥ 2 proved by Joseph Halpern and Yoram Moses
in [HM85, HM92] as well as from co-NP-hardness of S51 proved by Richard
Ladner in [Lad77] (Ladner also proved PSPACE-hardness of T1 and S41
there).
Note 5.4.3. Conservativity is usually proved by a derivability-preserving trans-
lation from the richer language to the more basic one as in the proof of
Lemma 5.3.2. But certain difficulties arise in constructing such a translation
for Lemma 5.4.2. The goal is to translate the hybrid language HLn into the
multimodal language MLn. In particular, we need the translation of axiom
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t :F → KiF to be valid for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Thus, t :F should be translated
as at least EF = K1F ∧ . . .∧KnF . But even that is not enough. In addition,
the translation of t :F → ! t : t :F has to be derivable in the respective modal
logic. If we choose to translate t :F as EF , this Positive Introspection axiom
will be translated as EF → EEF , which is not derivable even in S5n for
n ≥ 2. Indeed, already for n = 2, EF → EEF stands for
K1F ∧K2F → K1(K1F ∧K2F ) ∧K2(K1F ∧K2F ) .
There is no reason why K1F ∧K2F should entail K1K2F or K2K1F . This
example shows that the translation of t : F should be something akin to
common knowledge, which is not present in the hybrid language.
Theorem 5.4.4 ([Kuz06a]). S4LPCS with a decidable schematic CS is
PSPACE-complete.
Note 5.4.5. Since there is only one modality in S4LP, we will use  instead
of K1.
Proof. The lower bound, PSPACE-hardness of S4LPCS = S41LPCS was proven
in Theorem 5.4.1.
The upper bound is proven by generalizing and modifying Ladner’s de-
cision algorithm for S4 from [Lad77]. We describe a recursive procedure
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S4LPCS-WORLD that tries to construct an F-model M = (W,R, V,A) refut-
ing the given formula F if such a model exists.
The procedure has seven parameters
〈T ,F , T ,F, T ∗,F∗,L〉 ,
where
• T and F are finite sets of hybrid formulas;
• T  and F are finite sets of boxed formulas, i.e. formulas of form C;
• T ∗ and F∗ are finite sets of ∗-expressions of form ∗(s, C);
• L is a triple (T , T ∗, 〈B1, . . . , Bk〉), where
– T  is a finite (possibly empty) set of boxed formulas,
– T ∗ is a finite (possibly empty) set of ∗-expressions, and
– 〈B1, . . . , Bk〉 is a sequence (possibly empty) of hybrid formulas.
The intuitive understanding is that each call of the procedure describes
the conditions imposed on one world of the future model. The world is not
present explicitly. We will denote it by w.
• T is a set of formulas that have to be true at w in the future model.
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• T  is a set of boxed formulas that have to be true at w in the future
model.
• F is a set of formulas that have to be false at w in the future model.
• F is a set of boxed formulas that have to be false at w in the future
model.
• T ∗ is a set of ∗-expressions that has to be a subset of A∗w for the future
admissible evidence function A, i.e. T ∗ ⊆ A∗w.
• F∗ is a set of ∗-expressions that has to be disjoint from A∗w for the
future admissible evidence function A, i.e., F∗ ∩ A∗w = ∅.
• Finally, L represents a log of the previous recursive calls and is kept to
prevent the algorithm from looping.
In order to determine whether F is a theorem of S4LPCS or, equiva-
lently, whether F is valid in all F-models for S4LPCS , we start the procedure
S4LPCS-WORLD on input
〈∅, {F}, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, (∅, ∅, λ)〉 ,
where λ stands for the empty sequence. In other words, we only need F ∈ F
to be false at some world of the future model. We want the procedure
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to return true iff such a world and such a model exist. The procedure is
described in Fig. 5.4.1.
In Step 11 of the procedure,
(T , T ∗, B) ∈ L
is a shorthand for the statement that
L = (T , T ∗, 〈B1, . . . , Bk〉)
with B = Bi for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Accordingly, the condition
(T , T ∗, B) /∈ L
in the subscript of the second big conjunction is simply the negation of
(T , T ∗, B) ∈ L.
Operation ⊚ in Step 11 is defined as follows:
L⊚〈T , T ∗, B〉 =


(T , T ∗, 〈B〉) if L = (∅, ∅, λ)
(T , T ∗, 〈B1 . . . , Bk, B〉) if L = (T , T ∗, 〈B1 . . . , Bk〉)
(T , T ∗, 〈B〉) if L = (T 0 , T ∗0 , 〈B1 . . . , Bk〉) and
T  ) T 0 or T ∗ ) T ∗0
In Step 11, procedure S4LPCS-WORLD uses an external subroutine ∗!CS-
DERIVE from p. 196.
∗!CS-DERIVE〈T ∗, ∗(t, B)〉
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Figure 5.4.1: Recursive procedure S4LPCS-WORLD
procedure S4LPCS-WORLD〈T ,F , T ,F, T ∗,F∗,L〉;
begin
if T ∪ F * SLet then
begin
1. choose G ∈ T ∪ F \ SLet;
2. if G = ⊥ ∈ T then return false;
3. if G = ⊥ ∈ F then return
S4LPCS-WORLD〈T ,F \ {⊥}, T ,F, T ∗,F∗,L〉;
4. if G = B → C ∈ T then return
S4LPCS-WORLD〈T ∪{C}\{B → C},F , T ,F, T ∗,F∗,L〉 ∨
S4LPCS-WORLD〈T \ {B → C},F ∪ {B}, T ,F, T ∗,F∗,L〉;
5. if G = B → C ∈ F then return
S4LPCS-WORLD〈T ∪{B},F ∪{C}\{B → C}, T ,F, T ∗,F∗,L〉;
6. if G = B ∈ T then return
S4LPCS-WORLD〈T ∪ {B} \ {B},F , T  ∪ {B},F, T ∗,F∗,L〉;
7. if G = B ∈ F then return
S4LPCS-WORLD〈T ,F \ {B}, T ,F ∪ {B}, T ∗,F∗,L〉;
8. if G = t :B ∈ T then return
S4LPCS-WORLD〈T ∪ {B} \ {t :B},F , T ,F, T ∗ ∪ {∗(t, B)},F∗,L〉;
9. if G = t :B ∈ F then return
S4LPCS-WORLD〈T ,F\{t :B}, T ,F, T ∗,F∗∪{∗(t, B)},L〉 ∨
S4LPCS-WORLD〈T ,F ∪ {B} \ {t :B}, T ,F, T ∗,F∗,L〉;
end;
if T ∪ F ⊆ SLet then
begin
10. if T ∩ F 6= ∅ then return false;
11. if T ∩ F = ∅ then return∧
∗(t,B)∈F∗
¬
(
∗!CS-DERIVE〈T ∗, ∗(t, B)〉
)
∧∧
B∈F
(T  ,T ∗,B)/∈L
S4LPCS-WORLD
〈T  ∪ (T ∗) : , {B}, T , ∅, T ∗, ∅,L⊚ (T , T ∗, B)〉;
end;
end.
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returns true iff
T ∗ ⊢∗!CS ∗(t, B) .
Note that, whenever that happens, the current S4LPCS-WORLD call imme-
diately returns false.
To prove correctness, we will show how to extract a refuting F-model
for F from a successful run of
S4LPCS-WORLD〈∅, {F}, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, (∅, ∅, λ)〉
This model will be based on a tree of polynomial in |F | depth. Of course, such
a tree itself may be exponential in |F |. This does not prevent the procedure
from using only polynomial space. Our procedure will be traversing this tree
one node at a time. At any moment, the procedure will see only a single node
and store certain information about the parent nodes from the (polynomial)
branch of the current node.
Lemma 5.4.6 (Correctness of S4LPCS-WORLD). The call of procedure
S4LPCS-WORLD〈∅, {F}, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, (∅, ∅, λ)〉 (5.4.1)
returns true iff there exist an F-model M = (W,R, V,A) for S4LPCS and a
world Γ ∈W such that M,Γ 1 F .
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Proof. Let us first prove that the desired countermodel exists if true is re-
turned as the result of call (5.4.1).
Consider the successful run of our procedure. This run consists of many
successful recursive calls of S4LPCS-WORLD (a successful call is a call that
returns true). There may have been some unsuccessful calls too that did
not affect the final returned value. From now on we disregard all such un-
successful calls.
The calls made in Step 11 of S4LPCS-WORLD (see Fig. 5.4.1) will be
referred to as essential ; all the other calls are local . The initial call (5.4.1)
is also considered essential. We will associate a world ΓL with each essential
call
S4LPCS-WORLD〈T ,F , T ,F, T ∗,F∗,L〉 .
We will refer to all essential calls with the last parameter L as to L-calls ,
because L uniquely defines the essential call for each computation branch.1
For each L-call, where
L = (T , T ∗, 〈B1, . . . , Bk〉)
1There may be different L-calls on different branches, so it could be better to encode
the essential calls and worlds associated with them by the full list of all parameters of the
call rather than just the last parameter. But this would create enormously long subscripts
for the worlds, which would greatly impact readability. At the same time L is sufficient to
identify a call within each branch, which prompted us to use this potentially ambiguous
notation.
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with k ≥ 1, i.e., for each essential call with the exception of the initial
call (5.4.1), the closest essential call preceding this L-call in the run of (5.4.1)
is uniquely defined. We will refer to this closest essential preceding call as
the L−1-call
S4LPCS-WORLD〈T0,F0, T 0 ,F0 , T ∗0 ,F∗0 ,L−1〉 ,
where
L−1 =


(T , T ∗, 〈B1, . . . , Bk−1〉) if T 0 = T , T ∗0 = T ∗, and k ≥ 2 ;
(T 0 , T ∗0 , 〈C1, . . . , Cl〉) if T 0 ( T , T ∗0 ⊆ T ∗, and k = 1 or
T 0 ⊆ T , T ∗0 ( T ∗, and k = 1 ;
(∅, ∅, λ) if k = 1 and L is the second essential
call on its branch.
For each L-call let T , F , T , F, T ∗, and F∗ be parameters of the
closest consecutive call after this L-call that will use Step 11 (this future call
may be either essential or terminal). We will denote these sets by TL, FL,
T L , FL , T ∗L , and F∗L respectively.
For each computation branch, several local calls are generally made be-
tween any two consecutive essential calls. Let the earlier of these two calls
be an L-call. In the course of the intermediate local calls, formulas are being
chosen from T and F to be discharged in Steps 2–9. Imagine an alterna-
tive procedure where exact same formulas are chosen in the same order, and
exact same intermediate local calls are made with the only exception that
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the chosen formulas are never discharged from parameters T or F . Let T L
and FL denote the first two parameters that would have resulted in such an
alternative run right before the next essential call.
We are now ready to define the countermodel.
• The set of worldsW consists of all ΓL for essential L-calls in the original
successful run of (5.4.1).
• Accessibility relation. For each essential L-call other than (5.4.1) let
ΓL−1R0ΓL . (5.4.2)
Let also
Γ(T  ,T ∗,〈B1,...,Bk〉)R0Γ(T  ,T ∗,〈B1〉) , (5.4.3)
provided that the essential calls corresponding to the former and lat-
ter worlds occur on the same computation branch of the tree in the
opposite order, i.e., first the (T , T ∗, 〈B1〉)-call and then the L =
(T , T ∗, 〈B1, . . . , Bk〉)-call. In addition, we require that T L = T 
and T ∗L = T ∗.
Let R be the reflexive and transitive closure of R0.
• Admissible evidence function. We define an F-type possible evidence
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function B such that for any essential call L and corresponding world ΓL
ΓL ∈ B(t, G) ⇐⇒ ∗(t, G) ∈ T ∗L (5.4.4)
Let A be the minimal F-type admissible for S4LPCS evidence function
based on B, defined according to (3.5.9).
• Propositional valuation V is defined for each essential L-call and cor-
responding world ΓL by
ΓL ∈ V (p) ⇐⇒ p ∈ TL (5.4.5)
It is easy to see that M = (W,R, V,A) is indeed an F-model for S4LPCS .
• W 6= ∅ because each run has at least one essential call, namely the
initial call (5.4.1).
• Being a reflexive transitive closure, clearly R is reflexive and transitive.
• A is an admissible evidence function by Theorem 3.5.20.
Our goal is to show that for the initial call (5.4.1)
M,Γ(∅,∅,λ) 1 F . (5.4.6)
We will prove a more general fact:
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Lemma 5.4.7 (Truth Lemma). For each essential call L and corresponding
world ΓL
G ∈ T L =⇒ M,ΓL  G (5.4.7)
G ∈ FL =⇒ M,ΓL 1 G (5.4.8)
Proof. Induction on complexity of G.
p ∈ T L. Sentence letters are never discharged by S4LPCS-WORLD, hence
p ∈ TL. Therefore, ΓL ∈ V (p) by (5.4.5), and M,ΓL  p by (3.3.15).
p ∈ FL. Again p ∈ FL. The L-call was successful, so by Step 10 FL∩TL = ∅, and
p /∈ TL. Therefore, ΓL /∈ V (p) by (5.4.5), and M,ΓL 1 p by (3.3.15).
⊥ ∈ T L. The L-call was successful, so by Step 2, this cannot happen.
⊥ ∈ FL. M,ΓL 1 ⊥ by (3.3.16).
B → C ∈ T L. By Step 4, either B ∈ FL or C ∈ T L. By IH, either M,ΓL 1 B or
M,ΓL  C. In either case M,ΓL  B → C by (3.3.17).
B → C ∈ FL. By Step 5, B ∈ T L and C ∈ FL. By IH, M,ΓL  B and M,ΓL 1 C.
Thus, M,ΓL 1 B → C by (3.3.17).
B ∈ T L. For B to be true at ΓL it is sufficient to show that
ΓLRΓL′ =⇒ B ∈ T L′ (5.4.9)
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Then, by IH, we will have M,ΓL′  B for all ΓLRΓL′ and hence
M,ΓL  B by (2.4.4).
According to Step 6, B ∈ T L′ whenever B ∈ T L′ , so we will show
ΓLRΓL′ =⇒ B ∈ T L′ (5.4.10)
Since R is the reflexive and transitive closure of R0, to show (5.4.10),
we need to show that
– B ∈ T L and
– ΓL1R0ΓL2 and B ∈ T L1 =⇒ B ∈ T L2
The former condition holds. Let us prove the latter. Assume that
B ∈ T L1 . ΓL1R0ΓL2 may hold because of either (5.4.2) or (5.4.3).
(5.4.2) L1 = L−12 . Then, by Step 11, L2-call has been initiated with
T L1 ⊆ T . By Step 6, B ∈ T L1 . Hence, B ∈ T L2 .
(5.4.3) L1 = (T , T ∗, 〈B1, . . . , Bk〉) follows L2 = (T , T ∗, 〈B1〉) on a
computation branch, where T L1 = T  and T ∗L1 = T ∗. Note that
the parameter T  is non-decreasing along each branch and that
this parameter for any L-call always coincides with the first ele-
ment in L. Therefore,
T  ⊆ T L2 ⊆ T L1 = T  .
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It follows that T L2 = T L1 and B ∈ T L2 . There are two ways how
B could appear in T L2 :
in Step 6 or
in the L2-call itself (Step 11).
In either case B ∈ T L2 .
This completes the proof of (5.4.10).
B ∈ FL. By Step 7, B ∈ FL . Therefore, at the closest consecutive Step 11
– either an L′-call was made with parameters
S4LPCS-WORLD〈T L ∪ (T ∗L ) : , {B}, T L , ∅, T ∗L , ∅,L′〉 , (5.4.11)
so that ΓLR0ΓL′ and B ∈ FL′ . By IH, M,ΓL′ 1 B. Clearly,
ΓLRΓL′ , hence M,ΓL 1 B by (2.4.4).
– Or call (5.4.11) was not made because
L = (T L , T ∗L , 〈B1, . . . , Bk〉) ,
with B = Bi for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k. In this case, there must have
been a sequence of preceding Lj-calls, j = 1, . . . , k on the same
branch with
Lj = (T L , T ∗L , 〈B1, . . . , Bj〉)
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the last of them being Lk = L itself such that for j = 1, . . . , k− 1
ΓLjR0ΓLj+1 (5.4.12)
Moreover, a prerequisite for call (5.4.11) not to be initiated is that
T  and T ∗ do not enlarge between the L-call and the immediately
following Step 11. This is sufficient to conclude by (5.4.3) that
ΓLR0ΓL1 . (5.4.13)
Since R is the transitive closure of R0 it follows from (5.4.12)
and (5.4.13) that
ΓLRΓLi .
On the other hand, it is clear that the parameters of Li-call must
have been
S4LPCS-WORLD〈T L ∪ (T ∗L ) : , {Bi}, T L , ∅, T ∗L , ∅,Li〉 ,
which means that B = Bi ∈ FLi and M,ΓLi 1 B by IH. Since
ΓLRΓLi , again M,ΓL 1 B by (2.4.4).
t :B ∈ T L. By Step 8, B ∈ T L and ∗(t, B) ∈ T ∗L . Size of t :B
|t :B| = |t|+ 1 + |B| > |B|+ 1 = |B| ,
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so M,ΓL  B by IH, which means that B is true in all the worlds
accessible from ΓL. Also ΓL ∈ B(t, B) by (5.4.4). A is based on B
hence ΓL ∈ A(t, B). As a result, M,ΓL  t :B by (3.3.18).
t :B ∈ FL. By Step 9, either
– B ∈ FL. In this case, M,ΓL 1 B by IH, so B is false in one of
the worlds accessible from ΓL. Hence, M,ΓL 1 t :B by (3.3.18).
– Or ∗(t, B) ∈ F∗L. At the immediately following Step 11 exter-
nal subroutine ∗!CS-DERIVE〈T ∗L , ∗(t, B)〉 must have been called.
Since the L-call is successful, that routine must have returned
failure, which means that
T ∗L 0∗!CS ∗(t, B) . (5.4.14)
Clearly by (5.4.4), for each L′-call and corresponding world ΓL′
B∗ΓL′ = T ∗L′ .
Therefore, the definition of A via (3.5.9) can be reformulated:
∗(s, C) ∈ A∗ΓL ⇐⇒
⋃
ΓL′RΓL
T ∗L′ ⊢∗!CS ∗(s, C) (5.4.15)
We will show that
ΓL′RΓL =⇒ T ∗L′ ⊆ T ∗L (5.4.16)
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Since ⊆ itself is reflexive and transitive, it is sufficient to prove
ΓL′R0ΓL =⇒ T ∗L′ ⊆ T ∗L (5.4.17)
ΓL′R0ΓL may hold because of either (5.4.2) or (5.4.3).
(5.4.2) L′ = L−1. Then, by Step 11, L-call has been initiated with
(T ∗L′) : ⊆ T . By Step 8,
(
(T ∗L′) :
)∗
= T ∗L′ ⊆ T ∗L .
(5.4.3) L′ = (T , T ∗, 〈B1, . . . , Bk〉) follows L = (T , T ∗, 〈B1〉) on a
computation branch, where T L′ = T  and T ∗L′ = T ∗. Note
that the parameter T ∗ is non-decreasing along each branch
and that this parameter for any L′-call always coincides with
the second element in L′. Therefore,
T ∗ ⊆ T ∗L ⊆ T ∗L′ = T ∗ .
It follows that T ∗L′ = T ∗L
Using (5.4.17) for a reflexive R, we can reduce (5.4.15) to
∗(s, C) ∈ A∗ΓL ⇐⇒ T ∗L ⊢∗!CS ∗(s, C) (5.4.18)
Combined with (5.4.14) this yields
∗(t, B) /∈ A∗ΓL
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or equivalently
ΓL /∈ A(t, B)
It immediately follows that M,ΓL 1 t :B by (3.3.18).
In either case, M,ΓL 1 t :B.
This completes the proof of the Truth Lemma 5.4.7.
Corollary 5.4.8. For the initial call (5.4.1) and its corresponding world Γ(∅,∅,λ)
M,Γ(∅,∅,λ) 1 F .
Proof. According to (5.4.1), F ∈ F (∅,∅,λ).
This corollary concludes the proof that a formula F is refutable whenever
the algorithm claims it to be.
Let us now show the converse: if a F is refutable, the algorithm does
return true.
Lemma 5.4.9 (Successful Termination Lemma). Let M = 〈W,R, V,A〉
be a model and Γ0 ∈ W be a world in it such that M,Γ0 1 F . Let Γ = Γ0
be the current world at the initial call (5.4.1) of procedure S4LPCS-WORLD.
We will show that there is a way to move the current world Γ within W after
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each essential call in such a way that throughout the run initiated by (5.4.1)
G ∈ T ∪ T  ⇒ M,Γ  A (5.4.19)
G ∈ F ∪ F ⇒ M,Γ 1 A (5.4.20)
∗(t, B) ∈ T ∗ ⇒ Γ ∈ A(t, B) (5.4.21)
∗(t, B) ∈ F∗ ⇒ Γ /∈ A(t, B) (5.4.22)
In this case the algorithm will never return false.
Proof. Induction on the recursion depth.
Base. For the initial call (5.4.1), F ∈ F and M,Γ 1 F .
Step 2 will never be applied as ⊥ cannot be true; therefore, by IH, it never
occurs in T .
Step 3 initiates a new call with no new formulas in either of the six sets men-
tioned.
Step 4 may initiate one of two possible calls. The decision is made based on
the current world Γ. Since B → C ∈ T by IH we have M,Γ  B → C.
By (3.3.17) either
– M,Γ 1 B, then invoke the recursive call with B added to F , or
– M,Γ  C, then invoke the recursive call with C added to T .
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In both cases (5.4.19)–(5.4.22) hold for the new recursive call.
Step 5 initiates two calls one after another. Since B → C ∈ F by IH we have
M,Γ 1 B → C. Thus, both
– M,Γ  B, so that the recursive call with B added to T satisfies
(5.4.19)–(5.4.22); and
– M,Γ 1 C, so that the recursive call with C added to F satisfies
(5.4.19)–(5.4.22).
Step 6 initiates a new call with B transferred from T to T  and B added
to T . Condition (5.4.19) for T is the same as for T , so the transfer
does not affect it. Further, since B ∈ T , by IH we have M,Γ  B.
Hence, B must be true in all the worlds accessible from Γ, including Γ
itself, i.e., M,Γ  B, which takes care of (5.4.19) for B.
Step 7 initiates a new call withB transferred from F to F. Condition (5.4.20)
for F is the same as for F, so the transfer does not affect it.
Step 8 initiates a new call with t :B replaced by B in T and ∗(t, B) added
to T ∗. By IH, we have M,Γ  t :B, so
– B is true in all the worlds accessible from Γ and
– Γ ∈ A(t, B).
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The former guaranties that M,Γ  B, which takes care of (5.4.19)
for B. The latter ensures (5.4.21) for ∗(t, B).
Step 9 may initiate one of two recursive calls. The decision is made based on
the current world. By IH, M,Γ 1 t :B, so
– either B is false in some world accessible from Γ, in which case
M,Γ 1 B, then invoke the call with t :B replaced by B in F ,
or
– Γ /∈ A(t, B), then invoke the call with t : B transferred from F
to F∗ in the form of ∗(t, B).
In either case (5.4.19)–(5.4.22) are satisfied.
Step 10 is never applied. By IH every formula from T is true at Γ whereas
every formula from F is false at Γ. No intersection is possible.
Step 11 calls several ∗!CS-DERIVE subroutines with parameters 〈T ∗, ∗(t, B)〉
for ∗(t, B) ∈ F∗. All of them return false.
Indeed, if true were returned for some ∗(t, B) ∈ F∗,
T ∗ ⊢∗!CS ∗(t, B) . (5.4.23)
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Let us define an F-type possible evidence function B such that
∆ ∈ B(s, C) ⇐⇒ ∆ = Γ and ∗ (s,G) ∈ T ∗ .
By Theorem 3.5.20, there exists a minimal admissible for S4LPCS evi-
dence function E based on B such that
∗(s, C) ∈ E∗Γ ⇐⇒
⋃
∆RΓ
B∗∆ ⊢∗!CS ∗(s, C) .
Since B∗∆ = ∅ for ∆ 6= Γ and B∗Γ = T ∗, we can simplify this equivalence
to
∗(s, C) ∈ E∗Γ ⇐⇒ T ∗ ⊢∗!CS ∗(s, C) .
Using (5.4.23), we would get ∗(t, B) ∈ E∗Γ, i.e., Γ ∈ E(t, B).
It remains to note that A is also an admissible for S4LPCS evidence
function that is based on B by IH, namely by (5.4.21). Therefore, A
is based on E . Then, we would have Γ ∈ A(t, B), which contradicts
the IH, namely (5.4.22) for ∗(t, B). This contradiction shows that all
calls of ∗!CS-DERIVE return false.
Finally, in this step several essential recursive calls are made. These
calls are independent of each other; each of them prompts us to move
the current world Γ to a new position Γ′ in W . Consider one of these
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new calls
S4LPCS-WORLD〈T  ∪ (T ∗) : , {B}, T , ∅, T ∗, ∅,L⊚ (T , T :, B)〉 ,
where B ∈ F. By IH, we have M,Γ 1 B, so there must exist
a world Γ′ accessible from Γ such that M,Γ′ 1 B. In that case we
will move the current world from Γ to Γ′. Condition (5.4.20) for B is
satisfied in Γ′.
M,Γ  C for each C ∈ T . Axiom 4 is valid,  C → C,
hence M,Γ  C for each C ∈ T . Therefore, M,Γ′  C for
each C ∈ T  and (5.4.19) holds for T  in Γ′.
For each ∗(s, C) ∈ T ∗ by IH we have Γ ∈ A(s, C). Then, Γ′ ∈ A(s, C)
by Monotonicity of A. Therefore, (5.4.21) holds for T ∗ in Γ′.
It remains to show that M,Γ′  s : C for each s : C ∈ (T ∗) : , i.e.,
for each ∗(s, C) ∈ T ∗. We already showed that Γ′ ∈ A(s, C) for each
∗(s, C) ∈ T ∗.
It is, therefore, sufficient to show that M,∆  C in all worlds ∆ acces-
sible from Γ′, i.e. to show that M,Γ′  C, for each ∗(s, C) ∈ T ∗. To
that end we will show that C ∈ T . Indeed, consider earliest moment
(in all the preceding recursive calls) when ∗(s, C) appeared in T ∗. A
careful observation shows that it could only happen in Step 8, whereby
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C must have been added to T and shortly thereafter transferred
to T  in Step 6. We already observed that parameter T  never loses
formulas.
We have verified all the conditions for the new essential call.
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.4.9.
This completes the proof of Correctness Lemma 5.4.6.
Note 5.4.10. Normally, correctness of a recursive algorithm is proven by in-
duction on the recursion depth.
Unfortunately, this method cannot be applied to the procedure S4LPCS-
WORLD. Such an induction proof is based on the assumption that consec-
utive recursive calls are completely independent of the calls preceding them.
For instance, we should be able to conclude that a world satisfying the in-
tuitive conditions exists for any terminal call, i.e., for any call that does not
spawn further calls of S4LPCS-WORLD, provided of course that this terminal
call returns true.
This is not the case for S4LPCS-WORLD (or, for that matter, for Ladner’s
algorithm S4-WORLD from [Lad77]). As we saw, the important recursive
calls are all made in Step 11. In terms of the F-model being constructed,
they make us jump from the current world w to a world w′ accessible from it
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that is to become the new current world; all recursive calls in the other steps
only refine the conditions within the confines of the then-current world.
These jumps from w to a new w′ are prompted by the necessity to refute
in w some negative boxed formula from F. At the same time all the posi-
tive boxed formulas from T  are transferred to w′. As a result, if a negative
boxed formula happens to hide inside a positive one, we are facing a possi-
ble perpetuum mobile with this negative formula always popping out of the
positive one to prompt another jump.
This potential loop is the sole reason why Ladner introduced the log-
argument L, which have been adapted to our needs in S4LPCS-WORLD.
The condition (T , T ∗, B) /∈ L in the second big conjunction of Step 11
(see Fig. 5.4.1) guarantees that future recursive calls do not duplicate any
recursive calls preceding them. This effectively prevents the procedure from
looping, but at the same time creates rather complicated dependencies among
recursive calls.
Indeed, a current call of the procedure may rely on the results of some
preceding calls that have not terminated yet, of which the current call is but
a part. Such a preceding call, apart from the computation branch that led
to the current call, may need to explore other branches of the computation
tree before this preceding call is terminated. It may well happen that the
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preceding call will return false after all, based on information from other
computation branches. Therefore, any conclusion based on the current call
only is premature; there is not enough information. ◭
Lemma 5.4.11. Procedure S4LPCS-WORLD is in PSPACE for any decidable
schematic CS.
Proof. First of all, the depth of recursion is at most polynomial in the size of
the given formula F . Indeed, between any two essential calls, the procedure
builds one branch of a propositional table with some extra steps for modality
and justification formulas. Still each step of this tableau procedure decreases
the sum of sizes of formulas in T ∪ F . Only subformulas of F and boxed
subformulas of F (because of Steps 8 and 9) can appear in these sets, thus
the maximal possible size of T ∪ F is polynomial (in fact, linear) in |F |
throughout the run, making the number of consecutive non-essential calls
polynomial along each branch.
The number of essential calls along each branch is also polynomial because
sets T  and T ∗ are only gaining new formulas. The size of the third argument
in L is at most linear in |F | because formulas there do not repeat. Again
we have at most linear number of increments to T  and/or T ∗ and at most
linear number of essential calls with the same pair of T  and T ∗ in between
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any two consecutive increments.
It is rather obvious that storing information necessary for each call only
requires polynomial space. But we also have to keep certain information
about prior calls to be able to backtrack. This means that we need to store
the stack of all configurations preceding the current call. We already proved
that the number of such configurations along each branch is polynomial. It
remains to note that each configuration can also be stored in a polynomial
space in |F |. As was noted earlier, the size of T and F is linear in |F |. The
same obviously is true about T , F, T ∗, and F∗. Each formula in these six
sets can be stored by placing a marker on a subformula of F . The amount
of markers needed is clearly finite: the markers will stipulate which set the
subformula belongs to, and whether it is the subformula itself or its boxed
version. Storing T  and T ∗ within L can be done in a similar way, as well
as storing the list of formulas in L.
It remains to note that the external subroutine ∗!CS-DERIVE in Step 11
is an NP-algorithm by Lemma 5.1.3.2, which can clearly be carried out on
a polynomial space. This subroutine is not recursive, although it is called
multiple times. Its input has size polynomial in |F |.
This completes the proof of Lemma 5.4.11.
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This completes the proof of Theorem 5.4.4.
5.5 Historical Survey
NP-completeness of LPCS with a finite CS easily follows from the results
of Sergei Artemov in [Art98]. Robert Milnikel in [Mil07] noted that NP-
completeness of LPCS with a decidable injective CS also follows easily.
The upper complexity bound of Πp2 (in the polynomial hierarchy) for
JCS , JTCS , J4CS , and LPCS with a decidable schematic CS was demonstrated
in [Kuz00]. Since T CS is schematic and decidable for these four logics, J,
JT, J4, and LP themselves are in Πp2.
The same upper bound was also claimed in that paper for JDCS and JD4CS ,
but an omission was found in the proof during the work on this thesis. A
finitary M-model refuting the given formula F was constructed in the proof.
But the Consistent Evidence Condition cannot be so easily checked for the
minimal evidence function constructed in the proof. The difficulty is that the
Consistent Evidence condition has to be checked for all terms t, not only for
subterms of F . Theorem 5.2.4 restores the result of [Kuz00] for JDCS with
decidable, schematic, and axiomatically appropriate CS. The complexity
of JD4CS remains to be found.
Nikolai Krupski in [Kru03] showed that rLP is in NP.
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PSPACE-completeness of S41LP was shown in [Kuz06a].
Milnikel in [Mil07] showed that J4CS is Π
p
2-hard for any decidable, ax-
iomatically appropriate, and schematic CS. As a corollary, any such J4CS ,
including J4 itself, is Πp2-complete.
Milnikel also showed that LPCS is Π
p
2-hard for any decidable, axiomatically
appropriate, and schematically injective CS. As a corollary, any such LPCS
is Πp2-complete. This does not yield Π
p
2-completeness of LP though because
T CSLP is not schematically injective.
Chapter 6
Self-Referentiality
In this chapter we will explore an application of justification logics to the
question of self-referentiality.
The modality in GL corresponds to provability in the formal arithmetic.
A whole textbook [Smo85] is devoted to the studies of self-reference of GL-
modality through the arithmetical methods or methods inherited from Peano
arithmetic.
Below we provide a similar analysis for epistemic logic by means of jus-
tifications. As in the case of GL even the definition of self-referentiality1 is
given through the justification language.
1We give it a slightly different name from the one used by Smoryn´ski because our
definition of ‘self-referentiality’ is indeed different from his ‘self-reference.’
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6.1 When Is Knowledge Self-Referential?
Pure justification logics JLCS clearly exhibit self-referentiality when a term t
proves something about itself:
JLCS ⊢ t :F (t) .
Such constructions are, of course, perfectly legal in the pure justification
language. In fact, there are many theorems of this type for any non-empty
schematic CS with t = c being a justification constant and F (c) being an
axiom instance:
JLCS ⊢ c :A(c) .
A natural question to ask is whether the use of such self-referential con-
stants is necessary for the Realization Theorem 3.2.20 to hold. Apart from
being direct as in ⊢ c :A(c), self-referentiality may also occur as a result of a
cycle of references:
⊢ c2 :A1(c1), . . . , ⊢ cn :An−1(cn−1), ⊢ c1 :An(cn) .
If direct self-referentiality is expendable, we should ask whether such self-
referential cycles are still required for the Realization.
Definition 6.1.1. A constant specification CS is called directly self-re-
ferential if c : A(c) ∈ CS for some axiom A that contains at least one
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occurrence of c.
A constant specification CS is called self-referential if
{c2 :A1(c1), . . . , cn :An−1(cn−1), c1 :An(cn)} ⊆ CS
for some axioms Ai(ci), i = 1, . . . , n, where each Ai contains at least one
occurrence of ci. ◭
Definition 6.1.2. Let JL be a justification counterpart of a modal logic ML,
i.e, JL◦ = ML.
We will call knowledge/belief described by pair ML/JL directly self-
referential if JL◦CS = ML implies that CS is directly self-referential.
We will call knowledge/belief described by pair ML/JL self-referential
if JL◦CS = ML implies that CS is self-referential. ◭
6.2 Self-Referential Knowledge
It was shown by Roman Kuznets that the realization of S4 in LP does require
directly self-referential constants (see [BK05, Kuz06c, BK06]). In [Kuz08]
this result was extended to K4, D4, and T.
For each modal logic ML from this list we will present a modal formula
Φ derivable in the logic, M ⊢ Φ. Let JL be a justification counterpart for
ML from Theorem 3.2.20. We will consider the constant specification CS for
CHAPTER 6. SELF-REFERENTIALITY 271
JL that is the largest constant specification without directly self-referential
constants. We will then show that any potential realization of Φ in the pure
justification language is not JLCS-valid by constructing an F-type counter-
model for any such realization.
We will use Φ = ♦(p→ p), or equivalently
Φ = ¬¬(p→ p) , (6.2.1)
for modal logics S4, D4, and T. For K4 we will use Ψ = ♦T → ♦(p → p),
or equivalently,
Ψ = ¬(p→ p)→ ⊥ (6.2.2)
instead.
The suggestion to use (6.2.1) for S4 came from an anonymous referee when
a preliminary version of this result was rejected from a conference. Melvin
Fitting then suggested that the same formula (6.2.1) can also be used for
D4 and T. He also suggested (6.2.2) as a transformation of (6.2.1) derivable
in K4.
Theorem 6.2.1 ([Kuz08]). S4/LP, D4/JD4, and T/JT describe directly self-
referential knowledge.
Proof. First of all, we need to show that (6.2.1) is derivable in S4, D4, and T.
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Figure 6.2.1: Tableau derivation of ♦(p→ p) in T and S4
1. 1 ¬ ♦(p→ p)
2. 1 ¬ (p→ p) by T-rule from 1.
3. 1 p from 2.
4. 1 ¬ p from 2.
5. 1.1 ¬ p by K-rule from 4.
6. 1.1 ¬ (p→ p) by K-rule from 1.
7. 1.1 p from 6.
8. 1.1 ¬ p from 6.⊗
Prefix 1.1 in Line 5 is new. Prefix 1.1 in Line 6 has already occurred on
Line 5. The branch is closed by Lines 5 and 7.
The tableau derivation of Φ in T or S4 can be found in Fig. 6.2.1. The tableau
derivation for D4 is in Fig. 6.2.2.
Let ML ∈ {S4,D4,T}; let JL ∈ {LP, JD4, JT} be its justification counter-
part, and let CS be the largest constant specification for JL without directly
self-referential constants. We will show that for any justification formula
F such that F ◦ = Φ, there exists an F-model M = (W,R, V,A) and a
world w ∈ W such that M, w 1 F . Therefore, by the Completeness The-
orem 3.3.14,2 no such F is derivable in JLCS . Thus, (JLCS)
◦ 6= ML and
realization is impossible within this CS.
For any pair of terms t and t′ used in place of the two ’s in Φ, we will
2Note that we only use soundness of justification logics w.r.t. F-models, which holds
without any extra assumptions on CS for JD4. On the other hand, the CS we consider
is axiomatically appropriate since for any axiom instance A there exists a constant not
occurring in A so that c :A ∈ CS.
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Figure 6.2.2: Tableau derivation of ♦(p→ p) in D4
1. 1 ¬ ♦(p→ p)
2. 1 ¬ (p→ p) by D-rule from 1.
3. 1.1 ¬ (p→ p) by K-rule from 2.
4. 1.1 p from 3.
5. 1.1 ¬ p from 3.
6. 1.1.1 ¬ p by K-rule from 5.
7. 1.1 ¬ ♦(p→ p) by K4-rule from 1.
8. 1.1.1 ¬ (p→ p) by K-rule from 7.
9. 1.1.1 p from 8.
10. 1.1.1 ¬ p from 8.⊗
Prefix 1.1 in Line 3 is new. Prefix 1.1.1 in Line 6 is new. Prefix 1.1 in Line 7
has already occurred on Line 3. Prefix 1.1.1 in Line 8 has already occurred
on Line 6. The branch is closed by Lines 6 and 9.
construct an F-model for JLCS that falsifies ¬t : [¬(p → t′ : p)], thus showing
that no realization of Φ is JLCS-valid.
Given t and t′, consider the following F-model for JLCS : M = (W,R, V,A)
with
• W = {w}
• R = {(w,w)}
• v(q) = W = {w} for any sentence letter q
• B(s,G) =
{
W if s = t and G = ¬(p→ t′ :p)
∅ otherwise
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• A is the minimal F-type admissible for JLCS evidence function based
on B
Such R is obviously serial, reflexive, and transitive, thus making it suitable
for LP, JD4, and JT.
Since w is the only world in the model, we will write
 F instead of M, w  F
A(s, F ) instead of w ∈ A(s, F )
¬A(s, F ) instead of w /∈ A(s, F )
The admissible evidence function A exists by Cor. 3.3.42.1. Note that A
depends on terms t and t′. In particular, A(t, ¬(p → t′ : p)) because A is
based on B.
It suffices to show ¬A(t′, p) to falsify ¬t : [¬(p → t′ : p)]. Indeed, 1 t′ : p
if ¬A(t′, p). Given  p, it yields  ¬(p → t′ : p). Finally, with this formula
true at the only world and with A(t, ¬(p→ t′ :p)), we will have
 t : [¬(p→ t′ :p)] .
¬A(t′, P ) follows from the following technical lemma. Let A0 be the
minimal F-type admissible for JLCS evidence function based on B0(s,G) ≡ ∅
for all terms s and all formulas G. Again, A0 exists by Cor. 3.3.42.1. Since A
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is (vacuously) based on B0 too, A0 ⊆ A. According to Cor. 3.3.42.1, evidence
functions A and A0 are defined by
• (3.3.37) via ∗CS-calculus for JTCS ;
• (3.3.38) via ∗!CS-calculus for JD4CS or LPCS .
In other words, for the respective ∗-calculus,
A0(s′, G) ⇐⇒ ⊢∗ ∗(s′, G) (6.2.3)
A(s′, G) ⇐⇒ ∗(t, ¬(p→ t′ :p)) ⊢∗ ∗(s′, G) (6.2.4)
Lemma 6.2.2. For any subterm s of term t′:
1. If ⊢∗ ∗(s, F ),
then JLCS ⊢ F and F does not contain occurrences of t′.
2. If
∗(t, ¬(p→ t′ :p)) ⊢∗ ∗(s, F )
0∗ ∗(s, F )
then F has at least one occurrence of t′. Moreover, if F is an implica-
tion, F = ¬(p→ t′ :p).3
3Remember that we consider ¬G to be an abbreviation of G → ⊥.
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Proof. The proof is by induction on the size of s.
Essentially, we show that all applications of ∗A2 in the ∗-derivation hap-
pen in the derivation without hypotheses, so that any ∗-derivation branch
starting with the hypothesis ∗(t, ¬(p→ t′ :p)) is, in a sense, “cut-free.”
s = x is a justification variable.
1. 0∗ (x, F ) for any F .
Thus, Clause 1 is vacuously true.
2. ∗(t, ¬(p→ t′ :p)) ⊢∗ ∗(x, F )
only if t = x and F = ¬(p→ t′ :p). The latter does contain t′ and
is the only allowed implication.
s = c is a justification constant.
1. If ⊢∗ ∗(c, F ),
it was derived by ∗CS or ∗CS !, so c : F ∈ CS and F must be
an axiom of JLCS . Any axiom is derivable in its logic. At the
same time, CS is not directly self-referential, so F cannot contain
occurrences of c, a subterm of t′. Thus, F cannot contain t′ either.
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2. It can only happen that
∗(t, ¬(p→ t′ :p)) ⊢∗ ∗(c, F )
0∗ ∗(c, F )
if t = c and F = ¬(p → t′ : p). The latter does contain t′ and is
the only allowed implication.
s = s1 + s2 1. If ⊢∗ ∗(s1+s2, F ),
it was derived by rule ∗A3, so ⊢∗ ∗(si, F ) for some i = 1, 2. By IH,
F is a theorem that does not contain t′.
2. Only in two cases can it happen that
∗(t, ¬(p→ t′ :p)) ⊢∗ ∗(s1+s2, F )
0∗ ∗(s1+s2, F )
(a) t = s1+ s2 and F = ¬(p→ t′ :p), the latter satisfies Clause 2,
or
(b) ∗A3 was used in the derivation from the hypothesis, so that
∗(t, ¬(p→ t′ :p)) ⊢∗ ∗(si, F )
0∗ ∗(si, F )
for some i = 1, 2. By IH, F contains t′, and, if an implication,
is ¬(p→ t′ :p).
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s = s1 · s2 1. If ⊢∗ ∗(s1 ·s2, F ),
it was derived by ∗A2, so there must exist a formula G such that
⊢∗ ∗(s1, G→ F ) and ⊢∗ ∗(s2, G). By IH, both G→ F and G are
derivable; hence, F is derivable by modus ponens. By IH, G→ F
does not contain t′, thus neither does F .
2. Only in three cases can it happen that
∗(t, ¬(p→ t′ :p)) ⊢∗ ∗(s1 ·s2, F )
0∗ ∗(s1 ·s2, F )
(a) t = s1 · s2 and F = ¬(p→ t′ :p), the latter satisfies Clause 2.
(b) Rule ∗A2 was used and there exists a G such that
∗(t, ¬(p→ t′ :p)) ⊢∗ ∗(s1, G→ F )
∗(t, ¬(p→ t′ :p)) ⊢∗ ∗(s2, G)
0∗ ∗(s1, G→ F )
We will show that these three statements are, in fact, incon-
sistent. By IH, Clause 2 for subterm s1,
G→ F = ¬(p→ t′ :p) = (p→ t′ :p)→ ⊥ .
So G = p → t′ : p, which is an implication different from
the only allowed in Clause 2. Hence, by IH, Clause 2 for s2,
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we would have ⊢∗ ∗(s2, G), which would contradict the IH,
Clause 1 for s2 since p→ t′ :p contains t′. This contradiction
shows the impossibility of Case 2b.
(c) Rule ∗A2 was used and there exists a G such that
∗(t, ¬(p→ t′ :p)) ⊢∗ ∗(s1, G→ F )
∗(t, ¬(p→ t′ :p)) ⊢∗ ∗(s2, G)
0∗ ∗(s2, G)
We will show that these three statements are also inconsistent.
By IH, Clause 2 for s2, formula G should contain t
′. Then,
G → F would also contain t′. Hence, by IH, Clause 1 for s1,
we should have 0∗ ∗(s1, G → F ), the impossibility of which
was shown in Case 2b. So Case 2c is also impossible.
s = ! s1 (for ∗CS-calculus used for JTCS).
1. If ⊢∗CS ∗(!s1, F ),
it was derived by ∗CS !, so s1 = ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n
c for some constant c and
integer n ≥ 0, and F must be of form ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n
c : . . . : ! c :c :A for some
axiom A such that c :A ∈ CS. By rule R4!CS ,
JTCS ⊢ ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n
c : . . . : ! c :c :A .
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Axiom A cannot contain c since CS is not directly self-referential.
Constant c is a subterm of s = ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n+1
c, which in turn is a subterm
of t′; therefore, A cannot contain t′. Since c, ! c, . . . , ! . . . !︸︷︷︸
n
c are
proper subterms of s, itself a subterm of t′, these ground terms
cannot contain t′ either. Summarizing, F does not contain t′.
2. The only case when
∗(t, ¬(p→ t′ :p)) ⊢∗CS ∗(! s1, F )
0∗CS ∗(! s1, F )
is when t = ! s1 and F = ¬(p→ t′ :p), the latter satisfies Clause 2.
s = ! s1 (for ∗!CS-calculus used for JD4CS and LPCS).
1. If ⊢∗!CS ∗(!s1, F ),
it was derived by ∗A5, so F = s1 :G for some formula G such that
⊢∗!CS ∗(s1, G). By IH, Clause 1 for s1, G is a theorem that does
not contain t′.
For any F-model M′ = (W ′, R′, V ′, E ′) for JLCS ∈ {JD4CS , LPCS}
the admissible evidence function E ′ is, of course, based on the
empty F-type possible evidence function B0(s,G) ≡ ∅. Such mod-
els, in particular such admissible evidence functions E ′, exist by
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consistency of JDCS and LPCS respectively. Therefore, E ′ ⊇ A′,
where A′ is the minimal F-type admissible for JLCS evidence func-
tion on W ′ based on B0. According to Theorem 3.3.41.4, A′ is
described by (3.3.38) for any w′ ∈W ′
A′w′(s′, H) ⇐⇒ ⊢∗!CS ∗(s′, H)
Therefore, for any such A′, it must be that A′(s1, G) = W ′ and
hence E ′(s1, G) = W ′ for any F-type admissible for JLCS evidence
function E ′.
Combining E ′(s1, G) = W ′ with validity of G, we get validity
of s1 :G from Completeness Theorem 3.3.14 (for JD4CS we use the
fact that our CS is axiomatically appropriate).
SinceG does not contain t′ and s1 is a proper subterm of t
′, formula
s1 :G cannot contain t
′ either.
2. Here are all the situations where it could happen that
∗(t, ¬(p→ t′ :p)) ⊢∗!CS ∗(! s1, F )
0∗!CS ∗(! s1, F )
(a) t = ! s1 and F = ¬(p→ t′ :p), the latter satisfies Clause 2, or
else
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(b) Rule ∗A5 was used, so that F = s1 :G for some G such that
∗(t, ¬(p→ t′ :p)) ⊢∗!CS ∗(s1, G)
0∗!CS ∗(s1, G)
By IH, Clause 2, G contains t′, thus so does s1 :G, which is
not an implication.
This completes the proof of Lemma 6.2.2
It remains to apply Lemma 6.2.2 to term t′ itself.
JLCS 0 p, so by Lemma 6.2.2.1, 0∗ ∗(t′, p).
But then, since t′ does not occur in p, by Lemma 6.2.2.2,
∗(t, ¬(p→ t′ :p)) 0∗ ∗(t′, p) .
Thus, by (6.2.4) ¬A(t′, p). As was noted earlier, this suffices for
M 1 ¬t : [¬(p→ t′ :p)]
and hence
JLCS 0 ¬t : [¬(p→ t′ :p)]
This completes the proof of Theorem 6.2.1.
Theorem 6.2.3 ([Kuz08]). Knowledge described by K4/J4 is directly self-
referential.
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Proof. The Hilbert formulation of D4 is obtained from that of K4 by adding
the Seriality Axiom. Note that the Seriality Axiom is indeed a single axiom
rather than an axiom scheme. Therefore, K4 ⊢ ♦T → ♦(p → p), or
equivalently, its contrapositive
Ψ = ¬(p→ p)→ ⊥
is derivable in K4.
J4 is a justification counterpart for K4. Let CS be the largest constant
specification for J4 that is not directly self-referential.
We will show that for any justification formula
F = t : [¬(p→ t′ :p)]→ k :⊥ ,
such that F ◦ = Ψ there exists an F-model for J4CS that falsifies F , thus
showing that no realization of Ψ is J4CS-valid.
Unlike in the proof of Theorem 6.2.1, the falsifying model here consists
of a single irreflexive world. Given t and t′, we consider M = (W,R, V,A)
with the
• W = {w}
• R = ∅
• v(q) = W = {w} for any sentence letter q
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• B(s,G) =
{
W if s = t and G = ¬(p→ t′ :p)
∅ otherwise
• A is the minimal F-type admissible for J4CS evidence function based
on B
Such R is vacuously transitive, thus making it suitable for J4. We will again
use abbreviated statements for  andA since this is also a single-world model.
Since in such a model any G is vacuously true at all accessible worlds,
 s :G ⇐⇒ A(s,G)
Since A(t, ¬(p → t′ : p)), in order to falsify F it is sufficient to show
that ¬A(k,⊥). Proof by contradiction. Suppose towards a contradiction
that A(k,⊥). By Theorem 3.3.41.4, according to (3.3.38)
∗(t, ¬(p→ t′ :p)) ⊢∗!CS ∗(k,⊥) .
by Lemma 3.4.10.2,
¬(p→ t′ :p), t : [¬(p→ t′ :p)] ⊢J4CS ⊥ .
But this cannot be the case since in the proof of Theorem 6.2.1 we have
constructed an F-model with both hypotheses being true. It was a JD4CS′-
model M′ = (W ′, R′, V ′,A′), where CS ′ is the largest constant specification
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for JD4 without self-referential constants. All axioms of J4 are also axioms
of JD4; self-referentiality of constants is logic independent. Thus, CS ⊆ CS ′.
R′ in JD4-models is transitive, A′ satisfies Application and Sum Closure
conditions. A′ also satisfies the Monotonicity condition. It remains to note
that A′ satisfied CS ′ Closure condition and hence CS Closure condition too.
Thus, the JD4CS′-model constructed in the proof of Theorem 6.2.1 is also a
J4CS-model for the two hypotheses. A satisfiable set of formulas cannot be
contradictory. This contradiction shows that ¬A(k,⊥).
6.3 Knowledge without Self-Referentiality
Unlike the four modal logics discussed in the previous section, logics K and D
can be realized without any self-referential cycles let alone self-referential
constants, which are essentially cycles of length 1.
More precisely, we will show that (JDCS)
◦ = D and (JCS)
◦ = K for some
non-self-referential constant specifications CS.
To construct such constant specifications, we will divide the set of con-
stants into levels indexed by non-negative integers, with each level consisting
of countably many constants. Let ℓ(c) denote the level of a constant c. For
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either logic, let
CS = {c :A ∈ T CS | for all constants a that occur in A, ℓ(a) < ℓ(c)} .
(6.3.1)
This constant specification is axiomatically appropriate, i.e., every axiom has
at least one constant justifying it.
Since the constant specification (6.3.1) has infinitely many constants on
each level, it is always possible to choose a fresh constant c whenever one is
wanting.
Theorem 6.3.1. Pairs D/JD and K/J describe knoweldge/belief that is not
self-referential.
Proof. We will prove that (JDCS)
◦ = D and (JCS)
◦ = K for the CS from (6.3.1).
Since JLCS ⊆ JL, we have (JDCS)◦ ⊆ JD◦ = D and (JCS)◦ ⊆ J◦ = K.
To show the other inclusion, we will reprove the Realization Theorem
using the CS from (6.3.1). One of the ways to prove Realization is by step-
by-step transformation of a cut-free Gentzen derivation of a modal theorem ϕ
into a Hilbert derivation of its realization ϕr. More precisely, a cut-free
Gentzen derivation
⊢ Γ⇒ ∆
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is being transformed into a Hilbert derivation
Γr ⊢
∨
∆r .
(As always, the empty disjunction is interpreted as⊥.) A detailed description
of this procedure can be found in [Art01, BK06].
Axioms of the Gentzen modal system are restricted to ⊥ ⇒ and p ⇒ p
for sentence letters p to have a better control over where and how ’s are
introduced. All occurrences of  in the Gentzen modal derivation are divided
into families of related occurrences. A cut-free derivation preserves polarity
of formulas, so there are positive and negative families of ’s. We realize
each negative family by a fresh justification variable. A positive family is
realized by a sum of auxiliary variables v1 + . . . + vn, one variable per each
use of a Gentzen modal rule to introduce a  from this family. If all ’s from
a positive family are introduced by Weakening, the family is instantiated by
a fresh justification variable. The transformation is done by induction on the
depth of the Gentzen derivation.
The Gentzen axioms, propositional rules, and Contraction can be trans-
lated using the standard propositional translation from Gentzen into Hilbert.
Since the reasoning involved is purely propositional, neither Axiom Internal-
ization is used, nor are new constants introduced. Weakening does not require
CHAPTER 6. SELF-REFERENTIALITY 288
Axiom Internalization either; it may bring constants from other branches, but
never a fresh constant. Thus, new constants are introduced by Axiom In-
ternalization only to translate modal rules. The only modal rule for logic K
is (2.3.1):
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⇒ ψ
ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn ⇒ ψ .
In addition, logic D has rule (2.3.2):
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ξ ⇒
ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,ξ ⇒
(see, for instance, [Wan94, Fit07a]). To translate both rules we use the
Internalization Property (Lemma 3.2.22).
Consider the K-rule (2.3.1) first. By IH, we already have a Hilbert deriva-
tion of
ϕr1, . . . , ϕ
r
n ⊢ ψr .
Internalizing this derivation, we get
x1 :ϕ
r
1, . . . , xn :ϕ
r
n ⊢ t :ψr
for some t, where each xi is the chosen realization of the negative  in front
of ϕi. We then substitute t for the auxiliary variable that corresponds to
this modal rule in the sum realization of the  in front of ψ throughout the
Hilbert proof.
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The D-rule (2.3.2) is similar. Internalization here yields
x1 :ϕ
r
1, . . . , xn :ϕ
r
n, xn+1 :ξ
r ⊢ t :⊥ .
Using axiom A7, t :⊥ → ⊥, and modus ponens, we can derive ⊥. Since no
positive  is introduced, there is no global substitution of auxiliary variables.
The proof of Lemma 3.2.22 shows that the rule R4!CS in the internalized
derivation appears only where axioms or instances of R4!CS were used in the
original derivation. We are free to pick a fresh constant every time.
So how can a self-referential cycle appear if we always pick fresh con-
stants? Where does it appear for stronger modal logics? Here is the answer.
When a term t substitutes for an auxiliary variable v, which appears in an
instance of R4!CS ,
! . . . ! c : . . . : ! ! c : ! c :c :A(v) ,
the constant c can a priori occur in t. As shown in Sect. 6.2, this cannot be
avoided in many logics with other modal Gentzen rules.
We show how to avoid such occurrences of c in t for K and D while staying
within constant specification (6.3.1).
Definition 6.3.2. The depth of an occurrence of  in a modal for-
mula ϕ is defined by induction on the size of ϕ:
• the outer  in ψ has depth 0 in ψ;
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• for any occurrence of inside ψ, its depth inψ is obtained by adding 1
to its depth in ψ. ◭
Definition 6.3.3. The level of an occurrence of  in a Gentzen
derivation is defined as its depth in the formula it occurs in plus the number
of modal rules used on its branch after this occurrence. ◭
Lemma 6.3.4. In a cut-free Gentzen K or D derivation of ⇒ ϕ, levels of all
occurrences of  from a given family are equal to the depth of the family’s
occurrence in ϕ.
Proof. The proof is a rather easy induction on the depth of the derivation.
Let N be the largest level of ’s in the given cut-free derivation. As we
showed, a new constant can be introduced only as part of Internalization
while translating a modal rule. For all rules of level i, let us always use
constants of level N − i. When constants introduced later on a branch refer
to constants introduced on this branch earlier, the former have larger levels
because the levels of modal rules decrease toward the root of the derivation.
It remains to show that the substitution of terms for auxiliary variables does
not violate the level structure of (6.3.1).
Indeed, every time a modal rule is used on a branch, all ’s it introduces
have the level of this rule, say m, which is strictly smaller than the levels of
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all ’s already on the branch. Suppose the Internalization used to translate
this modal rule introduced an Axiom Internalization c :A(v) with an auxiliary
variable v. This v corresponds to a family of ’s already present on the
branch, which must have a larger level l > m. Wherever the modal rule
corresponding to v occurs, by Lemma 6.3.4, it has the same level l. Therefore,
when a term t substitutes for v, all the constants in t will have level
N − l < N −m = ℓ(c) .
Thus, substitutions do not violate the conditions of our constant specifica-
tion.
6.4 Conclusions and Future Work
This thesis was mostly devoted to decidability and complexity questions for
pure and hybrid justification logics. The following is a list of main results
obtained:
1. The Substitution Property in its traditional formulation only holds for
schematic CS. An alternative Substitution Property with Renaming of
Constants is formulated and proven for axiomatically appropriate CS
(Lemmas 3.2.30 and 3.5.13).
2. Inadequacy of F-models is shown for JDCS , JD4CS , and JD45CS when
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CS is not axiomatically appropriate (Example 3.3.23).
3. Alternative Fk-models are developed for these logics (Def. 3.3.24). Sound-
ness and completeness of Fk-models are demonstrated (Theorem 3.3.25).
4. A complete description of minimal admissible evidence functions for M-
models, F-models, and AF-models is obtained for hybrid logics (The-
orems 3.5.18 and 3.5.20) and pure justification logics without negative
introspection (Theorems 3.3.34 and 3.3.41).
5. Nikolai Krupski’s results about axiomatization of the reflected frag-
ment of LP is generalized to reflected fragments of hybrid logics (The-
orem 3.5.23) and other pure justification logics without negative intro-
spection (Theorem 3.4.2).
6. Some interesting facts about the relationship of derivations from hy-
potheses in a justification logic and in its reflected fragment are studied
(Examples 3.4.5 and 3.4.6, Lemmas 3.4.8, 3.4.10, and 3.5.25).
7. A general framework is developed for proving decidability of justifica-
tion logics via the Finitary Model Property (Def. 4.3.2, Theorem 4.3.3,
Theorem 4.4.9).
8. Decidability of hybrid logics and of pure justification logics without neg-
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ative introspection provided that CS is decidable and almost schematic
(and additionally axiomatically appropriate for JDCS and JD4CS) is ob-
tained as a corollary of the Finitary Models method (Theorems 4.4.25
and 4.4.28). Although decidability of most of these pure justification
logics was known, this result is new for most hybrid logics.
9. It is shown that the condition that CS be almost schematic cannot be
dropped by demonstrating examples of undecidable pure and hybrid
justification logics with decidable CS ([Kuz05], Theorem 4.5.1).
10. N. Krupski’s NP upper bound on complexity of the reflected fragment
of LP is extended to reflected fragments of all hybrid logics and all
pure justification logics without negative introspection for decidable
almost schematic CS; the result is also generalized to derivations from
hypotheses (Theorem 5.1.5).
11. Upper bound on complexity of JCS , JTCS , J4CS , and LPCS with decidable
almost schematic CS is shown to be Πp2 ([Kuz00]). The algorithm is
shaped as a tableau derivation (Theorem 5.2.2).
12. An omission is found in the complexity estimate of JDCS and JD4CS
in [Kuz00]. It is shown how prefixed tableaux a la Fitting-Massacci can
be adapted to showing the same upper bound for JDCS with decidable,
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almost schematic, and axiomatically appropriate CS (Theorem 5.2.4).
It remains an open problem to show this upper bound for JD4CS ; some
difficulties are outlined in Note 5.2.6.
13. Lower bound for hybrid logics, which are typically PSPACE-hard, is
shown through a semantic proof of their conservativity over the respec-
tive multimodal logics (Theorem 5.4.1).
14. A matching upper bound is found for S41LPCS with a decidable and
schematic CS. Thus, S41LPCS with a decidable schematic CS is PSPACE-
compete ([Kuz06a], Theorem 5.4.4).
15. Strong self-referentiality of T, K4, D4, and S4 is shown ([BK06], The-
orems 6.2.1 and 6.2.3, [Kuz08]).
16. It is shown that K and D are not self-referential (Theorem 6.3.1, [Kuz08]).
Naturally, there are many open problems in the area.
• It is discussed why the apparatus of minimal functions fails in pres-
ence of negative introspection. It remains to find an adequate tool for
constructing models for these justification logics. The absence of such
tools presents a major obstacle to developing a decision procedure for
these logics.
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• Decidability of JDCS and JD4CS requires an extra condition compared
to other justification logics, namely axiomatic appropriateness of CS.
It is unknown whether this condition is substantial, i.e., whether either
of these justification logics can be undecidable if CS is decidable and
schematic but not axiomatically appropriate.
• Lemma 5.3.7 describes an interesting connection between subclassi-
cal propositional systems and JDCS with non-axiomatically appropri-
ate CS. It would be interesting to explore this relationship further.
Can this relationship be exploited to learn more about decidability
discussed in the previous item?
• It seems reasonably straightforward to construct a PSPACE decision
procedure for JD4CS with decidable, almost schematic, and axiomati-
cally appropriate CS using F-models. This upper bound, nevertheless
does not seem optimal given (presumably) much lower upper bounds
of Πp2 for other justification logics.
• Very few of the complexity bounds for justification logics are tight.
Most prominently there is no nontrivial lower bound known for LP
itself.
• Still very little is known about the complexity of hybrid logics. It
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seems that Demri’s methods from [Dem00] can be applied to T1LPCS
and S51LPCS , but generalizing them to a larger number of modalities n
meets with substantial difficulties rooted in modal rather than in jus-
tification part. Already the case of S42LP is quite non-trivial.
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